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ABSTRACT 
 
AMBER PETERMAN: Essays in Maternal Health and Human Rights:  
Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa 
(Under the direction of Sudhanshu Handa) 
 
 
This compilation of essays focuses on programs, policies and emerging issues which center on gender 
equity and women’s empowerment as broad themes within the larger realm of maternal health and 
human rights.  The first essay explores effects of women’s property and inheritance rights on 
women’s long term economic welfare using a thirteen year panel from the Kagera region of Tanzania.  
The second essay examines contraceptive use and provision of family planning services and their 
effect on women’s economic welfare, again using data from Tanzania.  The third essay is a cross-
country study (Malawi, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda) examining contributions of trauma due to 
sexual violence and female genital cutting to the burden of gynecological fistula.  The geographic 
focus of all three essays is sub-Saharan Africa, because women in this region are some of the most 
impoverished in the world, both in terms of classic measures of poverty and on dimensions of human 
rights.  Motivation for examination of these topics is in part due to a lack of empirical evidence from 
an economic development perspective.  The majority of previous analyses have been framed in a 
legal or human rights perspective, or limited in geographic and methodological application because of 
data constraints.  It is my hope that this research will indirectly benefit women and their families in 
sub-Saharan Africa through increased knowledge, awareness and policy change.  
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
 Introduction 
This dissertation focuses on programs, policies and emerging issues which center around two 
broad themes within maternal health and human rights: 1) gender equity and 2) women’s 
empowerment.  Although there is some overlap between these two concepts, they both relate to and 
have motivated distinctive components of my work.  The dissertation is divided into three essays.  
The first explores effects of women’s property and inheritance rights (WPIR), the second 
contraceptive use and provision of family planning (FP) services, and the third traumatic 
gynecological fistula due to sexual violence (SV) and female genital cutting (FGC).  The geographic 
focus of all three essays is sub-Saharan Africa, because women in this region are some of the most 
impoverished in the world, both in terms of classic measures of poverty and on dimensions of human 
rights.  Motivation for examination of these three topics is in part due to a lack of empirical evidence 
surrounding these issues from an economic development perspective.  Previous analyses have been 
framed in a legal or human rights perspective, or limited in geographic and methodological 
application because of data constraints.  It is my hope that this research will indirectly benefit women 
and their families in sub-Saharan Africa through increased knowledge, awareness and policy change 
surrounding what I feel are very important and inspiring issues.  What follows is a brief explanation 
of the underlying themes identified above and a discussion of how they relate to each specific essay.   
The first underlying goal of my dissertation is to consider programs and policies which have 
the potential to improve gender equity.  Gender discrimination directly inhibits economic growth by 
making inefficient use of individual ability and limiting meaningful contributions of women.  
Broadly, gender discrimination can be defined as “any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on 
the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment 
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or exercise by women…of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural or any other field (UN, 1976).”  In recognition of the importance of gender aspects in 
development, programs and policies are increasingly incorporating gender-specific components as a 
means to improve overall human capital outcomes and reduce poverty.  A more recent challenge is 
the vulnerability of women to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, reflected not only in terms of higher infection 
rates, but also in their role as primary care givers.1  This complication further justifies the need for 
gender specific development policies to be considered and evaluated.  WPIR considers a 
discriminatory dimension in which women are given unequal rights in comparison to men.  Access to 
contraceptives gives women an equal say in childbearing, reproductive and human capital investment 
decisions, which increases power dimensions both within marriage and society overall.  Finally, 
women bear an unequal burden of SV and FGC worldwide and in turn suffer unequal adverse 
consequences including the possibility of traumatic gynecological fistula.  To the extent that 
examination and amelioration of the topics in my dissertation interact with gender equity, my research 
will promote decision making to facilitate women’s wellbeing and poverty reduction. 
The second underlying goal of my dissertation is to consider programs and policies which 
have the potential to enhance women’s empowerment.  Although women’s empowerment has been 
conceptualized and measured in a variety of ways, it is often thought of as the ability of individual 
women to make life choices (Kabeer, 1999; Malhorta, Schuler & Boender, 2002).  Empowerment as a 
process occurs when individuals who were previously disempowered or denied the ability to make 
choices subsequently acquire the ability to make life choices.  Studies examining women’s 
empowerment have been built around predictions that women with greater decision making ability 
and access to resources can seek and procure more favorable outcomes for themselves independent of 
other factors.  The theme of improving choices for women is directly connected to each of my three 
                                                 
1 Women constitute nearly 60 percent of the more than 25 million people estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS 
in sub-Saharan Africa.  In many places, HIV prevalence among girls and young women aged fifteen to nineteen 
is four to seven times higher than among boys their age (Walsh, 2005).  In addition to low socio-economic 
status which fuels transmission, evidence suggests that women are biologically more likely to be infected than 
men (see Loewenson & Whiteside, 1997; WB, 1998:33-34). 
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essays.  For example, women who acquire property rights gain the ability to make choices to sell or 
transfer property, increase credit or decrease cash constraints, to control welfare and labor force 
outcomes.  Similarly, women who have the ability to control their fertility through contraceptive use 
are able to strategically plan their education and work trajectories as well as other social and 
economic aspects of family life.  Women who receive attention to medically and psychologically treat 
trauma gynecological fistula are better able to move forward to build a social and financial future for 
themselves.  To the extent examination and research of these three issues will enhance women’s 
empowerment, my dissertation research has the potential to increase knowledge around key issues for 
the welfare of women. 
Benefits of women’s empowerment and gender equity are not necessarily limited to women 
alone.  A growing body of research has specifically examined outcomes among second generations 
and how transfers in human capital are made from mother to child.  Improvements in health and 
human capital for women have been linked with favorable outcomes for children in a number of 
settings (see e.g. Duflo, 2000; Handa, 1999; Hoddinott & Haddad, 1995; Quisumbing & Maluccio, 
2000; Thomas, 1997; Thomas, Strauss & Henriques, 1991).  Therefore, the implications of my 
research do not pertain only to women, but will extend welfare outcomes to children and society in 
general. 
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CHAPTER II: WOMEN’S PROPERTY RIGHTS AND GENDERED POLICIES: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR WOMEN’S LONG-TERM WELFARE IN RURAL TANZANIA 
 
 
“Women don’t need property of their own. 
We take care of them…like we take care of our cows.” 
 
(Male elder in Bagamoyo, Tanzania (Tenga & Peter, 1996)) 
 
Introduction 
Programs and policies for economic development are increasingly incorporating gender-
specific components as a means to improve overall human capital outcomes. The World Bank 
recently identified gender equality as both an objective in itself, as well as a key means to promote 
growth, better governance and reduce poverty (WB, 2001; WB, 2001a). The goal of gender equity is 
both significant and complex for public policy.  In addition to marginalization due to socioeconomic 
status, women face a distinct and unique set of challenges, including reproductive heath and childcare 
concerns, discrimination and gender-based violence (Malhotra, Schuler & Boender, 2002).  A more 
recent challenge is the vulnerability of women to the HIV/AIDS pandemic, reflected not only in terms 
of higher infection rates, but also in their role as primary care givers.2  These complications further 
justify the need for development policies to be considered and evaluated as containing gender-specific 
elements. 
Property and inheritance rights are one such realm in which women lag behind men.  In sub-
Saharan Africa and other regions where gender discrimination is widespread, claims have been made 
that restrictive customs and policies concerning property rights have hampered the economic 
                                                 
2 Women constitute nearly 60 percent of the more than 25 million people estimated to be living with HIV/AIDS 
in sub-Saharan Africa.  In many places, HIV prevalence among girls and young women aged fifteen to nineteen 
is four to seven times higher than among boys of the same age group (Walsh, 2005).  In addition to low socio-
economic status which fuels transmission, evidence suggests that women are biologically more likely to be 
infected than men (Loewenson & Whiteside, 1997; WB, 1998). 
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advancement of women.  However, despite an abundance of qualitative evidence, there is almost no 
quantitative evidence surrounding women’s property and inheritance rights (WPIR) and their 
relationship to human development indicators in sub-Saharan Africa.  As with many claims which 
appeal to human rights arguments, critics may argue that adverse effects of restrictive WPIR are built 
on the exhibition of the worst case scenarios and that these effects are not relevant or significant for 
women as a group.  This paper seeks to provide preliminary empirical evidence exploring claims 
concerning WPIR and economic outcomes for women using the Kagera Health and Development 
Survey (KHDS), a longitudinal panel from rural northern Tanzania collected over 13 years from 1991 
to 2004.  The panel nature of the data offers a unique opportunity to examine long-term effects of 
WPIR, which are commonly excluded from micro-level quantitative examination in developing 
countries due to data constraints.  Using a baseline cross-section, results indicate that women who live 
in communities with high WPIR are more likely to engage in non-agricultural, self-employed work 
and have higher savings, individual and household-level expenditures.  When extended to an 
individual-level fixed effects model using panel data controls for individual-level time invariant 
endowments as well as attrition using the inverse probability weighting method (IPW), results 
indicate that women who live in communities with high WPIR are more likely to be employed 
outside the home and have higher earnings.  Overall, these effects are not sub-group specific to 
women who are less educated, poorer, or who have experienced widowhood or divorce.  In addition 
to individual outcomes, household-level outcomes for total expenditures and savings are examined to 
ascertain if individual gains for women result in fewer gains for other household members or are 
indicative of greater overall welfare within households.  Results show that although WPIR is 
associated with higher household expenditure using a cross-sectional model, this finding does not 
carry over to individual fixed-effects models that control for women’s time invariant heterogeneity.  
These findings suggest that WPIR restrictions placed on women in Kagera significantly hinder the 
economic advancement of women and that similar situations are likely in other sub-Saharan African 
countries.  
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Background and significance  
 Gendered development and WPIR in sub-Saharan Africa 
There is significant evidence of gender-based discrimination concerning land and property 
rights across sub-Saharan Africa.  The majority of this literature takes the form of qualitative 
research, case studies, institutional analysis, anecdotal evidence and popular press and is framed using 
a human rights or legal perspective (e.g. COHRE, 2003; LaFraniere, 2005; Manji, 2000; Sossou, 
2002; Walsh, 2005; HRW, 2003).  Documentation in these frameworks typically highlights the social 
and psychological suffering women are forced to endure due to cultural and ritual practices 
surrounding WPIR, especially in the context of widowhood.  In general, legal examination of WPIR 
invokes an equity argument and references the many international conventions and declarations 
which uphold women’s rights to property and equal treatment by law.3  
More recently, property rights have been examined using an economic development 
framework.  One of the most visible supporters of property rights for economic development is 
Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto.  In his 2000 book, The Mystery of Capital, he claims that 
poverty is created and maintained by the way in which poor people are excluded from the legal 
system, including rights to property created by Western capitalism (de Soto, 2000).4  Evidence of how 
lack of property rights harms the general poor can easily be extended to women as an alternative sub-
group.  In fact, a growing sub-field of development economics examines how women’s lack of access 
to inputs and resources like land, as well as their disadvantaged bargaining position results in negative 
economic and health outcomes (Agarwal, 2002 and Chadha, 1992 in India; Zwarteveen & Meinzen-
Dick, 2001 in South-East Asia).  For example, in her influential book, A Field of One’s Own, 
                                                 
3 See for example the 1966 ‘International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,’ the 1979 
‘Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,’ and more recently the 
‘Women’s Declaration on Population Policies,’ the 1995 ‘Beijing Platform for Action,’ and the 2003 
‘Commission on Human Rights Resolution 2003/22 on Women’s equal ownership, access to and control over 
land and the equal rights to own property and to adequate housing.’) 
 
4 De Soto’s solution is to formalize all informal use of land, giving poor the ability to use property as collateral 
to obtain loans and to further invest funds.   
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Agarwal (1995) uses India as a case-study to argue that land rights for women are good for economic 
efficiency, welfare, equity and empowerment.  As a basic argument, access to, ownership of and 
control of property are fundamental determinants of secure livelihoods.  These ‘privileges’ provide a 
place to live, a site for economic and social activity as well as collateral for credit, other resources and 
services.  However, in developing countries, women’s rights to land and tenure are often thought of in 
the context of their relation to men: as wives, daughters, mothers or sisters (Gray & Kavene, 1999).  
Even if women have rights to use land, they are typically limited in their ability to transfer, sell, 
designate an heir for and loan land to other parties.  Although WPIR have been examined from an 
economic development perspective, there is a lack of empirical work, both on the determinants and 
the effects of restrictive WPIR.  Part of this difficulty stems from the fact that WPIR in rural areas are 
often outside the reach of traditional legal structures and therefore necessitate data collection of 
customary law at the community level in addition to individual-level outcome measures. 
Ironically, economic development in and of itself cannot guarantee improvements in property 
rights for women, especially in rural regions.  Using case studies, Gray and Kavene (1999) claim that 
in many regions of sub-Saharan Africa, women’s land rights have actually eroded with the 
introduction of new crops, improved transportation and agricultural development including irrigation 
projects and new farming techniques.  This view is supported by Tripp (2004) who asserts that 
individual men and corporations (dominated by men) have increasingly challenged women’s rights 
because they are better situated to take advantage of the economic gains from increased land value 
due to technological improvements.  Women are disadvantaged in the market systems of property 
ownership, either because opportunities to buy land are very limited or because local level authorities 
discriminate against women, preventing them from claiming land which in theory should be upheld 
by law (Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997; Whitehead & Tsikata, 2003).  The same instability is often 
exhibited when legal titling schemes are introduced.  This evidence reinforces the need for gender 
sensitive development policies, without which there exists the potential to adversely affect 
marginalized groups such as women.  
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Despite the link between WPIR and women’s welfare in popular press and qualitative 
literature, there is limited empirical work supporting this claim.  However, several studies have 
examined women’s actual ownership of property rather than WPIR.  For example, Allendorf (2007) 
uses population-level data from Nepal to show that women who own land are more likely to have 
high decision-making power and less likely to have underweight children.  Similarly, Mason (1998) 
finds that women who own land in Thailand and India are more likely to have high economic 
decision-making power in a study of five Asian countries.  Deere and colleagues (2005) examine 
rural households in Paraguay and Peru and conclude that households in which females have land 
ownership have higher total household income in Peru and higher non-farm income in both countries.  
Using data from Chandigarh, India, Datta (2006) finds that joint titling of housing increases, among 
other things, bargaining power of women as well as respect they receive from their spouses.  Also in 
India, Panda and Agarwal (2005) find women with immovable property (land or house) are less likely 
to experience physical or psychological marital violence. However, none of these studies deal with 
potential endogeneity issues surrounding individual-level asset ownership and welfare outcome 
measures, which are likely to be jointly determined.  This paper addresses endogeneity by examining 
community-level outcomes and changes over time which are less likely to suffer from the same biases 
with respect to individual-level outcome measures. 
WPIR in the context of HIV/AIDS 
The examination of WPIR is especially crucial in the context of HIV/AIDS.  Strickland 
argues that when women are barred from owning property, they are unable to secure resources that 
would allow them to improve their chances of preventing infection, even before the dissolution of a 
marriage or death of her spouse (a conceptual diagram from Strickland, 2004 traces out pathways 
between WPIR and household level consequences of HIV/AIDS and is included as Figure A2 in the 
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Appendix).5  For example, lack of rights within a marriage may increase women’s vulnerability to 
domestic violence, unsafe sex, and other HIV related risk factors.  It is believed that HIV/AIDS has 
exacerbated the issue of woman’s rights for two reasons: 1) the epidemic is placing more women and 
children in the situation of widowhood at a younger age than before; and 2) the specific manner in 
which HIV/AIDS impoverishes a household means that upon finding herself a widow, a woman has 
few resources left with which to resist outside pressures exerted by the clan or members of the 
extended family regarding inheritances (Drimie, 2002).6  In addition, widows may face several 
customary practices such as widow inheritance or cleansing in which sexual activity is often 
unprotected and coerced (Walsh, 2005).7  Widow inheritance refers to the practice when a male 
relative of the dead husband takes over the widow as a wife, often in a polygamous marriage.  
Although variants of the practice exist within tribes, cleansing usually involves sex with a social 
outcast, supposedly to cleanse the woman of her dead husband’s evil spirits.  In this practice, sex is 
often forced and protection is rarely used, as the cleansing is not thought to be valid unless semen 
enters the woman (Walsh, 2005).  Consequences for the spread of HIV/AIDS are especially relevant 
if the male regularly engages in cleanses with many widows, as is often the case in small 
communities.  Given the associations between property rights and women’s ability to make 
economically motivated choices, it is not surprising that lack of WPIR has been cited as fueling the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic and as a major issue surrounding rural economic development and poverty 
(Krishnan et al., 2008; Walsh, 2005).   
The Setting: Republic of Tanzania 
                                                 
5 Despite population-level poverty being viewed as a risk factor for HIV/AIDS, there is considerable debate as 
to the relationship between resources, wealth and HIV within a given resource poor country.  See e.g. Piot, 
Greener & Russell, 2007, Mishra et al., 2007 or Bingenheimer, 2007 for overviews and evidence. 
 
6 For example, AIDS related losses can reduce African household incomes by up to 80 percent, food 
consumption by 15 to 30 percent and primary school enrollment by 20 to 40 percent (Whiteside, 2002).  
 
7 However, it should be noted this practice is increasingly being abandoned where the death of the husband is 
thought to be caused by AIDS (UNAIDS, 1999). 
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Formed in 1964, the United Republic of Tanzania occupies the largest land area of any 
country in East Africa and is home to over 38 million inhabitants (WB, 2006).  The country borders 
with eight countries, Kenya and Uganda to the north, Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo to the west and Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique to the south.  Although enjoying relative 
political stability, Tanzania ranks among the poorest countries in the world.  The per capita GNI was 
340 USD 8 in 2005 and over 35 percent of the population on mainland Tanzania was below the 
national poverty line at the most recent measurement in 2000 (WB, 2006).9,10  In 2001, Tanzania 
ranked 160 out of 175 on the Human Development Index collected by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) at a value of 0.4, below the average value for sub-Saharan Africa 
(UNDP, 2003).11  In addition to overall measures of poverty within the population, women as a social 
group in Tanzania face particular hardship.  Tanzania ranked 130 out of 144 countries on the UNDP 
Gender-Related Development Index, at a value of 0.396.12  This inequity is further seen in Tanzanian 
outcomes for proxy indicators of women’s status such as the maternal mortality ratio and women’s 
labor force participation.  According to estimates by the WHO, UNICEF and UNFPA, Tanzania had 
the world’s sixth highest number of maternal deaths during 2000 (at an estimated 21,000 maternal 
deaths), putting a woman’s lifetime risk of maternal death at approximately one out of 10 women 
(UNDP, 2003).  The majority of working women (approximately 72 percent) are involved in 
                                                 
8 The per capita GNI (Gross National Income) are converted into USD using the Atlas method.  This takes into 
account GDP plus the net flows from other factors (rents, profits, and labor income) from abroad.  The Atlas 
method smoothes exchange rate fluctuations by using a three year moving average, price-adjusted conversion 
factor (WB, 2006).   
 
9 The poverty measures were calculated using the Household Budget Survey 2000-01 and the Integrated Labor 
Force Survey 2000-01, the poverty line refers to the national basic needs poverty line (United Republic of 
Tanzania, 2003). 
 
10 Poverty levels differ between urban and rural residence.  The proportion of poor living in urban areas is 13 
percent, while the proportion poor living in rural areas is 87 percent (United Republic of Tanzania, 2003.) 
 
11 The Human Development Index is made up of the average achievements in life expectancy at birth, adult 
literacy, combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrollment ages and gross national income. 
 
12 The UNDP measures gender inequality by using the unweighted average of three component indices: 1) life 
expectancy, education and income.  Its gender-related development index (GDI) ranges from 0 (lowest gender 
equality) to 1 (highest gender equality).   
   
 12
agriculture, primarily working family owned land (TNBS, 2000).  The remaining working women are 
employed in unskilled labor and manual jobs (20 percent).  Only two percent of working women hold 
professional, managerial or technical jobs.  According to the ILO, structural adjustment during the 
late 1980’s and early 1990’s are thought to have worsened gender inequality in access to employment 
and economic activities, especially in the formal sector (ILO, 1997).  With respect to welfare 
outcomes, evidence suggests that overall indicators lag relative to neighboring countries and also the 
relative position of women in Tanzania has not been improving. 
WPIR in Tanzania 
Tanzania is in a unique position to evaluate the effects of changing WPIR.  In 1999, Tanzania 
passed one of the most radical land laws in Africa.13  The law shifted land administration to the 
village level, where each community is in charge of registration, adjudication, titling and land 
disputes (Tripp, 2004).  This was done primarily to prevent outside appropriation of land and keep all 
disputes in communities internal and secondarily to promote the operation of a market in land rights.  
In addition, the reforms stipulated that women are to be represented in the land administration bodies 
and protects women’s rights to co-ownership of land as well as the individual right to acquire, hold, 
sell and use land.14  These concessions were the result of much advocacy and public debate lead by 
the Gender Land Task Force (GLTF), a coalition of women’s rights NGOs and associations 
coordinated by the Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (TWLA) (for full discussion of advocacy 
and public hearings concerning the Acts of 1999 see Tsikata, 2003).   
Historically, the Tanzanian government did not give rural populations and women full access 
to land and property.  Originally Tanzania’s administration and law governing bodies reflected 
proprietary laws established during British colonization, similar to East African neighbors Kenya and 
                                                 
13 The reforms begin with the appointment of the Presidential commission on Land Matters in 1991 and resulted 
in the passage of the Land Act and the Village Land Act in 1999.  The commission made recommendations in 
three broad areas: 1) policy and questions of law; 2) administration and adjudication of disputes and 3) gender 
equity.    For detailed description of the reform process see Tsikata (2003). 
 
14 The Village Land Act specifies that the Village Council govern land related issues, of which at least one third 
of its total of 25 members should be women (Walker, 2002).  
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Uganda (Walker, 2002).  Independence resulted in the forced resettling of people into ujamaa villages 
in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s, set up around collective agriculture (Ikdahl et al., 2005).  In 
theory, the equity ideology rooted in collective farming included all community members, however, 
in practice did little for women’s property rights.  In the late 1970’s, this policy was abandoned and 
through the 1980’s land laws were in a constant state of confusion due to ambiguous and 
contradictory laws, poor administration, dual allocation of land rights and the historical villagization 
process (Ikdahl et al., 2005).  The current Land Acts are a result of both internal and external pressure 
for land reform due to insecurity and the desire to facilitate a market for land rights.   
In addition to laws governing land rights, women are concerned with general marriage laws 
and rules regarding the transfer of assets in the case of marriage dissolution through divorce or death.  
Despite the existence of a colonial ‘rule of law,’ prior to 1971 family law in Tanzania was essentially 
governed by custom or religious beliefs of various communities.  In 1971, Tanzania enacted The Law 
of Marriage Act, aimed at providing uniformity in marriage and divorce and recognizing equity 
between husbands and wives (Mtengeti-Migiro, 1997).  The Law of Marriage Act also allowed 
women to hold and sell property, and to be sued in their own name (Tenga & Peter, 1996).  Although 
the act was seen as advancement for Tanzanian women, it did not make clear exactly what a woman 
would receive upon divorce or death of her husband.15  For example, woman’s rights were retained 
for any property she may have brought to the marriage; however, there is ambiguity as to whether 
unpaid labor including improvements to land, subsistence farming, housekeeping, or childcare 
constitutes contributions to marital assets or are simply ‘wifely duties’ (Mbilinyi, 1972).  Although on 
paper, women have strong rights to land and possessions, it is widely agreed that considerable 
resistance and interpretation of the law occurs, especially in rural areas where customary law is strong 
or where populations lack knowledge about their rights concerning land and property. 
Impact of WPIR on women’s welfare: A conceptual framework 
                                                 
15 For example, the Law of Marriage Act set a minimum legal age of marriage of 15 for women and 18 for men.  
In addition, it required registration of marriage and provided legal terms for divorce for the protection of the 
family members.  See Tenga & Peter, 1996 or Mtengeti-Migiro, 1997 for further discussion of terms included. 
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 Economic models of household production exploring determinants of labor force 
participation, time use and expenditure behavior have been widely utilized to guide empirical work in 
developing countries (see Strauss & Thomas, 1995; 1998; Behrman & Deolalikar, 1988; Juster & 
Stafford, 1991 for reviews).  These models are rooted in Becker’s household production framework in 
which households allocate time and goods to produce a range of market and non-market commodities 
(Becker, 1965).  Household utility is maximized subject to a variety of constraints (time and 
technology) to recover reduced-form demand equations for all inputs in the production function.  
These reduced form equations map demand for employment, time allocation or certain commodities 
to exogenous inputs at the individual, household and community level.   
 For example, following Beegle (2005), time demand for individual woman i in activity j (for 
example, working her own land) can be modeled as the following reduced form demand equation: 
(1) Tij = Tij (Tt, pm, ph, wi, Ai, vi, vij | Z); 
where Tij is total time or hours spent working on her own land, Tt is total time available, pm and ph are 
vectors of prices for market and home-produced commodities, wi is the wage rate, Ai are assets or 
unearned income, vi are unobservable individual-level characteristics, vij are exogenous 
environmental characteristics, conditional on Z, a set of individual level tastes and preferences.  As 
previously mentioned, similar reduced-form demand equations may be constructed for other 
outcomes. 
 Before extending the model to incorporate WPIR, it is first important to distinguish between 
potential interpretations of the indicator.  The natural interpretation of the indicator is a direct 
representation of inheritance and property rights.  Under this interpretation WPIR have the potential 
to indirectly affect all women though current and future expectations surrounding accumulation and 
ownership of assets.  Further, restrictive WPIR would be expected to directly affect a subset of 
women who are widowed, divorced or separated through actual reduction in assets.  However, it is 
also possible the indicator of WPIR may also represent general gender discrimination in a given 
community, in addition to or inclusive of inheritance and property rights issues.  Under this 
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interpretation, WPIR may be a proxy measure for, among other things, community-level tastes and 
preferences for gender equity, women’s decision-making power and autonomy, or other gender-
specific policies.  In this scenario, WPIR would be expected to broadly affect women and girls of all 
ages though a number of pathways discussed below.  This more broad interpretation has the 
advantage of including alternative dimensions of gender discrimination which we may want to 
capture, while the first definition is more specific and amenable to policy recommendations.  
Under these two interpretations, there are a number of pathways through which WPIR may 
enter into individual reduced-form demand equations.  If we consider the second interpretation, WPIR 
could affect time use through exogenous environmental characteristics vii , the wage rate wi, or 
unobservable individual level characteristics vi.  For example, due to gender discrimination, women 
may have received less education and thus be unable to perform certain jobs such as professional 
occupations, thus diminishing vi or individual endowments.  Alternatively women could receive a 
lower wage on average than men working in similar occupations because their time is less valued in 
comparison to male counterparts, thus WPIR would enter through vij. However, if we consider the 
first interpretation, it would be expected that the main and dominating effect would be through Ai or 
unearned income.  Because assets in this case represent large and meaningful contributions to the 
woman’s income source (for example, land) and security (for example, housing) the effect is expected 
to be large and significant.  In addition to income effects, lack of property rights and widow 
inheritance specifically are expected to enter into the reduced form equations as they have the 
potential to increase vulnerability to domestic violence, unsafe sex, and other HIV-related risk factors 
(recall discussion in Section B5).      
Data: Kagera Health and Development Survey 
Sampling strategy 
The KHDS were originally part of a joint research project titled the “Economic Impact of 
Fatal Adult Illness from AIDS and Other Causes in Sub-Saharan Africa” launched by the Population 
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and Human Resources and Africa Technical Department of the World Bank (WB-DRG, 2004).16  The 
Kagera region is located to the west of Lake Victoria bordering Rwanda and Burundi to the east and 
Uganda to the north.  The region is primarily rural and is home to over two million people, divided 
into five administrative districts (TNBS, 2002). 17  In Kagera, adult mortality is higher than would be 
expected because of the early spread of HIV/AIDS in the area around Lake Victoria. The first case of 
AIDS in Tanzania was identified in Kagera in 1983, although experts conjecture that HIV was present 
in the area at least a decade earlier (WB, 2004). The area is a hub for long-range commerce between 
the East African coast and Central Africa and was heavily affected by the war between Tanzania and 
Uganda in the late 1970’s.  More recently, it has been the site of refugee camps for those fleeing from 
conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi.   
The KHDS interviewed 816 households in 51 communities over four passages at seven 
month intervals between 1991 and 1994 and again in 2004 (WB-DRG, 2004; see Figure A1 in the 
Appendix for location of clusters within Kagera).  Special concern was given to tracking and re-
interviewing respondents in an attempt to understand economic mobility and changes in living 
standards induced by or affecting migration choices.  The household sample was randomly selected, 
stratified on geography, community adult mortality rates18 and indicators at the household level that 
were thought to be predictive of future adult deaths.  In the first stage, 550 primary sampling units 
(PSU) in Kagera were classified according to four agronomic zones19 and either a high or low level of 
                                                 
16 The research project is also known as the Economic Impact of Adult Mortality (EIAM) Study.  Funding was 
provided by the World Bank Research Committee, the United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) and the Danish Agency for Development Assistance (DANIDA) (WB, 2004). 
 
17 The five districts are Bukoba, Muleba, Karagwe, Biharamulo and Ngara. 
 
18 Community adult mortality rates were taken from the 1988 census and a subsequent enumeration for the 
survey (WB-DRG, 2004). 
 
19 The four agronomic zones were selected to suggest characteristic agricultural patterns: 1) tree crop zone (low 
fertility soils in areas of high rainfall where main crops are bananas, coffee and tea, in the northern part of 
Kagera), 2) riverine zone (alluvial and colluvial soils considered high potential, but requiring flood control, 
main crops are cereals, sugarcane, rice and legumes, in the middle region of Kagera) 3) annual crop zone (soils 
of low to medium fertility with moderate potential and lower rainfall, main crops are groundnuts, cassava, 
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adult mortality.  Clusters of households were randomly drawn from each PSU, stratified on 
agronomic zone, with a probability of selection proportional to population.  In the second stage, 
households were classified as either ‘sick’ or ‘well.’20  Approximately sixteen households were 
selected at random from each cluster, fourteen from the ‘sick’ and two from the ‘well’ group (see 
WB, 2004 or Beegle, DeWeerdt & Dercon, 2006 for further discussion of sampling procedure).  The 
KHDS questionnaires were modeled after the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Surveys 
and collected extensive, detailed information on household income, consumption, expenditure, 
individual economic activities, education and individual health status (including the height and weight 
of all household members).  In addition, matching community modules were administered at local 
markets to gather price information and at local health and education facilities. 
Organization of data 
The baseline rounds of the KHDS (1991 to 1994) are divided into four waves, corresponding 
to the sequence of interviews administered to each household, and four passages, corresponding to the 
year of the data collection.  For example, a woman interviewed for the first time in the last data 
collection in 1994 corresponds to wave 1, passage 4, whereas a woman interviewed for the fourth 
time in the last data collection corresponds to wave 4, passage 4.  The baseline for this analysis 
comprises the intersection of the four waves of data.  To optimize panel size and length between 
interviews, data for each woman was taken from the first wave, regardless of when the interview was 
or how many times she was interviewed.  The resulting cross-section is comprised of majority 
passage 1 interviews (74 percent), an additional ten percent from each passage 2 and 3 and six percent 
from passage 4 interviews.  Note that the sample is limited to women between the ages of 15 and 55 
in the baseline.  This is done to purposefully limit the sample to adult women who may be responsible 
                                                                                                                                                       
cotton and cereals, in the southern part of Kagera) and 4) urban zone (town of Bukoba, the capital of Kagera 
plus additional urban communities) (WB-DRG, 2004). 
 
20 ‘Sick’ households were those who either had an adult death (aged 15-50) due to illness in the last year or an 
adult too sick to work at the time of the survey or both.  ‘Well’ households were all others with no recent deaths 
or sick members (WB-DRG, 2004). 
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for economic decisions and produce valid labor force and expenditure indicators.  Community 
characteristics were matched with each woman from contemporaneous passage indicators.  The end-
line data was collected in one wave starting in early 2004, resulting in a panel length of 
approximately 13 years. 
 Attrition  
 A potential threat in analyzing any longitudinal data is attrition bias.  Surveys fielded in 
developing countries are particularly susceptible to high levels of attrition due to highly mobile 
populations, incidence of disease and exogenous shocks such as drought or civil conflict.  In a review 
of attrition in longitudinal data from developing countries, Alderman and colleagues find attrition 
rates between six to 50 percent between survey rounds, or 1.5 to 23.2 percent attrition per year 
(Alderman et al., 2005).  In the KHDS, of the total baseline sample of adult women (N = 1,480), 
approximately 50.9 percent or 3.9 percent per year are lost to attrition over the panel period.  Due to 
the special attention to tracking and adult mortality built into the survey design, it is possible to assign 
causes to much of the attrition.  Of the total attriters, approximately 15.8 percent were lost to 
mortality, while 33.4 percent lost to movement out of sample communities (see Beegle, De Weerdt & 
Dercon, 2006a for detailed description of re-interview rates among the full sample).21  If attrition 
occurs randomly, then the estimation strategy does not need to address selection explicitly, however, 
some efficiency may be lost due to reductions in sample sizes.  However, since the KHDS was 
designed to over-sample households in communities with high levels of mortality and since 
populations are highly mobile, it is unlikely that attrition in this case is random with respect to the 
outcomes of interest.  For example, it may be expected that women who experience mortality over the 
sample would have had the worst welfare outcomes had they lived.  If restrictive WPIR contribute to 
mortality, then not accounting for selection may lead to an underestimation of the effect of WPIR.  
Likewise, if women who would have otherwise had the best welfare outcomes have migrated out of 
                                                 
21 Note that many of the women who moved out of sample communities are re-interviewed in KHDS 
(approximately half), however since they have no community-level variables including WPIR, they cannot be 
included in the sample and are treated as attriters.   
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the sample and having high WPIR helped facilitate the move, the effects of WPIR will be 
underestimated.  However the directions of these associations are unclear.  For example, it could also 
be imagined that in certain cases, poor WPIR could result in a woman being stripped of her 
possessions and forced to migrate back to her birth family or seek other opportunities.  Finally, 
migration and mortality may be related, for example, households may migrate as a coping or 
preventative strategy when facing illness or after experiencing mortality.  Due to the unclear direction 
and magnitude of these biases, a careful and explicit treatment of attrition is necessary for the 
subsequent welfare analysis. 
 To investigate the extent of non-random attrition, two tests are conducted.  First, a 
comparison using simple t-tests is made on the distributions of individual and community-level 
observables between the attriters and non-attriters in the baseline.  Second, an alternative of the 
BGLW test is performed in which outcome variables are predicted in the baseline as a function of 
baseline control variables and an indicator for future attrition (Becketti et al., 1998).  The attrition 
indicator shows whether or not bias exists controlling for observables (in other words, whether or not 
bias is non-ignorable; see Alderman et al., 2005 for explanation and notation of testing for attrition).  
The results of these two tests are reported in Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix.  The t-tests in Table 
A1 show that there is significant correlation on a number of observed variables between attriters and 
non-attriters, however, the BGLW tests summarized in Table A2 show that attrition may only be an 
issue for modeling employment outside the home and earnings. 
Estimation strategies and variables 
 The estimation procedure follows four steps described below.  First, determinants of WPIR at 
the community level are explored using the baseline pooled cross-section to identify key 
characteristics of communities which are initially implementing high levels of WPIR.  Second, a re-
interview model is estimated to obtain the probability of being interviewed in the 2004 end-line 
survey.  Third, a model predicting economic outcomes at the woman level is developed to examine 
how community-level WPIR may influence individual welfare.  This model is estimated using a 
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baseline cross-section of all women, as well as a fixed effects model over the panel period among a 
reduced sample of women who appear in both rounds.  Finally, the fixed effects model examining 
welfare outcomes is adjusted for non-random attrition using the inverse of probability weighting 
method (IPW).  A number of extensions are explored to assess the robustness of findings.   
 Trends and community-level determinants of WPIR 
Although sample size limits the potential to model complex relationships, understanding 
trends and correlates of WPIR on a community-level is a useful exercise for several reasons.  First, it 
will indicate if, when and where WPIR are changing.  Second, it will aid in making policy 
prescriptions.  For example, if determinants such as economic indicators are associated with WPIR, 
community development initiatives may aid in liberalizing WPIR through increased presence of legal 
structures and increased education of the population.  In contrast, if WPIR are significantly associated 
with tribal or ethnic group majorities, this may indicate the important role of custom and require a 
more structured intervention to promote change.  If this is the case, understanding which cultural 
groups lag behind others is also valuable information for targeting interventions or providing legal 
services.  In addition, it will help in clarification of the exogeniety assumption surrounding WPIR.22    
In this analysis, an assumption is made that WPIR are exogenous to each individual woman and are 
rather choice variables at the community.  Therefore, significance of community-level determinants 
of WPIR will add evidence to this claim.   
The model to examine community-level determinants of WPIR is as follows: 
(2)  Pr (High WPIRc =1) = f (T, Statusc , Customc , Economicc); 
High WPIR is a function of time of survey, women’s relative status in the community, custom or 
traditions and economic development.  The equation will be estimated using linear probability models 
(LPMs) among a pooled sample of all five cross-sections containing 51 communities (four baseline 
                                                 
22 For example, it could be argued that WPIR is a choice variable on the individual women level.  This would 
occur if specific women or groups of women try to influence or change WPIR.  If this is the case, a problem 
would arise if these women with high WPIR would be expected to have better economic outcomes on average 
than women in communities with poor WPIR because of correlated unobservables at the individual level. 
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waves plus 2004 follow-up).23  Each community-level survey was administered to a group of village 
leaders who had the most knowledge about various community administrative, economic, health, or 
social issues.24  To indicate women’s status, a variable is constructed indicating the proportion of 
community ‘experts’ who were women.  It is expected that communities in which women are given 
equal voice and respected as knowledgeable leaders will call upon a higher proportion of women to 
respond to survey questions in comparison to communities who assign less importance to women.  
The vector of custom variables refers to majority ethnic groups and religious groups in the 
community, while the vector of economic variables refers to indicators of general development of the 
community (see Table A3 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics of community-level control 
variables).    
The four WPIR indicators utilized in the analysis are collected in each round of all 51 
surveyed communities.25  The key element is the nature of self report, meant to indicate the actual or 
de facto rights of women, as opposed to the legal or political, de jure mapping of WPIR (see Kabeer, 
2001 for discussion of necessity of including de facto rights in empirical studies).26  Table 2.1 shows 
the community-level (top panel) and individual-level (bottom panel) distribution of WPIR over the 
survey period.  In addition to the baseline (column B) and end-line observations (column C), the 2004 
survey asks a retrospective question which asks community leaders to ‘recall’ what was customary 
approximately 20 years earlier (or 10 years prior to the baseline).  These indicators are included in 
column A for examination of trends only, as they are likely to include substantial recall bias in 
                                                 
23 For consistency between cross-sectional and panel specifications, all binary models are estimated using 
LPMs.  Parallel analysis using probit models do not change results. 
 
24 For example, a minimum of three experts representing the most knowledgeable people in the following areas 
were called: births, deaths and migration (suggested village secretary/chairman), economic activities (suggested 
community development officer), education (suggested chairman of education committee), health (suggested 
chairman of health committee), agriculture and livestock, cultural practices (WB, 2004). 
 
25 In actuality 49 survey instruments were filled at the community level, two of which represented two clusters 
each for a total of 51 community clusters (WB, 2004).  
 
26 The answers to WPIR questions are asked to the group of experts as described above.  When there was 
disagreement among the experts, the majority opinion was honored (WB, 2004). 
   
 22
comparison to contemporaneous responses.  All WPIR indicators make significant improvements 
over the two decades.  For example, the percentage of women living in communities where it was 
customary for a woman to inherit land after a husband’s death increased from zero in the pre-panel 
period, to 45 percent in the baseline to 88 percent in the follow-up.  The practice of widow 
inheritance decreases with 33 percent of women exempt from inheritance in the pre-panel period, 63 
percent exempt in the baseline to 94 percent in the follow-up.27  Similar trends are found for the 
remaining indicators and individual-level distributions closely map those found at the community 
level.  The key policy variable termed ‘high WPIR’ is reported at the bottom of each panel and equals 
one if all four policies are also equal to one (thus the wife can inherit land, house, and assets and is 
not subject to inheritance herself).  The percentage of women living in communities with high WPIR 
is 22 in the baseline and increases to 81 percent in the end-line. 
 In addition to the main trends reported in Table 2.1, it is also interesting to fill in some 
auxiliary descriptive variables concerning WPIR.  Overwhelmingly, in 90 percent of end-line 
communities, respondents report that ‘clans’ typically settle inheritance matters, while other 
responses include family members (six percent), the community (two percent) and other sources (two 
percent).  Over half of communities report inheritance disputes in the past year and the average 
number of disputes among this group is approximately 3.6 with a maximum of 15 reported disputes.  
It is interesting to note that in communities with high WPIR as defined above, the reported number of 
disputes are fewer (approximately 1.7) versus those with low WPIR (approximately three).  This 
indicates that situations in which women are potential victims of property rights abuses, challenges 
and disputes are more likely to arise, than in cases in which women are given property and challenges 
arise from other family seeking to recover inheritance. 
                                                 
27 Passages 1 and 2 in the baseline did not ask this question in the community questionnaire.  Therefore 
indicators of exemption from widow inheritance for women in these passages were replaced with the value for 
Passage 3.  In either case, this represents a value collected approximately six months to 12 months after 
individual level outcomes.  Although it is unlikely for the indicator to have changed for a significant portion of 
the sample, it would result in an underestimation of the change over the panel period and would tend to bias 
results toward zero or no significant affect of WPIR as a whole. 
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Re-interview model 
 As discussed in the previous section, it is likely that the data suffer from non-random attrition 
over the panel period.  The IPW method is implemented to overcome the selection bias using a fixed 
effects model and parallel normal fixed effects models are run for comparison (see Wooldridge, 2002 
for overview; Wooldridge, 2001 for in-depth examination of assumptions; Jayne & Yamano, 2005 for 
application in economic framework).  In the first stage, the IPW method uses a set of excluded 
variables, for example, denoted ‘Z’ to predict re-interview (or non-attrition) in addition to control 
variables in each time period (in this case only the follow-up, 2004).  In the second stage, the inverse 
of this probability is used to weight all observations in the end-line.  The IPW method makes the 
assumption that observed variables ‘Z’ exist which are strong enough predictors of re-interview that 
the relationship between controls and outcomes in subsequent periods are independent of attrition 
selection.  In other words, the IPW method assumes that Z variables soak up any significant 
unobservables which may predict attrition selection and be correlated with outcomes of interest.  
Under these conditions, Wooldridge shows that the IPW method is a consistent estimator of 
population parameters and can be applied to cases with binary outcomes (Wooldridge, 2001).      
 To predict re-interview, several Z variables are used at the household and community-level 
which are theoretically and statistically valid predictors of attrition due to mortality and/or mobility: 
1) indicator of presence in all four rounds of the baseline (1991-1994), 2) indicator of daughter of 
household head, 3) lagged community-level proportion of adult deaths due to illness and 4) 
community-level price per tablet of pharmaceuticals.28  It is expected that variable 1 will be positive 
predictor of re-interview, households which have a stable residence will be more likely to stay in the 
                                                 
28 The pharmaceutical in name is paracetamol, an aspirin substitute.  Other pharmaceuticals were tested in the 
model but were dropped because of their low correlation with re-interview.  In addition, following Beegle, De 
Weerdt & Dercon (2006), alternative relationships to the household head and indicator of child living elsewhere 
were also tested as potential predictors of attrition and found to have no correlation with re-interview.  Note that 
Beegle and colleagues are only instrumenting mobility and therefore these mentioned variables have increased 
validity for their analysis versus this analysis.  Additionally mortality related enumeration rates connected with 
sample selection as well as shock variables at the community level (drought, flood, etc.) were tested and also 
found to lack statistical power with the inclusion of other Z variables and controls and were therefore are not 
utilized. 
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same area, rather than out-migrate.  It is expected that variables 2, 3 and 4 will be negative predictors 
of re-interview.  Daughters of household heads who are still living at home are subject to future 
marriage and movement out of the household.  In addition, women in communities with higher adult 
death rates due to illness or with higher costs of treatment are more likely to experience mortality 
over the panel period in comparison to those with comparably low incidence of illness and costs of 
treatment.  The re-interview model can be written as follows: 
(3)  Pr (Ri, 2004 =1) = f (Z i, 1991, X i, 1991, Xc, 1991); 
where the probability of re-interview (woman has not died or moved out of the sample) is a function 
of the Z variables listed above and vectors X of individual and community-level characteristics 
including WPIR.  All control variables at the individual and community level which are used in the 
subsequent analysis estimating determinants of women’s welfare are included in the re-interview 
model.  Not only should all determinants be good predictors of re-interview (as measured by the R2 
value) but in addition the Z variables should be jointly significant (rule of thumb, Wald test value 
above 10).  The model above is estimated using a LPM specification and the recovered predicted 
probability is applied as an inverse weight to the models estimating women’s welfare discussed 
below.  Descriptive statistics of the Z variables are given in Table A4 in the Appendix. 
 Estimating determinants of women’s welfare 
Predictions of women’s welfare are guided by the reduced-form demand equations described 
in section C and can be written as follows: 
(4) Pr (Employed i, 2004-1991 = 1) = f (High WPIRc, 2004-1991, X i, 2004-1991, X c, 2004-1991); 
In the above specification, the probability of being employed is a function of community-level WPIR, 
individual characteristics and other community-level controls.  The model is estimated for each 
welfare outcome first using OLS and LPMs among the working sample baseline cross-section.  
Subsequent analyses extends the model to include the 2004 round using individual-level fixed effects 
and fixed effects adjusted for attrition using the IPW method as discussed above.  Individual-level 
fixed effects have the advantage of controlling for heterogeneity due to fixed factors such as initial 
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endowments (for example, cognitive ability) or time invariant behaviors (for example, work ethic or 
preference for savings) which may affect outcomes.29  Due to sample size, binary outcomes cannot be 
estimated using non-linear models as all observations which do not change over time are dropped.30  
The vector of individual-level variables includes age, education, religion, tribe/ethnicity and an 
indicator for lower quintile of wealth index.  The wealth index is measured as household per capita 
created through factor analysis using land, dwelling and livestock values and a range of assets (mean 
values and principal contributions are reported for baseline and follow-up in Table A7).  The vector 
of community-level variables includes proxy measures of infrastructure and labor force opportunities 
such as indicators of urban, population, presence of bank, public transport, any households have 
electricity, piped water and an indicator of residing in the district containing Kagera’s regional 
capital.  In addition, month indicators are included to control for fluctuations in labor demand due to 
seasonalities and baseline passage indicators are included to control for time trend differences in the 
baseline survey round.  Descriptive statistics for all control variables at the individual level are 
included in Table A6.          
Table 2.2 displays descriptive statistics for individual-level welfare outcome indicators in the 
baseline and the follow-up periods.  Outcomes are grouped into three categories: 1) labor force 
participation and earnings 2) expenditures and 3) savings (see Table A5 in Appendix for details on 
construction of all outcome variables).  Although not comprehensive, these measures are meant to 
capture aspects of economic status for individual women and for general household welfare.31  It 
would be expected that women who fare better economically will have higher rates of labor force 
participation, particularly working outside the home, as well as higher earnings, savings and 
                                                 
29 Fixed effects models are used as an alternative to random effects models.  The Hausman test rejects the 
random effects model in favor of fixed effects in all cases but self employment.   
 
30 As an alternative, conditional logit models are run on panel specifications to estimate working outside the 
home, working self employed and indicator of savings account, however, the sample size drops to 220 and thus 
is not utilized. 
 
31 Although many of these variables are subject to recall bias, documentation indicates that individual members 
were interviewed separately in private for individual level outcomes such as mentioned above, improving 
accuracy and confidentiality of responses. 
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individual expenditures.  It is also hypothesized that high WPIR will be a significant determinant or 
enabler of high welfare for women and overall for households.   
Generally, the welfare of women is improving over the panel period.  For example, earnings 
and labor force opportunities are increasing: a larger percentage of women report working outside the 
home (seven versus 11 percent) and working self employed (seven versus thirteen percent).  These 
changes may be a result of economic development which has taken place over the period including 
advances in technology or simply the result of aging of women over the sample period.  Overall, the 
category in which improvements are not seen is for individual and household expenditures which 
decrease slightly over the panel.32  Approximately five percent of women have a formal savings 
account.  Unfortunately, savings indicators are not collected in the end-line and thus more 
sophisticated estimations over time are not possible.  
Results 
Community-level determinants of WPIR 
 Table 2.3 shows the results for the determination of WPIR at the community-level.  
Covariates are added step-wise: column one contains only the time trend and women’s status 
indicators, while column 2 adds custom indicators and column 3 adds economic indicators.  A 
significant predictor of high WPIR in all models is the time trend variable, as would be expected.  
The proportion of female ‘experts’ in the community is associated with higher WPIR, although the 
effect is muted when economic controls are introduced.  This indicates communities with a larger 
number of women leaders are not necessarily those which have the best WPIR norms.33  Communities 
with an ethnic majority Hangaza and those with a religious majority Muslim are significantly less 
likely to have high WPIR than other ethnic groups.  Although presence of piped water and a bank in 
                                                 
32 All expenditure and savings indicators were deflated to the baseline (1991) value of the Tanzanian shilling on 
a yearly basis using the CPI obtained from the Tanzanian Bureau of Statistics on July 18, 2007. 
 
33 Note other community-level indicators of high women’s status were tested and also found to be insignificant 
including proportion of women with higher education and proportion of women with higher education in 
comparison to men in the same community.   
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the community are statistically significant, economic indicators taken together are not jointly 
significant.  This indicates that cultural variables and women’s status within communities matter over 
and independent of relative economic development.   
Re-interview model 
 Table 2.4 shows results of the re-interview model.  In the first and second columns, the 
estimation is conducted using only the Z variables, resulting in statistical significance separately and 
jointly of all four variables.  As expected, if women enter into all four baseline rounds, they are 
significantly more likely to be re-interviewed in the follow-up.  If they are a daughter of the 
household head, they are significantly less likely to be re-interviewed.  In addition, the community-
level adult death rate due to illness and price of pharmaceuticals contribute negatively to the 
probability of re-interview.  In the third and fourth columns, control variables are added to the model, 
resulting in the insignificance of the relationship to the household head variable.  However, since all 
four variables as a group are still highly statistically significant, all four are retained in the final 
model.  F-tests of joint significance and R2 values are reported at the bottom of the table. 
Determinants of women’s welfare 
 Table 2.5 is a summary of results from all three specifications of models predicting women’s 
welfare.  Coefficient estimates are for the indicator of high WPIR and the dependent variables are 
listed on the first column.  In the baseline cross-sections (Column A), high WPIR is significantly 
associated with working self-employed, higher individual and household expenditures and total 
individual savings.  Column B indicates that when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (for 
example, initial endowments), high WPIR retains significance only for working self-employed.  
Finally, in column C when controlling for attrition, high WPIR is significantly associated with 
employment outside the home and log earnings.  These results are consistent with the theory that first 
a cross-sectional analysis not controlling for individual-level heterogeneity will overestimate the 
effects of WPIR, and second that there is a downward attrition bias due to losing women which would 
have otherwise had better economic outcomes.  The differences between the columns B and C are 
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consistent with the story that women who leave the panel either due to mortality or mobility may be 
the ones particularly affected by WPIR.  For example, it is feasible women who lose assets or are 
constrained by restrictive WPIR are forced to migrate out of the sample, perhaps return to their natal 
villages.  Likewise, women who have suffered property rights violations may be at a greater risk for 
HIV or lack personal security due to loss of housing or sources of economic support and be more 
likely to experience mortality.  Although neither of these hypotheses are testable, they are consistent 
with results in which coefficients become more statistically significant when controlling for attrition 
bias.  Given the difference in results over the three methods, the preferred model specification is the 
IPW fixed effects regressions (column C) which control for both individual heterogeneity and 
attrition bias.  Full regressions are reported in Tables A8, A9 and A10 in the Appendix. 
Extensions  
 Two additional explorations are conducted based on the results above.  First, interactions are 
explored between high WPIR and potential inhibitors of welfare outcomes under the hypotheses that 
lack of property rights effects marginalized groups in a different manner than the general population 
of women.  Three groups are explored: 1) widowed and divorced women,34 2) poor women (as 
measured by lowest wealth quintile) and 3) women with no formal education.  Even if WPIR do not 
significantly affect all women, it is possible that they adversely affect sub-sets that are particularly 
marginalized due to their family structures, class structures, lack of resources or lack of knowledge to 
uphold and claim property or assets (Lastarria-Cornhiel, 1997).  Secondly, to test the relative 
importance of each of the four policy variables influencing WPIR, the indicator is disaggregated and 
each component is tested separately in the models for women’s welfare outcomes.    
                                                 
34 Although these women are distinctly different, they share common hardships.  While widowed women may 
be subject to abuse by in-laws, divorced or separated women may be denied property by her husband and forced 
to return to her natal family.  In many cases returning home results in forced re-payment of bride price by the 
woman to her family, and is not necessarily accompanied by welfare improvements (Manji, 2000).  To test 
differences empirically, the groups were separated and coefficients from the cross-sectional models were tested 
against each-other.  Results indicate that the groups do not differ significantly with respect to the outcomes of 
interest and are therefore retained as one indicator. 
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 Summary results of the first extension are reported in Table 2.6 for outcomes which may be 
modeled in the panel specification.  The coefficients for interaction terms are found in column A for 
the baseline and column B for the fixed effects model and column C for the IPW fixed effects model.  
It would be expected that if high WPIR are especially crucial for the marginalized groups listed 
above, the interaction term will be positive and significant.  In other words, property rights matter 
significantly more for poor or uneducated women (are substitutes for poverty or educational status) in 
achieving higher welfare outcomes.  Although several interaction terms are significant in column A, 
these do not carry over to the panel specifications.  For example, on average, having high WPIR 
matters more in determining probability of individual expenditures for women of the lowest wealth 
quintile in comparison to other women.  Uneducated women benefit from high WPIR in comparison 
to other women when it comes to employment outside the home, total individual and household-level 
expenditures.  However, only for individual expenditures for low income women does the 
significance carry over to a fixed effects or IPW fixed effects specification.  These results show that 
while high WPIR aids marginalized women in achieving certain outcomes, generally no sub-group 
examined can be seen as particularly affected by WPIR as compared to all women.   
 Results of the second extension (not displayed) show that no one of the single policy 
variables is as strong a predictor as the combined indicator of high WPIR.  Of the four, the indicator 
of land inheritance is the strongest in delivering positive and statistically significant results while the 
indicator of widow inheritance is the weakest.  This may be because of the relative similarities 
between the inheritance of land, house and assets, which are likely to be correlated.  As predicted by 
the conceptual framework, widow inheritance may be more influential for welfare outcome in its 
effect through health, which is not explicitly modeled in these specifications.  As an alternative policy 
variable, a principal component score is developed and tested using all four variables, however, 
results remain largely unchanged.35 
Discussion and policy implications 
                                                 
35 The alpha scale reliability associated with the indicies are 0.70 for the baseline and 0.59 for the end-line. 
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 Three points of discussion emerge from the results above as warranting further attention.  
First, how large are the improvements in women’s welfare and what do they mean in practical terms?  
Second, how defendable are they and finally, what can be said to generalize this study to other 
regions and cultures?  Each of these points will be addressed in turn below. 
 As an example of the magnitude of improvements, take women’s employment outside the 
home.  According to simulations using the results reported from the IPW fixed effects model (Table 
2.5, panel C), the predicted average rate of employment outside the home is approximately 16.77 
percent.  If we consider a scenario in which there were no improvements in WPIR, the predicted 
average rate of employment outside the home is 8.83 percent, as compared to a predicted average rate 
of 24.18 under a scenario in which all communities moved from low to high WPIR.  The rate of self 
employment under improvements in WPIR is 2.1 times the rate under no improvements in the fixed 
effects specification and the gross earnings with improvements are 3.80 times the level without 
improvements.  In the baseline cross-section, a similar simulation shows that in communities with 
high WPIR, women’s predicted average individual savings are 1.35 times the predicted average 
amount in communities with low WPIR.  Clearly these are large and meaningful contributions.  In 
fact, the magnitude of WPIR coefficients are on par or larger than those found for education in other 
developing countries.  For example, Mammon and Paxton (2000) estimate that women with post-
secondary schooling are 23 percent (India) and 25 percent (Thailand) more likely to be in the labor 
force using data from the 1980’s and 1990’s than women with less than secondary education.  
Likewise, using data from South Africa in the mid-1990’s, Winter (1999) shows that women who had 
completed secondary schooling had a 23 percent higher likelihood of labor force participation in 
comparison to those who had completed primary school.  However, not all indicators show significant 
associations.  One area in which no significant improvements are seen when controlling for 
individual-level fixed effects are expenditures.  First, the categories of individual expenditures may 
not be the appropriate measures.  For example, women may have increased expenditures, however 
they may be spending on their children, on household expenses or on their businesses rather than 
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spending on an individual-level.  Since the effect of WPIR on household-level expenditures are also 
insignificant, this indicates that potential increased expenditures may be offset by decrease in 
expenditures by other household members.  Alternatively, women could be saving more as predicted 
in the baseline cross-section rather than spending.  Unfortunately these measures are not collected in 
the end-line and therefore cannot be tested in more sophisticated models.   
There are several threats to the validity of the results discussed above.  One question 
proposed in the presentation of the conceptual framework is: what is really being measured by the 
WPIR indicator?  Recall that the direct interpretation is that WPIR represent only the customs relating 
to ownership and inheritance of land, house, assets and the widow herself, while the indirect 
interpretation is that WPIR is actually picks up more general gender-related status and empowerment 
norms and policies within each community.  Results of the interactions between widows/separated 
women and high WPIR show that these women are not necessarily more advantaged than other 
women when it comes to property rights issues.  This may suggest WPIR is actually a proxy measure 
since all women are affected equally (except in the case of savings for the cross-section).  However, 
the indicators of women’s status in the community-level exploration is insignificant, suggesting that 
on average communities in which women are regarded as leaders have no higher WPIR as compared 
to those which have fewer or no women identified as leaders.  It is not infeasible that WPIR as they 
appear in this paper do in fact effect all women through expectations and current ownership of 
property even if they are still in a marriage or are not yet married.  In fact, women may use ownership 
of assets and property to leverage bargaining power both within marriages and in the process to 
arrange a suitable partner.  In addition, inheritances from father to daughters may mirror those 
specifically asked for wives as is the case in this analysis.  In order to effectively test if the measure is 
picking up actual inheritance, it would require household and individual gender-disaggregated data on 
asset ownership and inheritance over time, which is not available in the KHDS.  Another limitation of 
the current study is the inability to determine when WPIR changed over the 13 year period.  This 
inability may lead to an underestimation of the effects of WPIR if changes occurred in the early 
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2000’s, thus having little time to effect meaningful and significant changes in women’s welfare.  A 
more precise measure would have been able to evaluate a before and after change instead of treating 
the time between panels as a black box. 
Finally, what can be said about generalizability?  Clearly Kagera is a somewhat unique region 
in Tanzania and the sampling process further distinguishes the data as representing a select sub-set of 
the population.  The situation in Kagera implies that WPIR have been much improved over the late 
1990’s and early 2000’s, however there is still significant discrimination with over 1/5 of the sample 
still restricting certain aspects of women’s rights and nearly half of those communities restricting 
rights in more than one realm.  It could be argued that results are not necessarily generalizable to 
other regions, especially given the importance of culture in determining property rights and the 
selective sampling which may drive outcome measures.36 Although it is difficult to draw conclusions 
over dozens of sub-Saharan African countries in different stages of development, institutional 
structures and cultures, there are several similarities to be mentioned.  In a global review of WPIR, 
UN-HABITAT (2006) identify only nine countries in sub-Saharan Africa which specifically give 
women equal property rights (Tanzania included), two with gender neutral laws and three currently 
revising or appealing restrictive laws.37 Throughout the literature it is cited that even in countries 
where legal rights exist are not always honored in traditional settings (Drimie, 2002; Tekle, 2001; 
Khadiagala, 2001).  In addition, the limited data on titling which is available suggests that a very 
small fraction of all titled land is owned by women (Deere & Doss, 2006).  For example, in 
Cameroon less than ten percent of title deeds are held by women, in Kenya only five percent and in 
Uganda only seven percent of women own land in their names (ICRW, 2005; Rugadva et al., 2005).  
                                                 
36 Results from Beegle, De Weerdt & Dercon (2006a) show that there are few differences between the Kagera 
Rural CWIQ, fielded one month before the start of the 2004 KHDS round and the rural sample from the 2004 
KHDS.  However, the differences increase if the sample is increased to include the urban sector of the KHDS or 
those individuals tracked outside Kagera.  For more details see Beegle, De Weerdt and Dercon (2006a: 
Appendix C). 
 
37 Countries with equal WPIR include Burkina Faso, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Rwanda, South Africa, 
Tanzania, Uganda and Zimbabwe.  Ethiopia and Eritrea have gender-neutral laws and Botswana, Kenya and 
Namibia are in process of reform (UN-HABITAT, 2006). 
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Further, findings suggest that on average women’s land is not only smaller in size (Benin, Morocco, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe) but also in value relative to men’s (Ghana) (FAO, 1997; Doss 2006). 
However there are some broad distinctions which can be drawn based on priorities within land reform 
and within cultural inheritance systems.  For example, Walker (2002) separates those countries where 
land redistribution is a major issue (Namibia, South Africa, Zimbabwe) from those in which tenure 
security and agrarian reform are priorities (Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland and 
Zambia) and makes policy prescriptions for each grouping.  In addition, case studies may serve to 
highlight unique attributes of each country.  For example, case studies from Lesotho indicate that 
while widows are often given rights to their husbands land, it is revoked if they re-marry, therefore 
incentivising many widows to stay single (Drimie, 2002).  In this setting, honoring the right of 
women to land often is correlated with how educated village leaders are concerning HIV/AIDS and 
the level of discrimination towards widows whose husband’s deaths were attributed to HIV.  In 
Kagera the Haya tribe makes up the majority in the KHDS data (62 percent of the baseline sample), a 
patrilineal ethnic group in which inheritance runs from father to son (Manji, 2000).  Upon marriage, 
brideprice is paid from the bride’s family to the groom’s family and women are expected to leave 
their kin and reside in the village of their husband’s household.  Therefore, in certain matrilineal 
groups, these same patterns should not be expected (e.g. the Chewa in Malawi or the Kaguru in 
Tanzania).  In short, it is reasonable to assume that many sub-Saharan African countries are in similar 
situations as Tanzania which has seen relative liberalization of WPIR relative to men, while other 
countries lag behind. 
Conclusion 
 Women’s struggles for equal property and inheritance rights in sub-Saharan Africa are not 
new; they have been documented for decades.  Research shows it is not only the liberalization of laws 
that matters, but how such also how laws are implemented, enforced and protected.  In addition, legal 
rights often have little effect if they are not accompanied by promotion of change in customary law 
and how communities view the citizenship of their women.  This paper adds to the institutional, legal 
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and anthropological evidence by examining the problem from an economic perspective and attempts 
to quantify some economic effects of granting property rights to women.  Findings suggest that WPIR 
are significant in promoting individual economic advancement for all women, especially in the realms 
of employment and earnings.  These findings are based on changes in community-level variation of 
customs over time after a change in constitutional arrangements in land administration and are not a 
result of strictly exogenous policy change.  However, because of the nature of property rights, it is 
virtually impossible to implement a randomized field experiment varying levels of WPIR without 
introducing ethical considerations. There is clearly a lack of suitable and population-level WPIR data, 
collected on several levels (community, household and individual) with which to make clear policy 
recommendations.  Therefore, a primary consideration of researchers interested in advocating for 
increased WPIR should be to more clearly and cleanly collect and analyze data, both to examine 
impacts, trends and gaps between de jure and de facto WPIR.  If countries want to support human 
development and economic growth, they should not discount the potential of equitable policies to 
promote the advancement of women. 
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Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Time trends in WPIR measured at the community and individual level
(A) (B) (C)
10 Years Baseline Follow-up
If her husband dies, is it customary for the... Prior (1991-94)¹ (2004)
Panel A: Community-level distribution: (N = 51) (N = 51) (N = 51)
     (1)  Wife to inherit land (=1) 0.00 0.49 0.86
     (2)  Wife to inherit house (=1) 0.04 0.53 0.90
     (3)  Wife to inherit other assets (=1) 0.08 0.88 0.98
     (4)  Wife not to be inherited (=1) 0.39 0.61 0.94
High WPIR (all four policies =1) 0.00 0.24 0.80
Panel B: Individual-level distribution: ² (N = 755) (N = 1,480) (N = 755)
     (1)  Wife to inherit land (=1) 0.00 0.45 0.88
     (2)  Wife to inherit house (=1) 0.06 0.50 0.93
     (3)  Wife to inherit other assets (=1) 0.08 0.87 0.97
     (4)  Wife not to be inherited (=1) 0.33 0.63 0.94
High WPIR (all four policies = 1) 0.00 0.22 0.81
Note: Variables used for column A are collected through recall in the 2004 survey round.
¹ For simplicity, community baseline distribution is calculated from passage 1 in 1991.
² The sample for individual-level distributions include women who appear in the baseline
(column B) and those who appear in the panel (columns A and C).  
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Table 2.2: Distribution of economic welfare outcomes in baseline and follow-up
       Baseline      Follow-up
       (1991-94)         (2004)
     (N = 1,480)       (N = 755)
Labor force participation and earnings Mean SD Mean SD
     Employed outside the home (last week = 1) 0.07 0.26 0.11 0.31
     Working self employed (last week = 1) 0.07 0.25 0.13 0.34
     Earnings (log shillings) 0.63 2.18 0.92 2.60
Expenditures ¹
     Total individual expenditures (log shillings) 7.56 2.50 7.16 2.24
     Total household expenditures (log shillings) 9.47 1.55 9.03 2.77
Savings
     Savings account (=1) 0.05 0.23 --- ---
     Total individual savings (log shillings) 2.95 3.48 --- ---
     Total household savings (log shillings) 6.58 4.50 --- ---
¹ Expenditures categories are clothing, medical and food consumed outside the home.
Clothing and medical expenses are recalled for 12 months, food expenses on two weeks.  
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Table 2.3: Community-level determinants of WPIR (N = 254)
High WPIR
Indicator: (all four policies = 1; otherwise = 0)
2004 survey round (=1) 0.528 0.537 0.557
(0.063)*** (0.065)*** (0.066)***
Proportion female "experts" 0.356 0.336 0.323
(0.203)* (0.201)* (0.219)
Majority ethnic/religious groups: ¹
     Ethnic group Nyambo (=1) 0.128 0.155
(0.096) (0.103)
     Ethnic group Hangaza (=1) -0.113 -0.155
(0.075) (0.077)**
     Ethnic group Sukuma (=1) -0.119 0.018
(0.071)* (0.102)
     Religion Muslim (=1) -0.186 -0.201
(0.099)* (0.099)**
     Religion Christian (=1) 0.109 0.092
(0.180) (0.183)
Economic indicators:
     Urban (=1) -0.006
(0.093)
     HHs have electricity (=1) -0.102
(0.069)
     HHs have piped water (=1) 0.170
(0.099)*
     Population (in 1,000's) -0.005
(0.016)
     Bank (=1) -0.168
(0.096)*
Constant 0.221 0.229 0.255
(0.043)*** (0.048)*** (0.057)***
Joint significance of ethnic indicators:² 0.053 0.023
Joint significance of economic indicators: 0.182
R² 0.2021 0.2224 0.2394
Note: LPM is used to predict high WPIR using a pooled cross-section
(four baseline passages in addition to the 2004 round).  Robust standard
errors are reported in parenthesis.
* indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
¹ The excluded majority ethnic group is Haya, the excluded majority religious
group is Catholic.
² Joint significance is reported using a the p-value from a χ² test.  
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Table 2.4: Estimating re-interview among full baseline sample
Re-interview 
(=1 if yes, 0 if no)
Determinants (N = 1,480) Coeff SE Coeff SE
Enters all four baseline rounds (=1) 0.319 (0.017)*** 0.317 (0.024)***
Community-level illness related adult death rate -0.345 (0.116)*** -0.245 (0.095)**
Price per tablet of paracet (=1) -0.008 (0.004)** -0.007 (0.004)*
Daughter of HH head (=1) -0.099 (0.034)*** -0.005 (0.042)
Age splines:
Age 20 to 29 (=1) -0.01 (0.041)
Age 30 to 39 (=1) -0.004 (0.048)
Age 40 to 49 (=1) 0.083 (0.054)
Age 50 and over (=1) 0.099 (0.053)*
Education:
No formal education (=1) 0.028 (0.029)
Secondary or above (=1) -0.206 (0.056)***
Marital status:
Never married (=1) -0.123 (0.042)***
Widowed or separated (=1) -0.143 (0.031)***
Religion of HH head:
Muslim (=1) -0.054 (0.046)
Other Christian denominations (=1) -0.037 (0.031)
Ethnicity/Tribe of HH head:
Nyambo (=1) 0.119 (0.037)***
Hangaza (=1) 0.000 (0.049)
Other tribe (=1) -0.062 (0.037)*
Bottom quintile of wealth distribution (=1) -0.054 (0.030)*
Community-level variables:
High WPIR (=1) -0.066 (0.034)*
Urban (=1) 0.009 (0.048)
Population (in 1,000's) 0.001 (0.006)
Bank (=1) -0.001 (0.037)
HHs have electricity (=1) -0.083 (0.056)
HHs have piped water (=1) 0.034 (0.058)
Public transport (=1) 0.019 (0.035)
District is regional capital (=1) -0.021 (0.048)
Constant 0.700 (0.087)*** 0.745 (0.090)***
R² 0.1251 0.1855
Wald test for joint significance of Z variables:¹ 0.000 119.96 0.000 47.93
Note: LPM is used to estimate re-interview, standard errors clustered at the community
level are reported in parenthesis.  Also included but not reported are seasonal and 
passage indicators.
* indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
¹ Joint significance is reported using the p-value from a χ² test.  
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Table 2.5: Summary of coefficients on high WPIR for economic welfare outcomes (left column)
(A) (B) (C)
  Baseline Fixed effects Fixed effects
  Cross-section with IPW
(N = 1,480) (N = 755) (N = 755)
Labor force participation and earnings Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
     Employed outside the home (last week = 1) 0.002 (0.034) -0.004 (0.035) 0.153 (0.065)**
     Working self employed (last week = 1) 0.075 (0.025)*** 0.067 (0.035)* -0.144 (0.099)
     Earnings (log shillings) 0.054 (0.237) 0.029 (0.258) 1.336 (0.576)**
Expenditures ¹
     Total individual expenditures (log shillings) 0.461 (0.203)** 0.048 (0.240) -0.323 (0.490)
     Total household expenditures (log shillings) 0.230 (0.156)* 0.219 (0.286) -0.468 (0.527)
Savings
     Savings account (=1) 0.018 (0.017) --- --- --- ---
     Total individual savings (log shillings) 0.691 (0.295)** --- --- --- ---
     Total household savings (log shillings) 0.420 (0.457) --- --- --- ---
Note: All models are estimated using OLS and LPMs. Standard errors clustered at the community
level are reported in parentheses; See Tables A8, A9 and A10 in the appendix for full models.
* indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table 2.6: Sum
m
ary of interactions (low
est w
ealth quintile, no schooling and w
idow
hood) and W
PIR
 coefficients
(A
)
(B
)
(B
)
B
aseline cross-section
Fixed-effects
Fixed-effects w
ith IPW
 (N
 = 1, 480)
(N
 = 755)
(N
 = 755)
    H
igh W
PIR
 Interaction term
     H
igh W
PIR
Interaction term
     H
igh W
PIR
Interaction term
A. Lowest wealth quintile:
C
oeff
SE
C
oeff
SE
C
oeff
SE
C
oeff
SE
C
oeff
SE
C
oeff
SE
  Em
ployed outside the hom
e (last w
eek = 1)
0.005
(0.029)
-0.021
(0.069)
-0.006
(0.357)
0.013
(0.075)
0.154
(0.070)**
-0.003
(0.117)
  Self em
ployed (last w
eek = 1)
0.082
(0.026)***
-0.042
(0.044)
0.076
(0.039)*
-0.056
(0.064)
-0.157
(0.104)
0.098
(0.013)
  Earnings (log shillings)
0.106
(0.227)
-0.318
(0.504)
0.047
(0.255)
-0.997
(0.581)
1.390
(0.608)**
-0.412
(0.914)
  Total individual expenditure (log shillings)
0.358
(0.234)
0.630
(0.341)*
-0.147
(0.236)
1.083
(0.581)*
-0.559
(0.846)
1.784
(0.953)*
  Total household expenditure (log shillings)
0.270
(0.187)
0.183
(0.334)
0.215
(0.306)
0.023
(0.456)
-0.612
(0.585)
1.091
(1.132)
B. N
o schooling:
  Em
ployed outside the hom
e (last w
eek = 1)
0.016
(0.030)
-0.073
(0.038)*
-0.020
(0.037)
0.059
(0.057)
0.163
(0.070)**
-0.059
(0.102)
  Self em
ployed (last w
eek = 1)
0.071
(0.029)**
0.023
(0.046)
0.082
(0.041)**
-0.057
(0.042)
-0.169
(0.108)
0.153
(0.110)
  Earnings (log shillings)
0.185
(0.211)
-0.656
(0.414)
-0.066
(0.273)
0.343
(0.429)
1.451
(0.612)**
-0.705
(0.800)
  Total individual expenditure (log shillings)
0.325
(0.199)
0.682
(0.301)**
-0.014
(0.239)
0.223
(0.473)
-0.508
(0.483)
1.132
(0.696)
  Total household expenditure (log shillings)
0.186
(0.161)
0.570
(0.257)**
0.274
(0.300)
-0.195
(0.527)
-0.636
(0.542)
1.027
(0.732)
C
. W
idow or separated:
  Em
ployed outside the hom
e (last w
eek = 1)
-0.004
(0.034)
0.021
(0.021)
-0.024
(0.045)
0.071
(0.069)
0.105
(0.080)
0.184
(0.172)
  Self em
ployed (last w
eek = 1)
0.058
(0.026)**
0.053
(0.024)**
0.075
(0.040)*
-0.030
(0.055)
-0.112
(0.103)
-0.121
(0.154)
  Earnings (log shillings)
0.083
(0.252)
-0.140
(0.368)
-0.084
(0.310)
0.394
(0.048)
1.029
(0.725)
1.170
(1.327)
  Total individual expenditure (log shillings)
0.409
(0.220)*
0.253
(0.399)
-0.150
(0.270)
0.688
(0.546)
-0.332
(0.570)
0.035
(0.722)
  Total household expenditure (log shillings)
0.298
(0.149)**
0.007
(0.215)
0.258
(0.297)
-0.134
(0.499)
-0.342
(0.532)
-0.481
(1.027)
N
ote: A
ll m
odels are estim
ated using O
LS and LPM
s. Standard errors clustered at the com
m
unity level are reported in parentheses.  M
odels are estim
ated 
w
ith sam
e specifications as in Table 2.5; * indicates significance at 10%
; ** significant at 5%
; *** significant at 1%
.
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CHAPTER III: CONTRACEPTIVE USE AND WOMEN’S WELL-BEING: 
SPILLOVER EFFECTS OF FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES IN RURAL TANZANIA 
 
 
Introduction 
Giving women the ability to safely plan and space their fertility has profound consequences for the 
individual and society as a whole.  The contraceptive pill was cited by the Economist (1999) as the 
greatest science and technology advancement of the twentieth century and has been linked to 
decreases in total fertility and improvements in reproductive health outcomes worldwide.38  Further 
evidence suggests the ‘power of the pill’ may go beyond reproductive health to include positive 
externalities in social and economic realms.  For example in the US, diffusion of modern 
contraceptives has been linked to various dimensions of women’s welfare including delayed age at 
first marriage, higher labor force participation and increased earnings (Bailey, 2006; Goldin & Katz, 
2000; 2002).  Although little evidence exists of this spillover effect in developing countries largely 
due to data constraints, common belief suggests that women who are able to avoid unwanted or mis-
timed pregnancies, will in turn be able to invest more in their human capital, improving not only their 
own economic status, but also that of their children.  Understanding the linkage between family 
planning (FP) and development outcomes is especially important for resource poor countries where 
access to contraceptives is still restricted and funding for FP services is low.  Advocates of 
reproductive choice claim FP services should be offered as part of the essential development package 
because of their potential to empower women and improve overall societal well-being.  However, 
there is little evidence to support this claim.     
                                                 
38 The US Food and Drug Administration first approved the use of a synthetic progesterone norethynodrel 
called Enovid as an oral contraceptive in 1960.  
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This paper seeks to contribute to the gap in empirical evidence linking contraceptive use and 
women’s economic welfare outcomes using data from rural Tanzania.  The data span four waves of 
the Kagera Health and Development Survey (KHDS) collected from 1991 to 1994.  The KHDS were 
originally commissioned by the World Bank to identify the long-term impacts and determinants of 
adult working age mortality due to HIV/AIDS and thus contains a rich set of economic outcomes 
measured at the individual level.  A range of economic welfare outcomes are examined to provide a 
more robust understanding of the relationship with contraceptive use and are divided into three main 
groups: 1) labor force participation and earnings, 2) savings and 3) expenditures.  The main empirical 
challenge is the potential endogeneity of contraceptive use which is addressed through 
instrumentation using two-stage least squares (2SLS) and individual fixed effects longitudinal 
modeling.  Results indicate measures of contraceptive use are statistically significantly associated 
with nearly all measures of economic welfare in cross-sectional models, and many of these 
relationships hold when applied to models accounting for the endogeneity of contraceptive use.  In 
addition, several extensions to the main analysis are conducted which indicate the type of 
contraceptives used matter and women who have higher education are better situated to take 
advantage of the benefits of contraceptive use, however this relationship is not observed for older or 
wealthier women.  This study reinforces program implications from US based studies which indicate 
strong spillover effects of FP services to a broader range of economic and social benefits. 
Background and significance  
Contraceptive use, reproductive health and development outcomes 
Informed access to safe, affordable, effective and acceptable contraceptive methods are an 
integral component of reproductive heath, affecting quality of overall health and everyday life 
(USAID, 2005).  Research aimed at identifying the direct effects of contraceptive use on fertility, 
child spacing, birth outcomes and overall reproductive health has grown since the 1960’s and 70’s.  
Contraceptive use has been found to be correlated with lower fertility in a number of international 
settings using a variety of analytic techniques (see e.g., Adamchak & Mbizvo, 1990; Edwards, 1996 
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in Zimbabwe; Hinde & Mturi, 2000 in Tanzania).  Although questions remain regarding effectiveness 
of specific components, the direct effect of contraceptive use on fertility outcomes through reduction 
in total fertility or through birth spacing has been shown in select resource poor settings.  A closely 
related body of literature examines the linkages between access to FP services on the community-
level and actual individual use of contraceptive methods or fertility (see e.g., Angeles, Guilkey & 
Mroz, 1998; Beegle, 1995, both in Tanzania; Degraff, Bilsborrow & Guilkey, 1997 in the Philippines; 
Entwisle et al., 1996 in Thailand; Guilkey & Jayne, 1997 in Zimbabwe; Pörtner, Beegle & 
Christiaensen, 2006 in Ethiopia; Tsui et al., 1981 in Korea, Mexico and Bangladesh; Magnani et. al., 
1999 in Morocco).39  In general, these and other studies find that community-level availability of FP 
services are directly associated with the probability of current contraceptive use, although the 
magnitude of these associations vary within subgroups and among settings.  Results on the effect of  
community-level FP service availability on fertility is mixed, although lack of association has been 
attributed to endogenous placement of and lack of variation in services (e.g., Molyneaux & Gertler, 
2000; Pitt, Rosenzwieg & Gibbons, 1993 both from Indonesia find no effect; Sinha, 2005; Foster & 
Roy, 1997 both from Bangladesh find significant effects).  Findings from the literature examining 
direct FP service impacts is heavily contingent on assumptions regarding whether placement is 
demand or need driven rather than an exogenous positive shock. 
A less developed body of literature examines the indirect effects of contraceptive use on 
economic outcomes such as age at first marriage, labor force participation and earnings.  Using cross-
state quasi-experimental data from the US, Goldin and Katz (2002) find that access to oral 
contraception early in life leads to a later age at first marriage and a larger proportion of women in 
professional occupations.  Using a similar framework and domestic data from the late 1970’s through 
the mid 90’s, Bailey (2006) shows that legal access to the contraceptive pill is significantly associated 
with an increased number of women in the paid labor force as well as an increased number of annual 
                                                 
39 Cross program effects have also been found between access to FP and other birth outcomes such as abortion, 
child mortality and maternal mortality (Marston & Cleland, 2003; Rahman, DaVanzo & Razzaque, 2001; 
Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1982; Winikoff & Sullivan, 1987). 
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hours worked.  The author proposes access to FP services affect women’s lifecycle labor supply 
through a reduction in the costs and increase in the returns to pursuing a career.  The intuition is that 
providing an accessible means to delay childbearing allows women to continue formal education, 
pursue careers and work additional hours which would have been spent caring for children.  
Moreover, this effect is independent of changes in total completed fertility.  Bailey (2006) argues the 
ability to strategically space births and the delay early unintended pregnancies may be among the 
contraceptive pill’s most important contributions, and thus studies which only examine completed or 
total fertility effects of FP services necessarily omit an important and significant part of the story. 
Research examining the effect of contraceptive use on indirect economic welfare outcomes in 
developing countries is more uncommon due to data constraints.  Using data from Indonesia, 
Angeles, Guilkey and Mroz (2005) model women’s schooling, marriage and fertility decisions using a 
maximum likelihood framework and find that FP services at early ages significantly contribute to 
higher educational attainment and lower fertility among women.  Miller (2005) evaluates the 
Columbian Profamilia FP program and finds positive effects on education and labor force 
participation on young women exposed to the program as teenagers.  In addition to reducing women’s 
overall fertility, Foster and Roy (1997) show that FP programs have a significant effect on increasing 
their children’s schooling using data from the Matlab experiment in Bangladesh.40  Also using Matlab 
data, Sinha (2005) shows that access to FP services significantly reduces women’s fertility and labor 
force participation for their male children ages 10 to 16, although has no effect on female children’s 
labor force participation or school enrollment of either sex.  More recently also using the Matlab data, 
Joshi and Schultz (2007) find women and their children in villages with FP services have significantly 
higher measures of health using a twenty-year panel, however, economic benefits are found primarily 
among better educated women.  This study and the Indonesian study are initial evidence that the 
                                                 
40 The Matlab family planning, maternal and child health experiment was started in 1977 by the International 
Center for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh and provided intensive health service delivery including 
FP outreach through community health workers.  Approximately half of the 149 sample villages received the 
intensive treatment while the remainder continued to be served by existing government FP services (Joshi & 
Shultz, 2007).  
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social returns to reproductive health programs may have lasting indirect effects for women.  
However, it is possible that findings from Bangladesh are site specific due to the intensive nature of 
the experimental Matlab program design.  Although the theoretical and motivational basis for 
extending contraceptive use to economic outcomes in developing countries is promising, there is a 
lack of geographically diverse evidence to support this hypothesis.        
Contraceptive use in Tanzania 
Evidence suggests that contraceptive use in Tanzania has steadily increased during the 
1990’s.  According to the Ministry of Health, the contraceptive prevalence rate among currently 
married women of reproductive age in the late 1980’s ranged between five and seven percent (MoH, 
1989).  The 1991/92 Tanzanian Demographic and Health Survey (TDHS) estimated the same number 
at 10.4 percent and by 1996, the prevalence rate had risen to approximately 18.4 percent (Ngallaba et 
al. 1993; BoS & Macro International, 1997).  These trends show some of the largest gains in Eastern 
Africa in the decade and coincide with a series of general health sector reforms initiated in the early 
1990’s.  Reforms were aimed at addressing capacity and quality problems including shortage of 
trained personnel, low morale of current workers, poor management and heavy political influence in 
health sector appointments.  To specifically address the demand for FP services, the Ministry of 
Health established a Family Planning Unit in 1990 to coordinate and implement the countries first 
National Population Policy.  The policy was formally enacted in 1992, with the primary goal of 
strengthening FP services, promoting the health and welfare of families and eventually reducing 
population growth (Shutt, 1994).  In addition, these reforms coincided with the Family Planning 
Services Support Project, a $20 million, seven year USAID funded project.  The expected outputs of 
the project not only included expansion of quality clinical FP services, but also incorporated building 
institutional capacity in reproductive health and development of monitoring and evaluation of 
activities.  Despite the roll out of services and rapid increase in contraceptive uptake during the 
1990’s, the Tanzanian FP program lost momentum in the 2000’s (Pike & Simbakalia, 2006).  The 
total fertility rate (TFR) in Tanzania showed no statistical decline from 1996 to 2004 and the annual 
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change in contraceptive prevalence decreased from 2.1 percent (1992 through 1999) to 0.20 percent 
(1999 through 2004).41  However, unmet need has continued to increase.  Estimates from the TDHS 
2004 show that 1.1 million married women have an unmet need for contraception, a larger number 
than those currently using a modern method, or 880,000 women (BoS & Macro International, 2005).  
Although FP programs and diffusion of modern contraceptives were given resources and attention 
over a decade ago, this momentum has slowed and now lacks support from both in country and 
international organizations. 
Development in Tanzania 
Formed in 1964, the United Republic of Tanzania occupies the largest land area of any 
country in East Africa and is home to over 38 million inhabitants (WB, 2006).  The country borders 
eight countries, Kenya and Uganda to the north, Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of 
Congo to the west and Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique to the south.  Although enjoying relative 
political stability, Tanzania ranks among the poorest countries in the world.  The per-capita GNI was 
340 USD42 in 2005 and over 35 percent of the population on mainland Tanzania was below the 
national poverty line in at the most recent measurement in 2000 (WB, 2006).43  In 2001, Tanzania 
ranked 160 out of 175 on the Human Development Index collected by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) at a value of 0.40, below the average value for sub-Saharan Africa 
                                                 
41 The annual change in prevalence in the Lake Zone (Kagera, Kigoma, Mara, Mwanza, Tabora and Shinyanga 
regions) is estimated at 1.3 (1992 to 1999) and is estimated to have decreased to -0.46 (1999 to 2004) (Pike & 
Simbakalia, 2006). 
 
42 The per capita GNI (Gross National Income) are converted into USD using the Atlas method.  This takes into 
account GDP plus the net flows from other factors (rents, profits, and labor income) from abroad.  The Atlas 
method smoothes exchange rate fluctuations by using a three year moving average, price-adjusted conversion 
factor (WB, 2006).   
 
43 The poverty measures were calculated using the Household Budget Survey 2000/01 and the Integrated Labor 
Force Survey 2000-01, the poverty line refers to the national basic needs poverty line.  Poverty levels differ 
between urban and rural residence.  The proportion total poor living in urban areas is 13 percent, while the 
proportion of poor living in rural areas is 87 percent (United Republic of Tanzania, 2003). 
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(UNDP, 2003).44  In addition to the overall measure of poverty within the population, women as a 
social group in Tanzania face particular hardship.  Tanzania ranked 130 out of 144 countries on the 
UNDP Gender-Related Development Index, at a value of 0.396.45  This inequity is further seen in 
Tanzanian outcomes for proxy indicators of women’s status such as the maternal mortality ratio 
(MMR) and women’s labor force participation.  According to estimates by WHO, UNICEF and 
UNFPA, Tanzania had the world’s sixth highest number of maternal deaths during 2000 (at an 
estimated 21,000 maternal deaths), putting a woman’s lifetime risk of maternal death at 
approximately 1 out of 10 women (UNDP, 2003).  The majority of working women (72 percent) are 
involved in agriculture, primarily working family-owned land (TNBS, 2000).  The remaining working 
women are employed in unskilled labor and manual jobs (20 percent).  Only two percent of working 
women hold professional, managerial or technical jobs.  According to the ILO (1997), structural 
adjustment during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s are thought to have worsened gender inequality in 
access to employment and economic activities, especially in the formal sector.  With respect to health 
and welfare outcomes, evidence not only suggests that overall indicators lag relative to neighboring 
countries and that the relative position of women in Tanzania has not been improving. 
Theoretical model 
Economic models of household production exploring determinants of time use, expenditures and 
nutrition have been widely utilized to guide empirical work using data from developing countries (see 
Strauss & Thomas, 1995; 1998; Behrman & Deolalikar, 1988; Juster & Stafford, 1991 for reviews).  
These models are rooted in Becker’s household production framework in which households allocate 
time and goods to produce a range of market and non-market commodities (Becker, 1965).  This 
model has been specifically applied to reproductive decisions through the mapping of total lifetime 
                                                 
44 The Human Development Index is made up of the average achievements in life expectancy at birth, adult 
literacy, combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrollment rages and gross national income. 
 
45 The UNDP measures gender inequality by using the unweighted average of three component indices: (1) life 
expectancy, education and income.  Its gender-related development index (GDI) ranges from 0 (lowest gender 
equality) to 1 (highest gender equality).   
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fertility to the total psychic reward (utility) of consumption (see e.g., Becker, 1960; Robinson, 1997; 
Turchi, 1975).  In general, economic models of human capital outcomes specify the following: among 
other things, household utility is a function of number and quality of children, consumption of leisure 
and other non-market and market goods.  Utility is maximized subject to a variety of constraints (time 
and technology) to recover reduced form-demand equations for all inputs in the production function.  
These reduced-form equations map demand for children, nutrition, time allocation, or certain 
commodities to exogenous inputs at the individual, household and community level.   
 For example, following Beegle (2005), time demand for individual woman i in activity j (for 
example working her own land) can be modeled as the following reduced demand equation: 
(1) Tij = Tij (Tt, pm, ph, wij, Ai, vi, vij | Z); 
where Tij is total time or hours spent working on her own land, Tt is total time available, pm and ph are 
vectors of prices for market and home-produced commodities including contraceptives, wij is the 
wage rate, Ai are assets or unearned income, vi are unobservable individual level characteristics, vij  
are exogenous environmental characteristics, conditional on Z, a set of individual level tastes and 
preferences, including preferences for family size and/or regarding acceptability of contraceptive use.  
As previously mentioned, similar reduced-form demand equations may be constructed for other 
outcomes. 
Contraceptive use affects economic outcomes through a number of different channels.  The 
option to use contraceptive methods may influence a woman’s current or future decisions about 
schooling, marriage, or labor force participation through expectations of wij (wage rate for activity j) 
or though a shift in Z (tastes and preferences regarding family size).  In addition, women who are 
currently using contraceptive methods to space, limit, or delay fertility may be affected through an 
increase in Tt, total time which they would have otherwise spend caring for and raising children.  As 
previously discussed, many direct effects on fertility decisions (spacing or delaying) may only be 
identifiable after any individual woman’s fertility is completed.  It is important therefore, to examine 
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these cross effects without explicitly considering the effect through current fertility (Bailey, 2006; 
Miller, 2005).        
Data: Kagera Health and Development Survey 
The KHDS were originally part of a joint World Bank research project the “Economic Impact of Fatal 
Adult Illness from AIDS and Other Causes in Sub-Saharan Africa” (WB-DRG, 2004).46  The Kagera 
region is located to the west of Lake Victoria bordering Rwanda and Burundi to the east and Uganda 
to the north.  The region is primarily rural and is home to over two million people, divided into five 
administrative districts (TNBS, 2002).  The KHDS interviewed approximately 832 households in 50 
communities over four waves at seven month intervals between 1991 and 1994 (see Appendix Figure 
A1 for location of clusters within Kagera).  The household sample was random, stratified on 
geography, community adult mortality rates47 and indicators at the household level that were thought 
to be predictive of future adult deaths.  In the first stage, 550 primary sampling units (PSU) in Kagera 
were classified according to four agronomic zones and either a high or low level of adult mortality.  
Clusters of households were randomly drawn from each PSU, stratified on agronomic zone, with a 
probability of selection proportional to population.  In the second stage, households were classified as 
either ‘sick’ or ‘well.’48  Approximately sixteen households were selected at random from each 
cluster, fourteen from the ‘sick’ and two from the ‘well’ group (see WB-DRG, 2004 or Beegle, 
DeWeerdt & Dercon, 2006 for further discussion of sampling procedure).  The KHDS questionnaires 
were modeled after the World Bank’s Living Standards Measurement Surveys and collected 
extensive, detailed information on household income, consumption expenditure, individual economic 
activities, education and individual health status, including the height and weight of all household 
                                                 
46 The research project is also known as the Economic Impact of Adult Mortality Study.  Funding was provided 
by the World Bank Research Committee, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and the Danish Agency for Development Assistance (WB-DRG, 2004). 
 
47 Community adult mortality rates were taken from the 1988 census and a subsequent enumeration for the 
survey (WB-DRG, 2004). 
 
48 ‘Sick’ households were those who either had an adult death (aged 15 to 50) due to illness in the last year or an 
adult too sick to work at the time of the survey or both.  ‘Well’ households were all others with no recent deaths 
or sick members (WB-DRG, 2004). 
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members.  In addition, matching community modules were administered on local markets and price 
information, health facilities and education facilities. 
The analysis will utilize the first four waves of KHDS which started in 1991 and took place 
approximately every six to seven months afterward until 1994.49  The sample is limited to women 
between the ages of 15 and 49 who enter at least two of the four waves, corresponding to the age 
range of women who were asked the fertility modules.50  The panel is made up of approximately 
3,781 woman years over four passages (1,159 individual women).  The sample is restricted to women 
entering at least two rounds of the panel to eliminate inconsistencies in comparison between pooled 
cross-sectional and longitudinal models. 
Empirical models and variables 
The main empirical challenge in estimating the effect of contraceptive use on economic welfare is the 
endogeneity of contraceptive use.  It is likely there are a set of preferences regarding contraceptive 
use which are unobserved to the researcher (vector Z in equation 1).  These preferences or individual 
heterogeneities are of concern if they also affect economic outcomes and thus result in biased 
estimates, which are likely to overestimate the relationship between contraceptive use and welfare 
outcomes.  More specifically, it may be expected that women who are more likely to choose to use 
contraceptives are those who are more likely to work outside the home in the absence of 
contraceptive use.  Thus women who are empowered have a higher likelihood of both using FP 
services and having better economic welfare outcomes.  To illustrate the endogeneity problem and to 
provide a more robust understanding of the relationship between contraceptive use and women’s 
economic welfare outcomes, three different models are compared: 1) pooled cross-sectional models 
among all four waves, 2) two-stage least squares (2SLS) models instrumenting contraceptive use, and 
                                                 
49 The data was collected over four waves, corresponding with the questionnaire sequence and four passages, 
corresponding with the year the questionnaire was given.  Therefore, a woman who is interviewed for the first 
time in 1993 is assigned wave 1, passage 3.  For this analysis, each individual was assigned contemporaneous 
passage indicators and arranged according to survey year (for details see WB-DRG, 2004). 
 
50 In wave 1, all women are asked.  In the remaining waves, the module is asked to only 15 to 50 year olds and 
married 14 year olds.  
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3) a longitudinal individual-level fixed effects models.  The first model, does not account for 
endogeneity and uses a pooled cross-section where the illustrative unit of analysis is the individual 
woman (i) in community (j) can be written as follows: 
(2) Pr (Yi = 1) = β0 +β1(Ci) + β2 (Xi ) + β3 (Xh ) + β4 (Xj ) + εi 
Economic welfare outcome (Yi) of any given woman is a function of contraceptive use (Ci), 
individual woman-level characteristics (Xi ), household-level (Xh ) and community-level indicators 
(Xj).  Contraceptive use is measured by asking each woman the following question: “Some couples 
use contraceptive methods to avoid pregnancy or to space births, are you currently using a method of 
contraception? (for example, the pill, IUD [inter-uterine device], condoms, withdrawal, rhythm, 
abstinence).”  This question is asked for both primary and secondary birth control methods for each 
woman.  Because this measure is a broad definition of contraceptive use, alternative indicators 
representing only modern contraceptive use (pill, IUD, condoms and injectibles) and only dual 
contraceptive use (any method in addition to condoms) are explored as alternatives to the 
comprehensive measure described above.51  Individual-level control variables include age and age 
squared, education levels, marital status, religion, ethnicity and wave indicators.  Household-level 
characteristics included in all models are the bottom 40 percent of the wealth index and community-
level controls include indicator of bank, daily market, households in the community have electricity 
and piped water and seasonal indicators.  Seasonal indicators are month variables at the time of 
interview to control for fluctuations in work, earnings and expenditures inherit in agriculturally driven 
economies.  Binary outcomes are estimated using linear probability models (LPM) and continuous 
outcomes using OLS regression.  Standard errors are clustered at the community level to account for 
unobserved cluster-level variation. 
                                                 
51 Note several of the methods in this comprehensive measure do not require a medical intervention and can be 
behaviorally based (but require FP knowledge such as the rhythm method which must be taught at a clinic).  
Due to the low percentage using strictly modern methods, this more comprehensive measure is used to capture a 
greater percentage of women who are currently intending to limit or prevent pregnancy in the main analysis, 
while alternatives are examined in extensions. 
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As previously mentioned, a simple cross-sectional model such as (2) does not take into 
account unobserved heterogeneous preferences or fixed traits influencing individual-level 
contraceptive use.  Under this scenario, the error term εi takes the following form: 
(3) εi =λi + uit 
where λi  is constant across individuals and uit is assumed to be ~N(0, σ²u).  To address this potential 
bias, two different models are contrasted.  To correct for bias from time invariant sources, an 
individual-level panel fixed effects model is estimated and following specification:52 
(4) Pr (ΔYit = 1) = β0 +β1(ΔC i,t) + β2 (ΔXi,t) + β3 (ΔXh,t) + β4 (ΔXj,t) + Δεt 
Equation (4) maps the change in welfare (ΔYi) of each woman over the four waves as a function of 
the change in contraceptive use (ΔCi), the change in individual woman-level (ΔXi ), household-level 
(ΔXh ) and community-level indicators (ΔXj ).  In this specification the constant term (λi) is eliminated 
through differencing and equation (4) is left with a random error component, thus accounting for 
individual and community-level fixed sources of bias.  Note this approach relies on the assumption 
the main source of endogeneity is from time-invariant factors influencing contraceptive choice.  As an 
alterative to control for the endogeneity of contraceptive use, three variations of 2SLS are conducted 
instrumenting contraceptive use with a variety of health service availability including FP indicators at 
the community-level.53  This method involves predicting contraceptive use in a first stage equation, 
using the following specification: 
(5) Pr (Contraceptive Usei = 1) = β0 +β1(FPj) + β2 (Xi ) + β3 (Xh ) + β4 (Xj ) + εi 
In equation (5), the probability of using contraceptives is a function of community-level health and 
FP services (FPj instruments), a vector of individual-level (Xi ), household-level (Xh ) and 
community-level characteristics (Xj ).  The value of the predicted contraceptive use from equation (5) 
                                                 
52 Note that the choice of a fixed effects model can be tested against the alternative random effects estimator 
using the modified Breush-Pagan test for unbalanced panels adopted by Baltagi and Li (1990).  These statistics 
are reported in the bottom of Appendix Table B8. 
 
53 Note two stage residual inclusion models are an alternative to 2SLS models, and comparatively found to be 
more consistent (Terza, Basu & Rathouz, 2008).  However, for this analysis, results do not change substantially 
and therefore are not reported.  
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is then placed in equation (2) in the second stage to predict economic welfare outcomes.  To account 
for use of a predicted value, standard errors in the second stage are bootstrapped with 1,000 
repetitions.  Equation (5) is estimated using a LPM to avoid misspecification bias likely in use of logit 
or probit models (Angrist & Krueger, 2001).  The viability of the instrumental variables approach 
depends critically on the strength of the instruments in predicting the endogenous variable.  If 
equation (5) poorly predicts contraceptive use, then replacing the actual value with the predicted 
value only replaces the indicator with a noisy, poor measure.  The R² of the first stage (equation 5) is 
a good approximation of the strength of the instruments, where an R² under 0.10 is a poor predictor 
(Bollen, Guilkey & Mroz, 1995).  In addition, joint F-test’s on the instruments in the first stage 
should be statistically significant and strong, where the rule of thumb is an F-statistic of 10 or over.  
Finally the instruments should theoretically and statistically be excluded from equation (2) as shown 
by an insignificant or less powerful joint F-statistic when included in equation (2).  The basic set of 
indicators used to instrument contraceptive use are: 1) distance in kilometers to the nearest health 
facility, 2) nearest health facility stocks the contraceptive pill, 3) nearest health facility offers HIV test 
and 4) nearest health facility offers pregnancy test.  In addition, to increase the explanatory power of 
the instrument set, interactions between indicators service availability (instruments 2, 3 and 4) and 
education levels of individual women (primary and secondary education and above) are included.  It 
is assumed higher educated women are more able to take advantage of FP and other health services 
due to increased health knowledge and information as well as economic accessibility.  This set of four 
instruments in addition to the six education interactions will be referred to as the ‘basic instrument 
set.’  The KHDS collects a variety of other quality of care indicators including availability of various 
FP methods, number of days offering FP services, if payments are required for methods and other 
specific complimentary services (for example cesarean sections).  However, none of these services 
are significantly associated with contraceptive use and are thus not utilized.54  Further discussion of 
                                                 
54 In addition to testing straight indicators, indices using factor analysis and Cronbach’s alpha are constructed 
representing FP method availability and specific complimentary services at the community level.  However 
   
 60
the lack of significance of many FP service indicators is highlighted in the discussion section.  
Although the basic instrument set are theoretically valid exclusions and expected to explain 
contraceptive use rather than economic outcomes, the conditions for valid 2SLS modeling are 
stringent and there are many potential pitfalls (Angrist & Krueger, 2001).  In implementation of this 
approach, it is apparent this set of instruments has low predictive power of contraceptive use (as 
shown by the first stage R² and F-test of instruments) and therefore two alternative instrumentation 
variations are explored.  The first (variation 1) includes the four basic instrument set (including 
interactions with education indicators) as well as the community-level non-self clustered mean of 
contraceptive use.  The second (variation 2) includes the basic instrument set as well as cluster-level 
fixed effects in an effort to identify some of the spatial differences in service provision.55  These two 
variations are discussed further in subsequent sections. 
Results 
Descriptive results 
Descriptive statistics for contraceptive use and economic outcome indicators are presented in Table 
3.1.  In addition to the pooled sample, descriptive statistics are given for the first and fourth waves to 
help identify trends over the three year period.  Average contraceptive use is 12 percent among the 
pooled sample, moving from 15 percent in wave one to 11 percent in wave four.  A lower percentage 
of women practice modern and dual contraceptive use (six and two percent of the pooled sample, 
respectively).  The economic welfare indicators fall into three main categories: 1) labor force 
participation and earnings, 2) savings and 3) expenditures (see Appendix Table B1 for detailed 
information on construction of economic outcome variables).  Approximately eight and 10 percent of 
the pooled sample work outside the home and are self employed.  The percentage over the three year 
panel working outside the home decreases slightly, while the percentage working self employed 
                                                                                                                                                       
these indices are not significantly associated with individual-level contraceptive use and thus not utilized. 
 
55 Note in the models which employ cluster-level fixed effects, second stage models include district-level fixed 
effects to account for some of the higher level spatial factors influencing contraceptive use. 
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increases slightly.  Approximately five percent of the sample has a formal savings account, 45 percent 
of the sample has any kind of savings and 22 percent of the sample participates in an informal credit 
group.  Trends in earnings, expenditures and savings are mixed; earnings and expenditures decrease 
slightly while savings increase slightly over the panel period.   
Descriptive statistics for the key instruments used to predict the contraceptive use in 2SLS 
models are presented in Table 3.2 for the pooled cross-section as well as the first and fourth waves.  
The average distance to the closest health facility is 3.6 km and approximately 62 percent of the 
nearest facilities stocked the contraceptive pill at the time of the data collection visit.  Lower 
percentages of the closest facilities offer HIV tests (12 percent) and pregnancy tests (13 percent).  
Similar to individual-level contraceptive use indicators, FP and other health service provision 
decreases slightly over the panel period.  For example in wave 1, 61 percent of nearest health 
facilities stock the contraceptive pill, while this percentage decreases to 58 percent in wave 4. 
Descriptive statistics for all control variables in the pooled sample as well as the first and 
forth waves are presented in Table B2 in the Appendix.  The average age among the pooled sample is 
27 years and the majority category for education is partial or completed primary (77 percent).  The 
largest proportion of women are in a marital union (47 percent) followed by never married (35 
percent) and the fewest women have been widowed or separated (19 percent).  The majority 
household heads identify as Christian or Catholic (87 percent) and belong to the Haya ethnic group 
(63 percent).  Household wealth is computed through construction of a household per capita index 
created through factor analysis using land, dwelling, livestock values and a range of assets (mean 
values and principal contributions are reported for wave 1 in Table B3). Approximately 21 percent of 
the sample resides in urban areas, 29 percent of the communities have electricity and 23 percent have 
piped water.  The average cluster population size is approximately 3,440 inhabitants. 
First stage results: FP availability and contraceptive use 
Table 3.3 displays first stage results predicting contraceptive use using a pooled-cross section.  The 
first two columns present coefficients and bootstrapped standard errors using the basic set of 
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instruments, the middle two columns present results of variation 1 (adding the non-self clustered 
mean of contraceptive use), while the last two columns present results of variation 2 (adding cluster 
fixed effects).  Columns A, A1 and A2 are results using only instruments to predict contraceptive use, 
while columns B, B1 and B2 are results adding all control variables to models.  Note columns A, A1 
and A2 are displayed to illustrate the unmediated relationship between the instruments and 
contraceptive use, however predicted values are not used in subsequent analysis.  R² values and F-
tests of instrument strength are reported at the bottom of the table.  In models using the basic 
instrument set, increasing distance to the nearest health facility decreases the probability that a 
woman will be using contraceptives.  This effect is significant with and without additional control 
variables (moving from column A to B).  Indicators of stocking contraceptive pill and offering 
pregnancy tests contribute negatively to the probability a woman uses contraceptives, however, this 
effect is offset by positive interaction terms with primary and secondary education.  The direct effect 
of the provision of HIV testing is associated with higher contraceptive use, while interaction terms 
with education indicators are negatively associated with contraceptive use, which may indicate 
purposeful or endogenous placement of HIV testing services.  The primary concern with the basic set 
of instruments is low predictive power of contraceptive use.  The overall F-test of instrument strength 
is highly significant (1 percent level), however the F-statistic (6.05) fails to achieve the rule of thumb 
cut off of 10 or higher.  The R² value is also relatively low, only explaining just over seven percent of 
the variation in contraceptive use.  As previously noted, two alternative instrumentation strategies are 
explored, both of which boost the explanatory power of the model, however still do not achieve the 
rule of thumb tests for instrument strength.  The weak instrument problem is further explored in the 
discussion section and evidence suggests purposeful program placement may play a role in lack of 
explanatory power of the indicators utilized for instrumentation.  Other significant determinants of 
contraceptive use are age (U-shaped relationship), secondary education (positively associated with 
contraceptive use), being widowed or separated and low household wealth (both lower the probability 
of contraceptive use). 
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Contraceptive use and economic outcomes 
Table 3.4 displays a summary of the coefficients and bootstrapped standard errors for the effects of 
contraceptive use on a variety of economic welfare outcomes listed in the left column.  Column A 
displays results from the pooled cross-sectional models, columns B, B1 and B2 from the 2SLS 
models and column C from the individual-level fixed effects models.  Note that each coefficient on 
contraceptive use is taken from separate regressions predicting economic welfare outcome measures.  
Full regression results are found in Tables B4 through B8 in the Appendix.  F-statistics for tests of 
exclusion restrictions of instruments using 2SLS models are found in the bottom of Tables B5, B6 
and B7.  It should be noted nearly all exclusions are statistically significant at some level in economic 
outcome models, which is in part expected because of interaction terms.  However, with the exception 
of prediction of having a savings account, none of these levels are higher as compared to the first 
stage strength of instruments.  P-values from Hausman tests of contrasting fixed effects and random 
effects models for panel data models are found in the bottom of Table B8.  All Hausman tests reject 
random effects models in favor of the fixed effects specifications.  In models using the pooled cross-
section (column A), contraceptive use is positively associated with all economic welfare outcomes 
except working self employed.  For example, women who use contraceptives are five percentage 
points more likely to be employed outside the home in the last week and 10.5 percentage points more 
likely to have any individual savings.  However, when the endogeneity of contraceptive use is 
accounted for (columns B, B1 and B2), only savings indicators remain significantly associated with 
contraceptive use.  Note that many of the coefficients in the 2SLS models have magnitudes higher 
relative to the columns A or C and it is probable the estimates are unstable because of relatively weak 
explanatory power of instruments.  In column C, where individual time invariant fixed effects are 
employed, contraceptive use is positively correlated with holding a savings account, any savings, total 
individual savings, any expenditure and total individual expenditure.  The magnitudes of the fixed 
effects coefficients are lower than the cross-sectional analysis, but generally comparable. 
Extensions 
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Two extensions are explored to gain a more robust understanding of the linkages between 
contraceptive use and development outcomes.  First, interaction terms are explored between 
contraceptive use, age, secondary education or above and highest wealth quintile to explore 
heterogeneous treatment effects of contraceptive use.  Second, two alternative measures for 
contraceptive use are explored: 1) modern use and 2) dual use (with condoms).  Previous literature 
has shown that women with higher status as signaled by age, higher education, or household wealth 
are better situated to take advantages of and benefit from contraceptive use (Foster & Roy, 1997; 
Sinha, 2005; Rosenzweig & Schultz, 1982).  Therefore it is expected that interaction terms between 
contraceptive use, education and age will be positive and significant (complements), while the 
interaction term with low household wealth will be negative and significant (substitutes).  The 
alternative contraceptive use measures are interesting for a number of reasons.  Modern use represents 
a more restrictive definition of contraceptive use, specifically one which must be provided by a FP 
facility as opposed to a knowledge based or behavioral intervention such as the rhythm method or 
withdrawal.  Dual use is particularly noteworthy in the setting with high HIV prevalence to explore if 
women choosing to use condoms only or condoms alongside another birth control method show 
stronger associations with welfare outcomes through the added benefit of HIV protection.  It is 
expected both modern and dual contraceptive use will show stronger statistical significance or 
magnitude with welfare outcomes in comparison to the inclusive measure of contraceptive use as 
implemented in the main analysis. 
 A summary of results of the first extension are displayed in Table 3.5.  The top panel (A) 
shows the coefficients on contraceptive use and the interaction terms with age, the middle panel (B) 
replicates this model for interactions with secondary education and above and the bottom panel (C) 
with the bottom 40 percent of the wealth index.  Dependent variables are listed in the first column and 
each set of coefficients is taken from a separate regression.  The only set of interactions which are 
consistently significant those in the pooled cross-section analysis (column A) with contraceptive use 
and secondary education and above.  In five outcomes (employment outside the home, earnings, 
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savings account, any savings and total savings amount), higher education is positive and significant, 
signifying education and contraceptive use are complements.  However, none of these significant 
interactions carry over into the fixed effects panel specification.  One set of interactions with 
household wealth in predicting participation in informal credit groups move in the expected direction, 
however, overall there is no pattern signifying wealth or age may act to inhibit or promote the linkage 
between contraceptive use and welfare outcomes.   
 Summaries of the second extension examining the effects of modern use and dual use of 
contraceptives and economic welfare outcomes are reported in Tables B9 and B10 respectively in the 
Appendix.  Results of these extensions are generally as hypothesized, where coefficients for modern 
and dual contraceptive use are larger as compared to the broader measure of contraceptive use 
signifying a stronger effect size.  For example, modern contraceptive use is associated with an eight 
percentage point increase in the probability of employment outside the home and a 14 percentage 
point increase in probability of any individual savings (Table B9, column A).  Likewise, dual 
contraceptive use is associated with a 17 percentage point increase in probability of working outside 
the home and in having any individual savings (Table B10, column A).  Although the trend of 
increasing effects is generally the case with these alternative measures, dual contraceptive use is 
never significant in fixed effects models (Table B10, column B).  This is likely due to the very low 
percentage of women using dual protection and low power to achieve significance levels both in 
cross-sectional and panel models. 
Discussion 
There are significant challenges in identifying impacts of FP services, which not only contain a large 
behavioral take-up component, but also are subject to endogenous placement of programs.  In 
implementing a 2SLS approach, data on theoretically valid exclusions for instruments is often 
lacking.  Even when suitable instruments are available, they may not be statistically valid, which is 
partially the case in this analysis.  A number of FP service indicators are natural choices for 
instruments, however, overall they lack the explanatory power of strong instruments leading to 
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potentially biased and unstable results.  In spite of weaknesses of the 2SLS approach, due to the panel 
nature of the data, it is possible to offer a credible alternative approach to this problem through fixed 
effects modeling.  A factor which may be driving low explanatory power of FP services in 
determining contraceptive use is potential placement of FP programs.56  If FP programs are targeted 
or allocated within communities according to a specific funding rule or based on demand for services, 
this may bias results if distribution mechanisms are also correlated with outcomes such as health and 
fertility (Molyneaux & Gertler, 2000; Pörtner, Beegle, & Christiaensen, 2007; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 
1988).  The endogeneity problem of program placement is examined by Angeles, Guilkey and Mroz 
(1998) using cross sectional data from Tanzania.  Results show that without controlling for program 
placement, hospitals are the most important type of facility for providing FP services.  However, after 
controlling for the potential endogeniety of program placement, health centers are found to have 
significant effects on fertility reduction, while hospitals have insignificant effects.  To further explore 
the potential of endogenous program placement in the KHDS, a community-level analysis is 
conducted using demographic, economic, regional and fertility related factors to predict the 
probability of stocking contraceptive pills at the nearest health facility.  The results of this exploration 
are presented in Appendix tables B11 (descriptive statistics) and B12 (determinant analysis).  
Although the sample size is relatively small, the results confirm the hypothesis of endogenous 
program placement based on average community-level fertility.  Two variations are considered, 
column A includes average community fertility of women ages 30 to 50 to represent past demand or 
perceived need for FP services, while column B includes average community fertility of all women 
ages 15 to 50 to represent current demand or need for FP services.  Results indicate communities with 
an average fertility of one child higher per woman are associated with an eight (past fertility) to 14 
(current fertility) percentage point increased probability of the nearest health facility stocking the 
contraceptive pill.  This could be driven by demand in high fertility areas, or governmental planning 
                                                 
56 Program placement has been the hypothesized cause of negative association between FP programs and 
contraceptive prevalence in several cross sectional studies using Indonesian data (see e.g. Lerman et al., 1989). 
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which targets areas with the highest potential for program impact of providing services.  Regional and 
economic indicators are in general not significant suggesting distribution factors are not playing a 
significant role determining FP services (for example urban centers or districts closer to the capital 
city are not more likely to provide services).  The result of this analysis which suggests purposeful 
placement of services based on demand for services speaks to both a potential underlying factor 
driving the weak instrument problem found in this analysis and the difficulty in capturing accurate 
program impacts of FP services. 
 Other studies focused on identifying effects of contraceptive use or FP services have 
addressed endogeneity issues with varying levels of success.  In domestic studies, Bailey (2005) and 
Goldin and Katz (2002) use variation in state laws over time on access to contraception as 
instruments.  These laws (for example the requirement of prescription from physician versus 
pharmacist and access for legal minors) are taken as exogenous to the individual woman’s use of 
contraceptive services.  A number of studies from developing countries use geographic variation in 
introduction of FP service provision, arguing exogeneity of placement, either due to experimental 
program design (Foster & Roy, 1997; Joshi & Shultz, 2007; Sinha, 2005 all in Bangladesh) or 
‘haphazard’ distribution unrelated to fertility or other socio-economic characteristics of the 
community (Miller, 2005 in Columbia).  In considering factors which influence contraceptive choice, 
a variety of determinants linked to FP services have been shown to significantly influence individual 
women’s uptake of contraceptives including quality of care, provider attitudes and method 
availability (Lerman et al., 1989; Magnani et al., 1999; Tsui et al., 1981) and are thus natural 
instrument choices.  From an economic perspective, natural choices for instrumenting health input are 
prices, either in the form of time or access costs, such as distance to services, time spent waiting or 
monetary costs of services (Shultz, 2004).  It is not plausible to assume these factors are strictly 
exogenous to economic welfare outcomes, however, it is reasonable to assume they better predict use 
of contraceptives rather than general development outcomes.  In the current study for example, 
distance to nearest health clinic is used as an exogenous factor to predict contraceptive use.  Although 
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closer presence of a health facility is indicative of better overall development opportunities, it is likely 
this measure is a stronger predictor of health services use.  Based on the weakness of the indicators 
used in this analysis (nearest health facility), it is possible they are not comprehensive enough to 
capture the true array of services available to women in each community whom may be serviced by 
several health facilities.  This data limitation should be clearly acknowledged in discussion of 
findings and how they can be used to inform FP policy. 
An interesting area of further discussion and investigation are the ways in which 
contraceptive use interacts with HIV.  Although the KDHS data were collected to provide evidence of 
the interactions between HIV and economic status, it is unclear what direct conclusions can be drawn 
from this investigation. Theoretically, using contraceptives has two main benefits: 1) preventing 
unplanned pregnancy and 2) protecting against sexually transmitted infections (STIs) including HIV.  
In practice however, contraceptives with the most effective pregnancy prevention often have little or 
no protection from STIs (Cates & Stone, 1992; Mati et al., 1995).  Research examining the 
interactions between general contraceptive use and HIV transmission have not given definitive results 
(Daly et al., 1994), however there is evidence from some settings that condom use has contributed to 
a decline in HIV/AIDS prevalence rates (Hearst & Chen, 2004).  In this analysis, generally larger 
significant associations are found between dual contraceptive use and economic welfare outcomes 
among a cross-sectional analysis, however this does not translate to panel models.  As previously 
mentioned, this may in part be due to the low percentage of women using dual methods and since 
HIV biomarkers are not collected, it is unclear how this relationship may translate to HIV risk or 
infection.  On a service provision level, if FP services are an important source for HIV testing or 
treatment of STIs, offering services may be a significant inducer of positive behavior change in 
reducing HIV transmission, especially in the case of vertical transmission from mother to child (King, 
et al., 1995; Wilkinson et al., 1997).  There is some evidence HIV services are part of a larger 
package of reproductive health provision in the KHDS, however it is unclear through what 
mechanisms this may be directly or indirectly influencing use and ultimately welfare outcomes.  The 
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interactions, integration and roles of HIV in providing FP services are an active area of research 
(Berer, 2003; Bradley et al., 2008; Fleischman Foreit, Hardee & Agarwal, 2002).  Initial evidence 
suggests there are important synergies between the two areas, however questions still remain as to 
how best to implement and design programs in order to best take advantage of synergies.  
 There are several limitations worth discussing while considering results of this analysis.  
First, since the panel only covers four years, there may be inadequate potential to identify significant 
changes regarding certain outcome variables.  Second, the issue of attrition is not controlled for 
explicitly in the empirical estimation.  Attrition due to mortality is expected due to the nature of the 
setting and sampling procedure.  However, since the panel is relatively short and excludes very young 
and old women, the number of women who enter the panel and experience death is a small 
percentage.57  Attrition due to mobility and movement of the population is issue if the choice to move 
or enter the sample is in part determined by labor force opportunities and/or availability of services in 
the community.  Schultz (2004) highlights migration as a source of bias in modeling health related 
outcomes where movement can be viewed as a sorting mechanism according to health endowments, 
health stocks, preferences for health and regional prevalence of HIV/AIDS infection.  Exploration of 
differences in FP service availability and contraceptive use controlling for age indicate there are no 
significant differences in number of years lived in the sample community.58  There are mean 
significant differences in availability or use of contraceptives controlling for age between women who 
enter only two or three times in the panel versus all four, however it is unclear what role selective 
migration out of communities plays as motivation for out-migration is undocumented.  Finally, 
                                                 
57 If none of the women appearing in round one had experienced mortality in subsequent survey years, the 
sample size would be 18 women larger.  The percentage of women meeting sample qualifications and 
experiencing death in between rounds one and two is approximately 0.001.  The percentage meeting sample 
qualifications and experiencing death between rounds two and three and between three and four are 0.009 and 
0.01 percent respectively. 
 
58 Women’s average number of years living in communities in which nearest health facility stocks the 
contraceptive pill is 15.58, while average number of years among communities which nearest health facility 
dose not stock the contraceptive pill is 16.24 (p-value = 0.326).  Among women using contraceptives, average 
number of years in the community is 16.68, among those not using contraceptives, average number of years in 
the community is 15.70 (p-value = 0.289). 
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outcome measures are be subject to a variety of measurement, recall and self-report biases especially 
inherit in collecting welfare measures in developing countries and should be noted when reporting 
results.         
Conclusion 
This paper is a first step in assessing the spillover effects of contraceptive use on women’s economic 
welfare in a sub-Saharan African setting.  The empirical challenge of controlling for endogeneity of 
contraceptive use is addressed through 2SLS and panel fixed effects modeling which take into 
account unobserved fixed preferences regarding use of FP services.  Naïve estimates of the 
relationship without controlling for the individual choice to use contraceptives indicates a strong and 
positive link between contraceptive use and all labor force, savings and expenditure outcomes with 
the exception of working self employed.  Many of these relationships hold when applied to fixed 
effects models, where changes in contraceptive use are significantly associated with holding a savings 
account, individual savings and expenditures.  Unfortunately, instrumental variable approach yields 
unstable results, due in part to endogenous program placement of FP services and weak ability to 
sufficiently predict individual contraceptive use.  In general, these linkages are stronger and more 
significant when either modern or dual contraceptive use is considered.  In addition, women with 
secondary education and above have a comparative advantage in benefiting from contraceptive use in 
respect to economic gains, while this complementary effect is not observed among older or wealthier 
women.   
 This analysis speaks directly to the argument by FP advocates that “reproductive health 
matters” for economic development and mirrors conclusions from similar studies between FP use and 
women’s economic welfare in Indonesia, Bangladesh and Columbia.  As data on FP service provision 
and contraceptives in developing countries improve, a clearer understanding of what mechanisms are 
directly responsible for this finding will become possible both on a micro and macro level.  From a 
policy perspective this finding does not imply governments should advocate for lower fertility or use 
of contraceptives across the board, rather it suggests allowing women to make strategic choices 
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regarding the timing and spacing of childbearing provides them with an opportunity to improve other 
economic and social realms of their lives.  This linkage is of prime importance as funding for FP 
services is sidelined in favor of higher publicized or less controversial aid packages such as for 
HIV/AIDS funding.  Contraception should be viewed as part of an essential development package 
because of its potential to empower women and improve individual economic welfare.  
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Tables 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics for contraceptive use and economic welfare outcomes
         Pooled        Wave 1        Wave 4
       (1991-94)       (1991-94)          (1994)
     (N = 3,781)       (N = 956)       (N = 825)
Use of family planning Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Contraceptive use (=1) 0.12 [0.33] 0.15 [0.36] 0.11 [0.31]
Modern contraceptive use (=1) 0.06 [0.23] 0.07 [0.25] 0.06 [0.23]
Dual contraceptive use (=1) 0.02 [0.12] 0.02 [0.02] 0.01 [0.08]
Labor force participation and earnings
   Employed outside the home (last week = 1) 0.08 [0.27] 0.08 [0.28] 0.07 [0.26]
   Working self employed (last week = 1) 0.10 [0.30] 0.07 [0.25] 0.13 [0.34]
   Earnings (log shillings last month) 0.65 [2.23] 0.74 [2.35] 0.57 [2.12]
Savings
   Savings account (=1) 0.05 [0.22] 0.06 [0.23] 0.05 [0.22]
   Any savings (=1) 0.45 [0.50] 0.45 [0.50] 0.45 [0.50]
   Savings amount (log shillings) 3.18 [3.67] 3.06 [3.55] 3.31 [3.85]
   Participates in informal credit group (=1) 0.22 [0.41] 0.23 [0.42] 0.22 [0.42]
Expenditures¹
  Any expenditures (=1) 0.88 [0.32] 0.94 [0.23] 0.84 [0.37]
  Total expenditures (log shillings) 7.53 [3.06] 7.74 [2.29] 7.39 [3.51]
Note: All shilling amounts are deflated to the base year 1991.
¹ Expenditures categories are clothing, medical and food consumed outside the home.  Clothing
and medical expenses are recalled for 12 months, food expenses are recalled for two weeks.  
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Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of health services used to instrument contraceptive use
         Pooled        Wave 1        Wave 4
       (1991-94)       (1991-94)          (1994)
     (N = 3,781)       (N = 956)       (N = 825)
Community-level variables Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Distance to health facility (km) 3.609 [4.016] 3.749 [3.937] 2.777 [3.251]
Stocks contraceptive pill (=1)¹ 0.617 [0.486] 0.611 [0.488] 0.579 [0.494]
Stocks contraceptive pill*primary education 0.466 [0.499] 0.454 [0.498] 0.458 [0.499]
Stocks contraceptive pill*secondary education or above 0.036 [0.186] 0.039 [0.193] 0.028 [0.165]
Offers HIV test (=1) 0.122 [0.327] 0.139 [0.346] 0.087 [0.282]
Offers HIV test*primary education 0.103 [0.304] 0.112 [0.315] 0.078 [0.268]
Offers HIV test*secondary education or above 0.002 [0.049] 0.004 [0.065] 0.002 [0.049]
Offers pregnancy test (=1) 0.127 [0.334] 0.142 [0.349] 0.136 [0.343]
Offers pregnancy test*primary education 0.107 [0.309] 0.116 [0.321] 0.119 [0.324]
Offers pregnancy test*secondary education or above 0.008 [0.087] 0.012 [0.107] 0.010 [0.098]
Note: Values reflect services as the nearest health facility to the village, in the case there are two at the same 
distance to the village, the one with the larger number of services is used.
¹ Stocking of the contraceptive pill is at the time of the data collection visit.  
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Table 3.3: First stage results predicting contraceptive use (N = 3,781)
Contraceptive use (=1)
Basic set of Variation 1 Variation 2
instruments with non-self with cluster
clustered mean fixed effects
Instruments (A) (B) (A1) (B1) (A2) (B2)
Non-self village clustered mean contraceptive use --- --- 0.575*** 0.396*** --- ---
--- --- (0.069) (0.109) --- ---
Distance to health facility (km) -0.007*** -0.005** -0.004*** -0.004** -0.004 -0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Stocks contraceptive pill (=1)¹ -0.061*** -0.027 -0.050*** -0.028 -0.053** -0.041
(0.021) (0.031) (0.017) (0.029) (0.022) (0.030)
Stocks contraceptive pill*primary education 0.047** 0.031 0.035** 0.025 0.031* 0.02
(0.018) (0.032) (0.017) (0.031) (0.019) (0.031)
Stocks contraceptive pill*secondary education or above 0.203*** 0.106* 0.177*** 0.108* 0.170*** 0.109**
(0.047) (0.055) (0.045) (0.054) (0.034) (0.053)
Offers HIV test (=1) 0.107 0.095 0.113* 0.099* 0.137** 0.097
(0.067) (0.059) (0.062) (0.056) (0.065) (0.065)
Offers HIV test*primary education -0.092* -0.057 -0.090* -0.06 -0.08 -0.053
(0.052) (0.050) (0.052) (0.048) (0.061) (0.061)
Offers HIV test*secondary education or above -0.217*** -0.141** -0.215*** -0.144** -0.192 -0.132
(0.070) (0.061) (0.071) (0.058) (0.129) (0.127)
Offers pregnancy test (=1) -0.130** -0.155*** -0.153** -0.153*** -0.179*** -0.150**
(0.058) (0.056) (0.059) (0.055) (0.065) (0.064)
Offers pregnancy test*primary education 0.111* 0.111* 0.122** 0.115* 0.122* 0.103
(0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.067) (0.065)
Offers pregnancy test*secondary education or above 0.149** 0.094 0.169** 0.107 0.173* 0.101
(0.072) (0.070) (0.068) (0.068) (0.092) (0.092)
Age (years) 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.036***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Age² (years) -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Partial/completed primary (=1) 0.027 0.029 0.035
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027)
Secondary or above (=1) 0.105** 0.095** 0.095**
(0.045) (0.043) (0.046)
Never married (=1) 0.005 0.002 0.001
(0.019) (0.018) (0.017)
Widowed or separated (=1) 0.049** 0.047** 0.050***
(0.019) (0.018) (0.015)
Muslim (=1) -0.009 -0.011 -0.012
(0.020) (0.020) (0.017)
Nyambo (=1) -0.020 -0.016 -0.007
(0.021) (0.020) (0.034)
Hangaza (=1) -0.018 -0.012 -0.089**
(0.033) (0.024) (0.044)
Other tribe (=1) 0.002 -0.008 -0.037
(0.022) (0.018) (0.025)
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Table 3.3 continued
Bottom 40% wealth quintile (=1) -0.023* -0.023* -0.023*
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Urban (=1) 0.043* 0.019 0.003
(0.023) (0.018) (0.042)
Constant 0.157*** -0.406*** 0.076*** -0.438*** 0.219*** -0.427***
(0.019) (0.096) (0.017) (0.093) (0.052) (0.082)
F-test instruments (F-prob) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
F-test instruments (F-stat) 7.52 6.05 31.78 8.53 3.41 2.34
F-test community controls (F-prob) --- 0.001 --- 0.144 --- 0.098
R² 0.019 0.073 0.031 0.076 0.052 0.098
Note: Outcomes and estimated with LPMs.  Standard errors clustered at the community level are reported below in 
parenthesis ( ). Omitted are married, no schooling, Catholic/Christian religion and Haya ethnic group.  Also included as 
control variables but not reported are community-level indicators (daily market, population, bank, HHs have electricity,
HHs have piped water) and wave indicators.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table 3.4: Sum
m
ary of coefficient results of contraceptive use predicting econom
ic w
elfare outcom
es (left colum
n)
(A
)
(B
)
(B
1)
(B
2)
(C
)
Pooled
2SLS
2SLS
2SLS
Individual
  C
ross-section
V
ariation 1
V
ariation 2
panel FE
(N
 = 3,781)
(N
 = 3,781)
(N
 = 3,781)
(N
 = 3,781)
(N
 = 3,781)
Labor force participation and earnings
C
oeff
SE
C
oeff
SE
C
oeff
SE
C
oeff
SE
C
oeff
SE
   Em
ployed outside the hom
e (last w
eek = 1)
0.050**
(0.025)
0.022
(0.170)
0.061
(0.141)
0.082
(0.077)
0.008
(0.021)
   W
orking self em
ployed (last w
eek = 1)
0.024
(0.019)
0.024
(0.154)
0.091
(0.137)
0.037
(0.084)
0.025
(0.021)
   Earnings (log shillings last m
onth)
0.509**
(0.233)
0.778
(1.480)
1.131
(1.164)
0.896
(0.614)
0.031
(0.128)
Savings 
   Savings account (=1)
0.046**
(0.018)
-0.211
(0.142)
0.003
(0.110)
0.024
(0.054)
0.020*
(0.010)
   A
ny savings (=1)
0.105***
(0.023)
0.126
(0.290)
0.394*
(0.239)
0.239*
(0.134)
0.074**
(0.034)
   Savings am
ount (log shillings)
0.943***
(0.181)
1.611
(2.092)
4.184**
(1.723)
2.487**
(0.970)
0.571**
(0.240)
   Participates in inform
al credit group (=1)
0.045*
(0.023)
0.156
(0.241)
0.300
(0.203)
0.191*
(0.113)
0.044
(0.033)
Expenditures¹
  A
ny expenditures (=1)
0.036**
(0.014)
-1.219
(1.880)
-0.080
(0.167)
0.057
(0.092)
0.051**
(0.023)
  Total expenditures (log shillings)
0.650***
(0.145)
-0.216
(0.205)
0.411
(1.561)
1.049
(0.870)
0.637***
(0.226)
N
ote: A
ll m
odels are estim
ated using O
LS and LPM
s. Standard errors clustered at the com
m
unity level are reported in parentheses ( ). 
Standard errors for colum
ns B
, B
1 and B
2 are bootstrapped w
ith 1,000 replications.  See A
ppendix Tables B
4 through B
8 for full m
odels
A
ll shilling am
ounts are deflated to the base year 1991.
¹ Expenditures categories are clothing, m
edical and food consum
ed outside the hom
e.  C
lothing and m
edical expenses are recalled for 
12 m
onths, food expenses are recalled for tw
o w
eeks.
* indicates significant at 10%
; ** significant at 5%
; *** significant at 1%
.
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Table 3.5: Summary of coefficients for interactions (age, secondary education and above, bottom 40% wealth
            quintile and contraceptive use in predicting economic welfare
(A) (B)
Pooled cross-section Individual panel FE
 (N = 3,781)  (N = 3,781)
      Contr. use Interaction term       Contr. use  Interaction term
A. Interactions (contraceptive use*age) Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE Coeff SE
   Employed outside the home (last week = 1) 0.074 (0.069) -0.000 (0.002) 0.114* (0.069) -0.003* (0.002)
   Working self employed (last week = 1) 0.034 (0.069) -0.000 (0.002) 0.066 (0.081) -0.001 (0.003)
   Earnings (log shillings last month) 0.520 (0.677) -0.000 (0.023) 0.503 (0.527) -0.016 (0.016)
   Savings account (=1) -0.033 (0.046) 0.002 (0.002) -0.019 (0.040) 0.001 (0.001)
   Any savings (=1) 0.375*** (0.109) -0.009** (0.004) 0.318* (0.176) -0.008 (0.005)
   Savings amount (log shillings) 2.737*** (0.835) -0.060** (0.027) 1.969* (1.149) -0.046 (0.035)
   Participates in informal credit group (=1) -0.110 (0.078) 0.005* (0.003) 0.034 (0.101) 0.000 (0.003)
  Any expenditures (=1) 0.074* (0.038) -0.001 (0.001) 0.158* (0.089) -0.004 (0.003)
  Total expenditures (log shillings) 1.070** (0.462) -0.014 (0.014) 1.040 (0.822) -0.013 (0.026)
B. Interactions (contraceptive use*secondary education and above)
   Employed outside the home (last week = 1) 0.028 (0.024) 0.213*** (0.079) 0.006 (0.023) 0.209 (0.055)
   Working self employed (last week = 1) 0.032 (0.021) -0.078 (0.056) 0.030 (0.024) -0.061 (0.083)
   Earnings (log shillings last month) 0.267 (0.212) 2.267** (0.958) 0.027 (0.145) 0.054 (0.373)
   Savings account (=1) 0.029* (0.016) 0.157** (0.063) 0.022* (0.012) -0.023 (0.026)
   Any savings (=1) 0.089*** (0.025) 0.156* (0.083) 0.075** (0.035) -0.006 (0.150)
   Savings amount (log shillings) 0.800*** (0.188) 1.332* (0.709) 0.593** (0.247) -0.257 (0.997)
   Participates in informal credit group (=1) 0.045* (0.026) -0.003 (0.060) 0.046 (0.035) -0.028 (0.090)
  Any expenditures (=1) 0.038** (0.017) -0.038 (0.017) 0.055** (0.024) -0.037 (0.084)
  Total expenditures (log shillings) 0.634*** (0.169) 0.144 (0.518) 0.645*** (0.232) -0.101 (0.844)
C. Interactions (contraceptive use*bottom 40% wealth quintile)
   Employed outside the home (last week = 1) 0.058** (0.028) -0.022 (0.042) 0.024 (0.024) -0.041 (0.038)
   Working self employed (last week = 1) 0.030 (0.021) -0.016 (0.040) 0.038 (0.026) -0.036 (0.048)
   Earnings (log shillings last month) 0.582* (0.299) -0.209 (0.403) 0.078 (0.131) -0.128 (0.250)
   Savings account (=1) 0.060** (0.026) -0.041 (0.039) 0.018 (0.015) 0.006 (0.027)
   Any savings (=1) 0.125*** (0.030) -0.057 (0.047) 0.094** (0.043) -0.054 (0.073)
   Savings amount (log shillings) 1.127*** (0.256) -0.534 (0.378) 0.705** (0.320) -0.368 (0.503)
   Participates in informal credit group (=1) 0.074** (0.028) -0.085* (0.043) 0.088** (0.041) -0.120** (0.052)
  Any expenditures (=1) 0.029* (0.016) 0.022 (0.030) 0.054* (0.028) -0.007 (0.050)
  Total expenditures (log shillings) 0.620*** (0.177) 0.086 (0.318) 0.686** (0.280) -0.133 (0.457)
Note: All models are estimated using OLS and LPMs using same specifications as in main models, adding
interaction terms one by one. Standard errors clustered at the community level are reported in parentheses ( ).  All
shilling amounts are deflated to the base year 1991.
¹ Expenditures categories are clothing, medical and food consumed outside the home.  Clothing and medical
expenses are recalled on 12 months, food expenses are recalled for two weeks.
* indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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CHAPTER IV: INCONTINENCE AND TRAUMA: SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 
FEMALE GENITAL CUTTING AND PROXY MEASURES OF GYNECOLOGICAL FISTULA 
 
Introduction 
Gynecological fistula is an abnormal opening between the vagina and the bladder or rectum, 
resulting in uncontrollable leakage of urine and/or feces.59  Although the condition has been virtually 
eliminated in the developed world, cases are still found throughout sub-Saharan Africa, parts of Asia 
and the Middle East.  The most commonly cited estimates suggest over two million women suffer 
from untreated fistula, with 20,000 to 33,000 new cases occurring annually on the African 
subcontinent alone, however, figures are largely unknown (AbouZahr 1998; Stanton, Holtz & Ahmed 
2007; Vangeenderhuysen, Prual & Ould el Joud, 2001).  Fistula imposes lifelong isolation, shame and 
stigma, as women are typically rejected by their communities and families, unable to work or 
participate in organized social activities (Muleta et al., 2008; Williams 2007).  Fistula is primarily 
caused by obstructed labor from prolonged pressure on vaginal tissues, however it is also caused by 
trauma to the genital area though sexual violence (SV) or cultural practices such as female genital 
cutting (FGC).60  Although obstetric fistula has begun to receive attention on the international public 
health agenda, less attention has been given to traumatic fistula.61  In fact traumatic fistula is often 
treated as a unique occurrence or exception to the more common obstetric injury (Maybeya 2004; 
Roy et al., 2002).  Women with traumatic fistula may be victims of brutal rape and exposed to a 
number of other dangers including unwanted pregnancy, sexually transmitted infections (STIs) and 
                                                 
59 These two types of gynecological fistula are referred to as vesicovaginal fistulae (VVF) or rectovaginal 
fistulae (RVF); hereafter referred to as simply fistula. 
 
60 Also called female genital mutilation or female circumcision. 
 
61 The UNFPA’s Campaign to End Fistula was launched in 2003 and is now working in 40 countries 
worldwide.  Partners include the African Medical and Research Foundation, CDC, EngenderHealth, Family 
Care International, Population Council, WHO, the Women’s Dignity Project and the Worldwide Fistula Fund 
(www.endfistula.org). 
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psychological hardship.  Emerging field reports from medical personnel and relief workers within war 
zones indicate that traumatic fistula is a real and relevant problem (Kalume et al. 2004; Longombe, 
Claude & Ruminjo 2008; Nordland 2006; Shetty 2007).  However, since evidence has been largely 
anecdotal, qualitative or based on counts from select facilities, levels and contributions of trauma to 
fistula prevalence are virtually unknown.   
This analysis is the first to specifically examine the co-occurrence of incontinence, SV and 
FGC using population-level data.  The study uses recent Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) 
from four African countries (Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia) to investigate associations 
within a sample of reproductive age women 15 to 49. 62 More specifically, the aims of this study are 
to: 1) empirically test the associations between women’s self reports of incontinence and a variety of 
SV and FGC indicators, 2) provide simulations of the magnitude of these associations and 3) to 
explore statistical methods to account for sample selection and imperfections in data collection.  It is 
hypothesized that each measure of trauma will be positively associated with incontinence and that this 
measure will increase in magnitude and significance within regions where civil unrest is present and 
where particularly severe forms of FGC are practiced.  The remaining sections of the paper give 
general background and country specific information on traumatic fistula, SV and FGC, describe the 
data and methods used in the study, present and discuss the results and finally offer some policy 
recommendations based on the findings. 
Background and significance  
 Traumatic gynecological fistula: what do we know? 
In September 2005, a group of fistula surgeons, health and social workers, psychologists, 
lawyers and policy makers from 12 African countries met in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia for a workshop 
                                                 
62 DHS Mali (2006), DHS Pakistan (2006) and DHS Niger (2006) also collect incontinence data, however in 
Mali and Niger too few women report fistula symptoms and in Pakistan, neither SV nor FGC indicators are 
collected.  
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on traumatic fistula.63  It was the first ever meeting focused on traumatic fistula with the goal of 
sharing knowledge regarding magnitude, interventions, key successes, gaps and challenges 
surrounding the issue, as well as to develop country-specific recommendations (ACQUIRE, 2006).  
For the purpose of the meeting, traumatic fistula was defined as “an abnormal opening between the 
reproductive tract of a woman or girl and one or more body cavities or surfaces, caused by sexual 
violence, usually but not always in conflict and post-conflict settings.”  Conflict refers to situations of 
civil unrest including war zones and unstable environments where militia or guerrilla forces may be 
present.  Case studies presented at the workshop included Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
and Burundi where the magnitude of traumatic fistula is thought to be highest, in addition to other 
‘hot spots’ including Chad, Guinea, Rwanda, Liberia, Uganda and Sudan.  Discussion also 
highlighted FGC, particularly infibulation and the gishiri cut which are hypothesized to contribute 
directly to fistula (primarily in Somalia (infibulation) and Nigeria (gishiri cutting)).64, 65  The meeting 
was a key step in recognizing traumatic fistula as a distinct issue, creating a forum for exploration, 
knowledge sharing and making linkages and is a basis of much of the literature surrounding current 
knowledge of trauma and incontinence. 
The majority of current information surrounding incontinence and trauma comes from 
anecdotal reports and hospital-based studies.  Unpublished reports and communications from conflict 
situations estimate the percentage of traumatic fistula to be from two percent in Chad, to 35 percent in 
                                                 
63 The event was funded by EngenderHealth/The ACQUIRE Project, the Ethiopian Society of Obstetricians and 
Gynecologists and Synergie des Femmes pour les Victimes des Violences Sexuelles and took place from the 6th 
to the 8th (see ACQUIRE, 2005 for more details). 
 
64 Infibulation is the most invasive classification of FGC, practiced primarily in Somalia, Djibouti and parts of 
Sudan, Egypt and Ethiopia.  The procedure involves removal of the clitoris and partial or total removal of the 
labia minora.  In addition, cuts are made in the labia majora and subsequently stitched together, resulting in scar 
tissue which may cover the urethra and vaginal opening.  Because of the narrow opening, intercourse and 
childbirth may necessitate a ‘re-opening’ or defibulation and in many cases women are re-infibulated or sewn 
up after childbirth (Masterson & Swanson, 2000). 
 
65 Gishiri means salt in the Hausa language of Niger and Northern Nigeria.  The Hausa believe that an 
imbalance of salty or sweet food can cause a film to grow over the woman’s vagina, resulting in among other 
things, a difficult labor.  If during labor, this condition is suspected, a traditional healer or midwife may be 
summoned and a sharp object (knife, razor blade or piece of broken glass) is used to make a series of random 
cuts to ‘open the way’ for the baby to come out (Wall et al., 2001). 
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Kissidougou, Guinea to between four percent and 35 percent in DRC (ACQUIRE, 2005; 2006).  
Other reports in DRC estimate percentages to be much higher, for example, in Goma, DRC, a hospital 
received 3,550 rape survivors and performed 600 fistula repairs, 68 percent of which were traumatic 
in nature (ACQUIRE, 2006).  Still other studies from DRC find much lower percentages.  In a record 
review from Panzi Hospital in the Eastern region, Onsrud and colleagues (2008) find only one percent 
of all fistula patients present with the injury directly resulting from SV and four percent indirectly 
related to SV.  A study in the Addis Ababa Fistula Hospital in Ethiopia describes the cases of 91 
young girls over six years with fecal incontinence, 78 of which had sustained injuries from forcible 
sex within marriages (Muleta & Williams, 1999).  In Northern Nigeria, a hospital-based study 
attributes fewer than five percent of 899 fistula cases to gishiri cutting and the remaining to obstetric 
causes (Wall, et al., 2004).  Other studies in Nigeria estimate gishiri cutting to account for six to 
thirteen percent of cases (Ampofo, Otu & Uchebo, 1990; Tahzib, 1983; 1985).  There is also 
speculation that forms of FGC in which women develop scar tissue may contribute to fistula through 
increase risk for obstructed labor, however there is no conclusive evidence on the issue (Maybeya 
2004; Wall et al., 2001).  Johnson (2007) is the only population-based study I am aware of to analyze 
the determinants of fistula as well as assess the validity of incontinence as a fistula proxy measure 
from the 2004 Malawi DHS.   Findings from Malawi indicate that women who have experienced SV 
are approximately 70 percent more likely to report incontinence than their counterparts.  Although 
this study utilizes Malawi DHS data, it is a unique contribution as it includes disaggregated measures 
of SV, FGC indicators, offers cross-country comparisons, as well as simulations to approximate the 
contribution of SV to overall incidence of incontinence. 
Sexual violence in intimate partner relationships and in conflict situations 
SV is a general term to describe any “violence, physical or psychological, carried out through 
sexual means or by targeting sexuality (UN, 1998).”  Although SV can encompass everything from 
sexual discrimination and attempted rape to sexual slavery, for the purpose of this study, SV refers 
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specifically to penetrative rape of the genital area by an intimate partner or a stranger.66  Other studies 
examining effects of SV may not use the same definition; however, they are useful to review as they 
speak to the broader context and consequences of SV.  Intimate partner violence is the most pervasive 
form of gender-based violence.  Results from 50 population-based studies in 36 countries indicate that 
between ten to 60 percent of ever married or partnered women have experienced at least one incident 
of intimate partner violence (Heise, Ellsberg & Gottmoeller, 2002).  Violence is almost always 
accompanied by psychological abuse and in a third to over half of cases, by sexual abuse.  Intimate 
partner violence has been linked to a host of adverse health outcomes including mental health 
instability and depression, injuries, alcohol and drug use, unsafe abortion and suicide (Heise, Ellsberg 
& Gottmoeller, 2002; Campbell & Soeken, 1999).  In addition, a review of 19 studies worldwide 
indicates that anywhere from seven to 36 percent of women report sexual abuse during childhood 
(Finkelhor, 1994).  This increases the risk of injury as young girls are not fully developed and more 
likely to incur physical damage during sexual acts.   
Other forms of SV include forced sex or rape by strangers, acquaintances and other non-
partner individuals.  Conflict situations are characterized by increased incidence of forced sex and 
exacerbated by factors such as militarization, decreased respect for international law, deepening 
poverty and diminished state provision of basic services (ACQUIRE, 2006).  SV can be used as a tool 
for humiliation and genocide and reports indicate that women are often abducted and used as sex 
slaves or unpaid labor for military or rebel groups.  In the past five years, SV associated with conflict 
has been reported in dozens of countries, by refugees or displaced persons (ACQUIRE, 2005).67  
Although statistics from conflict situations are rarely reliable, post-conflict evidence surrounding the 
                                                 
66 Penetrative rape is defined by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia is the “sexual 
penetration, however slight: a) of the vagina or anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other 
object used by the perpetrator; or b) [of] the mouth of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator; where such 
sexual penetration occurs without the consent of the victim.  Consent for this purpose must be consent given 
voluntarily, as a result of the victim’s free will, addressed in the context of the surrounding circumstances (Foca 
case, 2002). 
 
67 Those mentioned in the corresponding report are Angola, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chechnya, Haiti, India, 
Kosovo, Mozambique, Pakistan, Peru, Serbia, Somalia, Uganda, Zimbabwe, DRC, Rwanda, Liberia, Sudan, 
Guinea and Chad to name a few (ACQUIRE, 2005). 
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nature of SV provides several insights.  First, evidence suggests that perpetration of violence is often 
by groups rather than a single individual.  In research from 2005 in Eastern DRC, 79 percent of nearly 
500 women who had been sexually assaulted had been attacked by between two and twenty men (IA, 
2005; UN ORCH/IRIN, 2007).  Secondly, the age of victims seems to vary widely from infants to 
elderly (HRW, 2002).  Finally, the context in which violence occurs is diverse, ranging from open 
raids, to prostitution, to kidnapping of women for ‘bush wives’ of domestic militia or peace keeping 
forces.  Although sexual assault is a violation of international law, few perpetrators are accused, 
convicted or sentenced.68 
There is evidence from developed countries linking SV to a range of maternal morbidities 
including pelvic pain, pelvic inflammatory disease, sexually transmitted infections and other 
conditions (Coker et al., 2000; Collet et al., 1998; Koss, Koss & Woodruff, 1991; Schei, 1991).  
There is less evidence from developing countries.  Adolescent girls in Rakai, Uganda who reported 
being forced during their first sexual experience are significantly more likely to report one or more 
symptoms of genital tract infection (Koenig et al., 2004).  A study among matched couples in 
Northern India shows that physical and sexual violence by intimate partners increase the odds of 
reporting general symptoms of gynecological morbidity, however they attribute much of the 
significance to the contribution of STIs (Stephenson, Koenig & Ahmed, 2006).  Significant 
associations stem from a combination of many factors including direct trauma, increased risk of 
infections, characteristics of partners, and the physiological damage incurred by abused women.  
Although none of these studies examines incontinence specifically, there is sufficient evidence to 
support linkages across a range of women’s health problems. 
Female genital cutting: magnitude and consequences 
 According to the WHO, FGC is “the partial or total removal of the female external genitalia 
or other injury to the female genital organs for cultural or other non-therapeutic reasons (WHO, 
                                                 
68 Sexual assault violates the 1949 Geneva Convention, the 1948 Genocide Convention, and the 1984 Torture 
Convention. 
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UNICEF & UNFPA, 1997).”  Classifications of FGC range from minor forms including pricking and 
piercing to infibulation, in which part or all of the external genitalia are removed and the remaining 
opening is stitched closed.69  Estimates suggest that over 130 million women and girls have 
undergone FGC, primarily on the African subcontinent and parts of the Middle East (UNICEF, 2005).  
FGC has been recognized as a fundamental violation of human rights, a form of gender 
discrimination used to control woman’s sexuality and expose girls and women to health risks 
(UNICEF, 2005).  Further, because women often undergo FGC before the age of 18, it is seen as a 
violation of the protection of children due to exposure of potential damaging practices.  In its least 
invasive forms, FGC has been linked to post-surgery hemorrhage, infection, and development of 
abscess and cysts, while more invasive forms of FGC have been linked to prolonged labor, urine 
retention and death (Jones et al., 1999; Jones, Ehiri & Anyanwu, 2004; Morison et al., 2001).  Despite 
its harmful health consequences, FGC continues to be valued by ethnic groups and linked to social 
standing, marriagability, fertility and a community’s social fabric (Berggren et al., 2006; Chege et al., 
2004; Gruenbaum, 2005).  Due to the cultural significance of FGC, programs to encourage its 
abandonment have adopted a holistic approach towards the elimination of the practice (WHO, 1999). 
The settings: Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda and Ethiopia 
 The countries included in this analysis are located in Eastern and Southern Africa, have high 
levels of poverty, low human capital and poor health.  These countries also have high maternal 
mortality ratios and low life expectancies (see Table C1 in the Appendix for background indicators by 
country).  In addition, measures of gender equity are low, with all four countries ranking in the lowest 
quintile of the UN’s gender related development index.  Of the included countries, Uganda and 
                                                 
69 The WHO groups FGC into four types: 1) Excision of the prepuce (fold of skin surrounding the clitoris), with 
or without excision of part or the entire clitoris, 2) Excision of the clitoris with partial or total excision of the 
labia minora (smaller inner folds of the vulva), 3) Excision of part or all of the external genitalia and stitching or 
narrowing of the vaginal opening (infibulation), 4) Unclassified, which includes pricking, piercing or incising of 
the clitoris and/or labia; stretching of the clitoris and/or labia; cauterization by burning of the clitoris and 
surrounding tissue; scraping of tissue surrounding the opening of the vagina (angurya cuts) or cutting of the 
vagina (gishiri cuts); introduction of corrosive substances or herbs into the vagina to cause bleeding or to 
tighten or narrow the vagina; and any other procedure that can be included in the definition of FGC (WHO, 
UNICEF & UNFPA, 1997). 
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Rwanda have a history of or are currently engaged in conflict.  For the last two decades, Northern 
Uganda has been in crisis due to an insurgency by the Lords Resistance Army killing more than half a 
million and displacing more than two million people (ACQUIRE, 2006; see Dolan, 2000 for 
overview of conflict).  In the early 1990’s, Rwanda experienced a civil war which culminated with 
the mass killings of hundreds of thousands of ethnic Tutsis in 1994.  Reports of SV have been linked 
to each of these situations.  The UN estimates that between 250,000 and 500,000 girls and women 
were raped during the Rwandan conflict in the early 1990s.  SV continues to be reported as a weapon 
of war in the Ugandan conflict mirrored in the stories and increasing numbers of young women in 
rehabilitation centers, however the magnitude remains unknown (Turshen, 2000; UN OCHA/IRIN, 
2007). 
Theoretical framework 
 The framework guiding this analysis draws on the path diagram first proposed by the 
Worldwide Fistula Fund (Wall et al., 2001).70  The framework includes both ‘origins’ and 
‘consequences’ of fistula and is included in its original form in Appendix C, Figure C1.  Examples of 
distal determinants (origins) of fistula are malnutrition and early marriage, examples of proximate 
determinants are lack of emergency services and obstructed labor.  Consequences of fistula include 
medical conditions such as infertility, foot-drop and chronic skin irritation as well as social 
consequences such as stigmatization, isolation and loss of social support.  This analysis will focus on 
the ‘origins’ flow and make policy recommendations extrapolating to ‘consequences’ of fistula.  In 
order to incorporate aspects of trauma into the framework, SV is conceptualized as a proximate 
determinant and FGC is specified as a ‘cultural practice.’  The presentation of the framework is for 
illustrative purposes only and meant to serve as a guide to understanding potential mediating and 
confounding factors associated with incontinence. 
Data: Demographic and Health Surveys 
                                                 
70 Formerly called the Worldwide Fund for Mother’s Injured in Childbirth. 
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 Four DHS surveys are included in the analysis: 1) Malawi (2004), 2) Rwanda (2005), 3) 
Uganda (2006) and 4) Ethiopia (2005).  The DHS are cross-nationally comparable population-level 
surveys collected by host country governments with funding and technical assistance from Macro 
International and USAID.71   The DHS are designed to inform the planning, implementation, 
monitoring and evaluation of population and health programs in and across countries by providing 
detailed information on a range of issues including fertility, infant, child and adult mortality, 
nutrition, family planning and HIV/AIDS.  All countries except Ethiopia include modules on SV 
while only Uganda and Ethiopia collect data on FGC.  Indicators of incontinence are collected by 
asking women if they have ever “experienced uncontrollable leakage of urine or feces through the 
vagina.”  The question sequence often mentions or adds a probe for the local term for fistula and 
relates it to condition women may experience after childbirth.  In addition to general questions, 
Malawi asks more specific questions to women who have had a live birth in the last five years.  
However, it does not approach the gold standard of a pelvic exam (see Appendix C for questionnaire 
modules by country).  Therefore, the fecal and urinary incontinence measure is a proxy and subject to 
several potential sources of bias.  A key issue surrounding the questionnaire design for this analysis 
are the sub-samples or threshold questions asked in two out of four countries .72  In Rwanda, 
incontinence questions are only asked to women who have had a live birth in the last five years, while 
in Ethiopia women are first asked if they have heard of a condition in which women leak urine or 
feces and are only asked subsequent questions if they answered affirmatively.  This has implications 
for population-level analysis if it is believed that women who are included in questioning are 
somehow different with respect to: a) their risk of incontinence, b) their risk of SV or c) their risk of 
FGC than those women who are not questioned.  All these are reasonable assumptions.  For example, 
                                                 
71 Funding is provided through USAID sponsored MEASURE DHS in addition to other international 
development agencies.  Data is publicly available from www.measuredhs.com. 
 
72 In this case, a ‘threshold question’ refers to a question asked to all women which determines a sub-sample of 
women who are then surveyed on incontinence.  Threshold questions may be asked immediately proceeding 
incontinence questions or may be determined from prior questioning (see Appendix C for modules included in 
each country.) 
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the Rwandan sample includes women with recent live births, excluding women who have had only a 
stillbirth or women who have been rendered infertile by incontinence.  Thus, the sampling framework 
may underestimate the prevalence of incontinence when extended to the full population.  Likewise, if 
women who are more likely to have heard of fistula are those who are better educated, have higher 
health knowledge and live in urban centers, the sample in Ethiopia may underestimate the prevalence 
of incontinence when extended to the full population. 
Empirical model  
In Malawi and Uganda, where incontinence questions were asked to all women ages 15 to 49, 
the estimating equation is a logit model predicting the probability of incontinence. To account for 
differences in sub-samples in Rwanda and Ethiopia, the equation is estimated using a Heckman 
selection equation.  Below is an example of the model estimated for Rwanda where incontinence 
questions are only asked to women who had had a birth in the last five years: 
(1) Pr (Birth in 5 yearsij = 1) = β0 +β1(contraceptive usei) + β2 (Xi) + β3 (Xj) + ε 
(2) Pr (Incontinenceij |birth in five yearsij= 1) = β0 +β1(SVi) + β2 (FGCi) + β3 (Xi) + β4 (Xj)  
+ λi (Δρσε) + ε 
Equation (1), the participation equation, predicts the probability of having a birth in the last five years 
using a probit model, which among other things is a function of an identifying instruments, 
contraceptive use and pregnancy termination of individual woman i in community j.  Contraceptive 
use and pregnancy termination variables are expected to be associated with the probability of having 
previous births.  However, they have no effect on incontinence except through their influence with 
previous births.  Equation (2) predicts the probability of reporting incontinence, conditional on having 
a previous birth, which is a function of both SV and FGC.73  Equation 2 contains an added term λi, the 
predicted inverse Mills ratio, or the non-selection hazard-rate which measures the likelihood that an 
individual has had a previous birth at the time of the survey.  In both equations, Xi and Xj represent 
                                                 
73 Note that FCG was not collected in Rwanda, but is included as a demonstration of how FGC will be modeled 
in those countries where the indicator is present. 
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vectors of individual-level and community-level control variables.  Individual-level control variables 
included are: 1) age splines,74 2) education attainment indicators, 3) wealth asset quintiles, 4) 
indicator of ever had a stillbirth and 5) indicator for bottom decile of height distribution.  Community-
level control variables included are: 1) urban residence and 2) limited access to health care.  Johnson 
(2007) gives a comprehensive explanation of pathways through which these variables may be 
associated with incontinence and is therefore not repeated here.  The error term ε is assumed to be 
normally distributed.  In Ethiopia, the participation equation models knowledge of the fistula 
condition, equation 1 is instrumented with measures of media exposure and health knowledge.  In 
Malawi and Uganda, equation 2 is estimated without a participation equation. 
 A variety of questions were asked to assess the prevalence of SV across surveys.  Each 
country collects SV measures in intimate partner relationships by asking a selected sample of women 
if they have ever been physically forced to have sex against their will by a current or past intimate 
partner.  In addition, two questions are asked concerning forced sexual experiences to assess if the 
woman has been forced to have sexual intercourse by individuals other than their partner.  For 
example, in Malawi, one woman per household who reports ever having sex are asked if their first 
sexual experience was forced and if they have been forced by someone other than their partner to 
have sex in the past year (see Appendix Table C2 for summary of SV questions asked in each 
country).  In order to utilize the full samples in each survey, SV indicators are constructed by 
imputing missing values for women who were not selected to complete the modules.  Imputed values 
are based on relationship status and report of ever having sex and including an indicator for imputed 
value as a covariate.  The composite indicator is constructed by taking the intersection of woman 
                                                 
74 Main results are robust to inclusion of age as a continuous variable, in five year splines or stratifying on age 
groupings.   
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reporting either forced sex or intimate partner SV and missing values are imputed identical to the 
specific measures.75 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.1 shows summary statistics for incontinence by country.  Reports of incontinence 
within sub-samples are highest in Malawi (approaching five percent), followed by Ethiopia and 
Rwanda (both over three percent) and lowest in Uganda (over 2.5 percent).  Lifetime prevalence 
follows the same pattern, with women in Malawi experiencing 16.4 reported cases of incontinence for 
every 1,000 live births to women in Uganda 5.9 cases for every 1,000 live births.  Significant 
differences by region (p<0.05) are found in all countries except Malawi, however are significant at a 
higher level in Rwanda and Uganda (p<0.01) in contrast to Ethiopia (p<0.05).  
 Table 4.2 displays summary statistics of the key independent variables by country. Of the 
three countries collecting SV information, Uganda has the highest composite value (42 percent) 
followed closely by Malawi and Rwanda (38 and 36 percent respectively).  The same ranking is 
found for intimate partner SV with 25 percent of Ugandan women, 13 percent of Malawian and 12 
percent of Rwandan women ever experiencing SV from intimate partners.  Finally, accounts of other 
forced sex are highest in Malawi (27 percent) followed by Uganda and Rwanda (23 and 17 percent 
respectively).  Of the two countries collecting FGC information, women in Uganda report a very low 
incidence (less than one percent) of FGC, while the majority of women in Ethiopia report some form 
(74 percent) and 4.5 percent report the most severe form. 
Table 4.3 presents descriptive statistics of control, mediating and excluded variables for the 
participation equations which will be used based on their association with incontinence and their 
potential association with SV and/or FGC (use of mediating variables will be explained in detail in 
section F3).  The modal age group in all countries is 20 to 29 and the modal education level is 
                                                 
75 Note that because of imputation, the mean values are close but not identical to weighted values among the 
selected sample. 
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primary, except in Ethiopia where nearly two thirds of women report having no formal education.  
Women report very low incidence of still births (approximately two percent) and from 20 to 40 
percent of women have never had a live birth.  The majority of women live in rural areas and report 
high levels of limited access to health care (from 40 to 68 percent). 
 Associations between SV, FGC and incontinence 
 Summary coefficients for SV and FGC from equations predicting incontinence are shown by 
country in Table 4.4.  In the first two columns (A and B) coefficients on composite indicators are 
displayed, while the remaining four columns (A1, A2, B1 and B2) break each composite indicator 
into two specific forms.  In Malawi and Rwanda, women who experience any form of SV are 
significantly more likely (OR = 1.67, 95 percent CI = 1.38 - 2.02; OR = 3.78, 95 percent CI = 2.29 - 
6.39) to report incontinence.  In Uganda, women who report any form of SV are also more likely to 
report incontinence (OR = 1.40, 95 percent CI = 0.75 - 2.64), however, the association is not 
statistically significant.  The statistically significant associations in Malawi and Rwanda hold when 
disaggregated to specific measures of intimate partner SV or other forced sex, however, in Rwanda 
the odds associated with forced sex are larger than for intimate partner SV (OR = 2.45, 95 percent CI 
= 1.41 - 4.26, verses OR = 2.37, 95 percent CI = 1.29 - 4.36) while in Malawi they are slightly lower 
(OR = 1.43, 95 percent CI = 1.16 - 1.76, verses OR = 1.65, 95 percent CI = 1.30 - 2.11).  Again in 
Uganda, no specific indicator is statistically significant.  Neither country with information on FGC 
shows significant associations with incontinence among composite or specific indicator.  Although 
not displayed, as discussed in the previous section, results from Rwanda and Ethiopia include a first 
stage selection model to account for the differences in sample selection.  The results of the first stage 
regressions are reported in Table C7 in the Appendix, including chi-squared statistics on identifying 
instruments which are significant and substantial.  Inverse Mill’s ratios achieve significance for 
Ethiopia and Rwanda, confirming significant differences in sample selection, however are significant 
at the 10 percent level only (reported at the bottom of each table). 
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Table 4.5 shows results of simulations of predicted levels and percent changes in 
incontinence under different scenarios which eliminate various sources of trauma explored in the 
multivariate analysis.  The changes associated with statistically significant coefficients are in bold.  
For example, in Rwanda, elimination of all forms of SV is associated with a 40 percent decline in the 
predicted prevalence of incontinence, while an elimination of only intimate partner SV or only other 
forced sex are association with 11 percent and 16 percent declines in incontinence prevalence 
respectively.  Elimination of all forms of SV are associated with an 18 percent decline in incontinence 
in Malawi and a 13 percent decline in incontinence in Uganda, although the later is based on 
insignificant coefficients.  Likewise, simulations of reductions in FGC show variations by country, 
however are not based on significant coefficients. 
Extensions and robustness checks 
Three extensions are conducted to check the robustness of findings.  First, there may be a 
concern that the analysis suffers from omitted variable bias, specifically from a measure 
encompassing women’s status or decision-making.  For example, it could be argued that women who 
experience SV are more likely to have lower decision-making power, suffer from low status in 
general and specifically be less likely to seek delivery care.   If this is the case, the coefficient on SV 
will pick up the partial effect of the mediating variable, low decision-making, if the mediating 
variable is not included in the regression.76  To test this hypothesis, a parallel analysis is run adding 
two mediating variables to proxy women’s health seeking at delivery: 1) skilled attendance at 
delivery and 2) delivery in a health facility for the last birth (descriptive statistics for the mediating 
variables are found on the bottom panel of Table 4.3).  Second, it may be expected that FGC may not 
                                                 
76 Note that this hypothesis holds for SV in intimate partnerships where power dynamics may exist which 
influence decision making, while it is not appropriate for forced sex from other individuals.  In addition to the 
indicators representing delivery care described here, two general decision-making indices are tested.  These 
indices are constructed from questions concerning a woman’s ‘final say’ on various items (own health care, 
large and small household purchases, visits and food preparation).  The first index is a sum of the number of 
decisions a woman reports having the final say on.  The second index is a scale created from factor analysis 
using the same questions which take a 0, 1 or 2 depending on if the woman has final say, shares the decision or 
if someone else has the final say.  Results are robust to inclusion of both variations of this general decision 
making index. 
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have a direct association with incontinence, however may contribute to fistula formation through 
build up of scar tissue causing obstructed labor.  To test this hypothesis, the sample is limited to 
women who have ever had a birth and a parallel analysis is run.  Finally, to verify that assumptions 
around the construction and treatment of missing values in the SV questions are not driving results, a 
parallel analysis is run with only those women who are selected for the violence modules.   
Results of the first robustness check indicate that the addition of the mediating variables does 
not significantly change results, thus refuting the hypothesis that women who experience SV are 
necessarily have low status (see Tables C5 and C6 for full logit models with composite and specific 
indicators).  This relationship, although counterintuitive, has been confirmed by several other 
population-level studies examining the association between SV and proxies of women’s status such as 
wealth, employment, and labor force participation (Kishor & Johnson, 2005; Farmer & Tiefenthaler, 
1999; Morrison & Orlando, 2004).  When samples are reduced to women who have at least one child, 
coefficients on FGC remain insignificant, refuting the hypothesis that FGC contributes to 
incontinence through build up of scar tissue and increases in obstructed labor.  Finally, results are 
robust to a parallel analysis conducted using only women selected for the violence modules.77 
Discussion 
Although SV is a significant determinant in two of the three countries included in this 
analysis, it is unclear if and how civil unrest contributes to delivering these results.  Incontinence 
varies significantly by region for all countries and forced sex varies significantly by region in Rwanda 
and Uganda which is suggestive of variations in stability within countries.  In Rwanda, the boarder 
regions with DRC have an unusually high percentage of reported incontinence, up to ten times the 
prevalence in other regions.  Northern Uganda, the site of ongoing conflict, has the second highest 
rate of incontinence after the Western region (also boarders DRC).  When the analysis is run just 
including the Northern province, SV is a significant determinant of incontinence, in line with country-
                                                 
77 Results from the second and third extensions are not presented, however are available from the author upon 
request. 
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level estimates from Rwanda and Malawi (OR = 2.90, 95 percent CI = 0.90 - 9.39; p-value =  0.076, 
N = 1,662).  There are a number of alternative explanations for the lack of statistical significance in 
the case of Uganda and in general for conflict regions.  First, populations in conflict areas are highly 
mobile and may re-locate in refugee camps or settlements which are excluded from a population-level 
survey.  It is also possible that conflict increases stress and resource scarcity within the household, 
leading to strained relationships and increases in intimate partner violence.  Therefore an indicator of 
forced sex which captures one component of a larger problem may be obscured by other factors.  
Finally, it is probable that women in conflict situations face a range of other barriers related to 
accessing pregnancy care and general health services, resulting in significant differences in health 
infrastructure and service availability not controlled for in the analysis.  Therefore, because of 
limitations in study design and weak evidence of the forced sex and incontinence association in 
Uganda, it is unclear how much conflict itself contributes to incontinence over situations of relative 
stability. 
This paper is the first to use selection models for incontinence data in an attempt to correct 
for diverse sample selection.  Ideally, questionnaire design would include fistula and incontinence 
measures for all women regardless of their specific knowledge surrounding the condition or their 
birth history; a new survey module designed to ameliorate these shortcomings is now being used in 
the DHS.  Predictions for Rwanda suggest that the selection bias is in the hypothesized direction (only 
selecting women with a live birth may underestimate the occurrence of incontinence since it leaves 
out those with stillbirths).  For example, among those women who have had a live birth in the past 
five years, the predicted probability of incontinence is 1.5 percent, while among those who have not 
had a live birth (the excluded sample), the predicted probability is 3.8 percent (conditional probability 
is 2.88 percent).  Therefore, the sample selection in Rwanda which collects information for only a 
sub-sample leads to an underestimate of the total incontinence burden.  However, predictions in 
Ethiopia do not follow the expected direction, where women who have heard of fistula and who have 
not report approximately the same levels of incontinence.  Although the inverse Mills ratios on 
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selection models were significant for both Rwanda and Ethiopia, the level is low (10 percent).  
Furthermore, the relationships between SV, FGC and incontinence do not change in significance or 
magnitude when run without sample selection.  Therefore, the use of sample selection in the DHS 
incontinence data must be acknowledged and is important for predicted prevalence levels, however, it 
is unclear if selection models significantly change results when examining associations. 
There are several limitations worth mentioning.  First, measures of SV, FGC and 
incontinence are self-reported.  This poses less of a challenge in the cases of SV and FGC, as both 
indicators are assumed to be an under-report of the true prevalence and thus any significant 
associations are lower bounds.  However, it is unclear what direction the bias is expected to be in the 
case of incontinence itself.  There have been several studies comparing women’s self-reports and 
medical diagnoses of reproductive morbidities which call for caution and attention to the specificity 
of questions which may vary by the severity of complication and recall time (Ronsmans, 1996; Filippi 
et al., 2000; Bhatia & Cleland, 2000).  Reporting may deviate from medical diagnoses and be 
influenced by a variety of factors including language and wording, place and timing of the interview, 
the interviewer themselves, in addition to the woman’s knowledge and willingness to disclose about a 
sensitive and shameful subject.  Since the validity of the survey instrument included in the DHS has 
not been directly tested, it is necessary to note that the measure used in this analysis is a proxy for 
fistula and is representative of woman who believe and are willing to report symptoms of 
incontinence (see Johnson, 2007 for further discussion of fistula measurement in DHS).  As many 
control variables which are believed to be associated with fistula remain insignificant across countries 
in this analysis, it is important to acknowledge this limitation.  Apart from measurement error, there 
are several other considerations in approximating findings to a population-level.  Since measures of 
incontinence, SV and FGC may be relevant for age groups less than 15 years old and over 49, but 
may differ from the sampled populations, associations cannot be taken to represent the women of all 
ages.  Perhaps some of the most extreme violations of human rights involving traumatic fistula that 
have been documented include brutal rape of infants and young children; this population is, however, 
   
 100
necessarily excluded from analysis (Nduati & Muita, 1992; ACQUIRE, 2006).  In addition, since it is 
thought that many women experiencing incontinence are ostracized from their communities, it is 
possible the sampling methodology of a household survey captures women with incontinence who are 
the ‘best off,’ while those less fortunate may be living on the streets or perhaps in group quarters.  
However, this limitation, like those mentioned above is expected to result in an underestimation of the 
true magnitude and association between SV, FGC and incontinence and thus result in findings which 
are a lower bound of the true associations.  
Conclusion and policy implications 
Evidence surrounding the extent and nature of traumatic fistula is a growing interest among 
health professionals and human rights advocates.  This paper is a first effort to explore the 
associations between SV, FGC and a proxy measure of incontinence using cross-country population-
level data from sub-Saharan Africa.  Results indicate that overall, SV is significantly associated with 
incontinence both from forced sexual encounters and from intimate partners is associated with 
incontinence in Malawi and Rwanda.  There is no evidence that FGC contributes to the prevalence of 
incontinence and this finding is robust to types of cutting and among samples of women who have 
given birth.  However, this result does not preclude the possibility that significant associations would 
be found in regions where particularly severe forms of FGC are practiced, such as parts of Nigeria 
and Sudan.  Given the scarcity of reliable population-level data on incontinence, a primary objective 
of the public health community interested in fistula research should be in developing and 
implementing more comprehensive and sensitive survey instruments in appropriate regions both for 
obstetric and traumatic fistula (Stanton, Holtz & Ahmed 2007; Johnson & Peterman 2008).  In 
addition, further research on program implementation especially on reintegration of women back into 
communities and qualitative explorations of how women view the relationship between SV, FGC and 
incontinence in select conflict areas are necessary next steps. 
Findings point to the importance of recognizing SV as a risk factor for incontinence and 
raising awareness surrounding how these women may be different from a fistula patient suffering 
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from obstetric related injuries.  For example, women who have experienced SV may be less likely to 
seek care because of stigma and shame in disclosing rape.  In addition, they may be more likely to 
have excess scar tissue or suffer from rectovaginal fistulae as compared to vesicovaginal fistulae 
typical of women who experience obstetric complications (ACQUIRE 2006; Muleta & Williams 
1999).  In especially brutal cases of sexual torture, women may have to undergo several surgeries due 
to deep internal wounds or reconstruct entire organs due to deep internal wounds.  Second, it is 
important to reinforce programs which seek to integrate services to serve women experiencing both 
SV and fistula, including both short term (emergency contraceptives, STI/HIV and pregnancy tests) 
and long term (HIV and STI treatment, social reintegration, legal referral and counseling) services.  
Several organizations in areas with particularly high demand have already rolled out integrated 
programs.  For example, HEAL Africa Hospital fistula program based in Goma, DRC and the 
General Referral Hospital of Panzi based in Bukavu, DRC provide medical, surgical, psychological 
and reintegration programs to women suffering from traumatic fistula.78  Finally, programs to prevent 
the perpetration of SV both in domestic and conflict situations are a key intervention for reducing 
women’s risk of experiencing traumatic fistula. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
78 The HEAL program was formerly called Doctor’s on Call for Services (DOCS).  For more information see 
www.healafrica.org and panzihospitalbakavu.org.  
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Tables 
 
Table 4.1: Summary statistics on incontinence
Malawi Rwanda Uganda Ethiopia
(2004) (2005) (2006) (2005)
Incontinence indicators N = 11,698 N = 5,386 N = 8,524 N = 3,907
Mean (%) 4.69 3.30 2.64 3.41
Confidence interval (95 percent) (4.25 - 5.13) (2.78 - 3.81) (2.25 - 3.04) (2.60 - 4.22)
Lifetime prevalence (per 1,000 births)¹ 16.40 8.33 5.92 10.43
Regional variation (p-value) 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.017
Note: Mean values are weighted according sampling units provided in the DHS.
¹ Calculated by dividing the sum of all fistula reports by the sum of all live births.  
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Table 4.2: Weighted mean values for sexual violence and female genital cutting
Malawi Rwanda Uganda Ethiopia
(2004) (2005) (2006) (2005)
Sexual violence indicators (in percentages) ¹ N = 11,698 N = 11,321 N = 8,524 N = 14,066
     Intimate partner sexual violence (=1) 13.04 11.62 25.09 ---
     Other forced sex (=1) 27.42 17.18 22.76 ---
     Composite measure (=1)² 37.84 36.41 42.31 ---
     Regional variation in intimate partner sexual violence (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 ---
     Regional variation in forced sex (p-value) 0.598 0.000 0.029 ---
Female genital cutting indicators:
     Least severe form (nicked, no skin removed =1) --- --- --- 69.72
     Most severe form (partially or all sewn shut =1) --- --- --- 4.53
     Any form (=1) --- --- 0.64 74.26
Note: Mean values are weighted according sampling units provided in the DHS.
¹ Mean values reflect prevalence extended to the full sample.  For wording of questions and selection
percentages by country see Table C2 in the Appendix.
² Composite value is the intersection of 'intimate partner sexual violence' and 'other forced sex' with missing
values treated the same as above.
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Table 4.3: Weighted mean values of control, mediating and excluded variables by country
Malawi Rwanda Uganda Ethiopia
Age: (11,698) (11,321) (8,524) (14,070)
Age 15-19 years (omitted) 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.23
Age 20-29 years (=1) 0.43 0.36 0.37 0.36
Age 30-39 years (=1) 0.22 0.23 0.25 0.24
Age 40-49 years (=1) 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.17
Formal education:
None (omitted) 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.66
Primary only (=1) 0.62 0.68 0.59 0.22
Secondary and above (=1) 0.15 0.10 0.21 0.12
Wealth:
Bottom decile of wealth index (omitted) 0.17 0.21 0.18 0.17
Second decile of wealth index (=1) 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.19
Third decile of wealth index (=1) 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19
Fourth decile of wealth index (=1) 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.19
Fifth decile of wealth index (=1) 0.23 0.21 0.25 0.25
Other individual characteristics:
Ever had still birth (=1) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01
Bottom decile of height distribution (=1) 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.10
Missing height information (=1) 0.07 0.50 0.66 0.52
Missing birth information (=1) 0.21 0.37 0.24 0.31
Community-level variables:
Urban (=1) 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.18
Limited access to health care (=1)¹ 0.61 0.40 0.54 0.68
Mediating variables
Skilled at last birth (=1) 0.56 0.40 0.45 0.16
Delivery at health facility last birth (=1) 0.58 0.30 0.45 0.09
Participation equation exclusions:
Ever terminate a pregnancy (=1) --- 0.13 --- ---
Ever use contraceptive method (=1) --- 0.21 --- ---
Reads magazine or newspaper more than once a week (=1) --- --- --- 0.01
Heard of sexually transmitted disease (=1) --- --- --- 0.90
Heard of tonsillectomy (=1) --- --- --- 0.84
Knows ways to avoid HIV infection (=1) --- --- --- 0.61
Note: Mean values are weighted according sampling units provided in the DHS.
¹ Community mean of self-report if accessing health care is a big problem.  
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Table 4.4: Summary of sexual violence and female genital cutting coefficients predicting incontinence 
                  by country
Composite indicators Specific indicators
(A) (B) (A1) (A2) (B1) (B2)
SV FGC Intimate Other FGC least FGC sewn
Country partner SV forced sex invasive shut
Malawi (N = 11,698) 1.667*** --- 1.654*** 1.428*** --- ---
(1.379 - 2.017) (1.298 - 2.106) (1.161 - 1.757)
Rwanda (N = 5,386) 3.778*** --- 2.375*** 2.453*** --- ---
(2.292 - 6.389) (1.294 - 4.361) (1.411 - 4.264)
Uganda (N = 8,524) 1.404 --- 1.008 1.500 --- ---
(0.746 - 2.641) (0.494 - 2.057) (0.772 - 2.916)
Ethiopia (N = 3,907) --- 0.819 --- --- 0.854 0.369
(-0.299-0.137) (0.520 - 1.401)(0.079 - 1.737)
Note: Coefficients are reported as odds ratios, 95 percent confidence intervals are reported below in ( )'s.  
Standard errors (not reported) are clustered at the PSU level. Composite and specific measures are taken
from separate regressions by country.  For full regressions using composite measures see Appendix Table
C3; regressions using specific measures see Appendix Table B4. Rwanda and Ethiopia are second stage
equations of Heckman selection models; for full first stage regressions see Appendix Table C7.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 4.5: Simulations of predicted incontinence prevalence rates eliminating sources of trauma
Malawi Rwanda Uganda Ethiopia
(N = 11,698) (N = 11,321) (N = 8,524) (N = 14,066)
Level Percent Level Percent Level Percent Level Percent
Scenario: change change change change
Current predicted prevalence 4.94 0.000 2.86 0.000 2.36 0.000 3.94 0.000
No sexual violence 4.04 -0.182 1.72 -0.400 2.06 -0.128 --- ---
No intimate partner sexual violence 4.58 -0.073 2.43 -0.107 2.35 -0.002 --- ---
No forced sex 4.42 -0.106 2.72 -0.162 2.14 -0.093 --- ---
No female genital cutting --- --- --- --- 2.37 -0.002 4.31 + 0.095
No female genital cutting, least severe form --- --- --- --- --- --- 4.38 + 0.112
No female genital cutting, most severe form --- --- --- --- --- --- 4.12 + 0.141
Note: Bold indicates simulated differences on coefficients with statistical significance at the 10 percent level
or better; Changes are percentage increases or decreases.
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APPENDIX A: CHAPTER II 
 
 
Figure J1. Location of sampling clusters in the Kagera Region, Tanzania 
 
 
 
Source: WB, 2004. 
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Figure A2: Potential pathways between WPIR and consequences of HIV/AIDS 
 
 
 
 
Source: Strickland, 2004. 
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Table A1: T-tests for attriters versus non-attriters (baseline 1991-94)
Full baseline sample
(by re-interview)
(N = 1,480)
Individual-level variables: (=0) (=1) p-value
Age splines:
Age 20 to 29 (=1) 0.34 0.27 0.047
Age 30 to 39 (=1) 0.17 0.20 0.058
Age 40 to 49 (=1) 0.08 0.16 0.000
Age 50 and over (=1) 0.05 0.09 0.001
Education:
No formal education (=1) 0.16 0.24 0.000
Secondary or above (=1) 0.10 0.03 0.000
Marital status:
Never married (=1) 0.41 0.25 0.000
Widowed or separated (=1) 0.23 0.18 0.026
Religion of HH head:
Muslim (=1) 0.16 0.13 0.089
Other Christian denominations (=1) 0.30 0.30 0.863
Ethnicity/Tribe of HH head:
Nyambo (=1) 0.09 0.15 0.001
Hangaza (=1) 0.09 0.14 0.002
Other tribe (=1) 0.17 0.13 0.081
Bottom quintile of wealth distribution (=1)¹ 0.20 0.20 0.678
Community-level variables:
Urban (=1) 0.30 0.18 0.000
Population (in 1,000's) 3.29 2.97 0.007
Bank (=1) 0.15 0.13 0.420
HHs have electricity (=1) 0.34 0.25 0.000
HHs have piped water (=1) 0.20 0.21 0.625
Public transport (=1) 0.29 0.29 0.920
District is regional capital (=1) 0.29 0.17 0.000
¹ For construction and contributions to wealth index see Table A7.  
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Table A2: Summary of panel attrition significance in baseline economic welfare 
estimations (BGLW test)
Any attrition in
follow-up
(1= yes, 0 = no)
Labor force participation and earnings (N = 1,480) Coeff SE
     Employed outside the home (last week = 1) -0.029 (0.015)**
     Working self employed (last week = 1) 0.001 (0.015)
     Earnings (log shillings) -0.246 (0.137)*
Expenditures ¹
     Total individual expenditures (log shillings) -0.044 (0.145)
     Total household expenditures (log shillings) 0.025 (0.085)
Savings
     Savings account (=1) 0.012 (0.013)
     Total individual savings (log shillings) -0.167 (0.216)
     Total household savings (log shillings) -0.128 (0.244)
Note: All models are estimated using OLS and LPMs. Clustered standard 
errors at the community level are reported in parentheses.
* indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
¹ Expenditures for clothing and medical categories are recalled for 12 months,
food expenditures are recalled on two seeks (See Table A5 for details on 
construction of dependent variables; see Table A6 for control variables).  
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Table A3: Summary statistics for community level determinants of WPIR (N = 254)
Community-level control variables: Mean SD Min Max
2004 survey round (=1) 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00
Percentage female "experts" (%) 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.67
Majority ethnic/religious groups: ¹
     Ethnic group Nyambo (=1) 0.10 0.30 0.00 1.00
     Ethnic group Hangaza (=1) 0.12 0.32 0.00 1.00
     Ethnic group Sukuma (=1) 0.05 0.21 0.00 1.00
     Religion Muslim (=1) 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00
     Religion Christian (=1) 0.03 0.17 0.00 1.00
Economic indicators:
    Urban (=1) 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
     HHs have electricity (=1) 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
     HHs have piped water (=1) 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
     Population (in 1,000's) 3.15 2.39 0.00 1.00
     Bank (=1) 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00
¹ The excluded majority ethnic group is Haya, while the excluded majority religious
group is Catholic.  
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Table A4: Descriptive statistics for Z  variables used to predict re-interview 
(Baseline, 1991-94)
Individual-level variables (N = 1,480) Mean SD Min Max
Enters all four baseline rounds (=1) 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Community-level illness related adult death rate¹ 0.64 0.16 0.14 0.94
Community-level variables:
Price per tablet of paracet (in shillings)² 11.27 3.87 1.34 20.00
Daughter of household head (=1) 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00
¹ Death rate is for 1988, calculated among adults age 15 to 50 as part of the survey 
sample selection (enumeration round).
²  Prices are an average of values collected from two types of markets: 1) the nearest 
community market and 2) roadside shops.  In the case of community markets, three 
prices were gathered from traders at different locations in the market (WB-DRG, 2004).
Prices are deflated to 1991 to adjust for differences in survey year.  
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Table A5: Construction of economic welfare outcomes 
Labor force participation and earnings
     Employed outside the home Measured as a binary indicator for the last week.  Woman is asked if she has
worked for someone who is not a member of her household and examples are given
(employer, the government, a firm, other people).  Asked to all household members over 
the age of seven.
     Working self employed Measured as a binary indicator for the last week.  Woman is asked if she has
worked for herself or her household and examples are given (independent merchant
or fisherman, lawyer, doctor or other self-employed activity).  Asked to all household 
members over the age of seven.
     Earnings Measured in log shillings on a monthly basis, deflated to 1991.  Includes paid salary, 
gratuities and bonuses and in-kind payments for any employed work.  Asks for both 
primary and secondary jobs.
Expenditures
    Total individual expenditure Measured in log shillings bought or acquired in the last year (medical and clothing) and 
last two weeks (food consumed outside the home), deflated to 1991.  Clothing includes 
khangas and kitenges, fabric and cloth, other clothing and footwear.  
Medical includes medicine and medical services including transportation to and from 
any health center. Asked to all household members over the age of 15.
     Total household expenditure The sum of all individual-level expenditures measured in log shillings.
Savings
     Savings account Measured as a binary indicator of reporting individual-level bank savings account.
     Total individual savings Measured in log shillings deflated to 1991.  Asks the amount of personal savings in
 the following places: bank savings account, checking account, foreign currency 
account, other bank accounts, other savings at home or in other's homes.  Asked to all 
adult household members over the age of 15.
     Total household savings Measured in log shillings deflated to 1991.  Aggregation of total individual savings for 
all household members.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 119
Table A6: Distribution of control variables for economic welfare outcomes 
          Baseline
          (1991-94)
Individual-level variables: (N = 1,480)  Mean SD
Age splines:
Age 15 to 19 (=1, omitted) 0.33 0.47
Age 20 to 29 (=1) 0.30 0.46
Age 30 to 39 (=1) 0.18 0.39
Age 40 to 49 (=1) 0.12 0.32
Age 50 and over (=1) 0.07 0.26
Education:
No formal education (=1) 0.20 0.40
Complete or partial primary (=1, omitted) 0.74 0.44
Secondary or above (=1) 0.06 0.25
Marital Status:
Union (=1, omitted) 0.47 0.50
Never married (=1) 0.33 0.47
Widowed or separated (=1) 0.20 0.40
Religion of HH head:
Catholic (=1, omitted) 0.56 0.50
Muslim (=1) 0.14 0.35
Other Christian denominations (=1) 0.30 0.46
Ethnicity/tribe of HH head:
Haya (=1, omitted) 0.62 0.49
Nyambo (=1) 0.12 0.33
Hangaza (=1) 0.11 0.31
Other tribe (=1) 0.15 0.36
Bottom quintile of wealth distribution (=1)¹ 0.20 0.40
Community-level variables:
Urban (=1) 0.23 0.42
Population (in 1,000's) 3.11 2.23
Bank (=1) 0.14 0.35
HHs have electricity (=1) 0.29 0.46
HHs have piped water (=1) 0.24 0.43
Public transport (=1) 0.29 0.45
District is regional capital (=1) 0.23 0.42
Baseline passage indicators:
Passage 1 ( =1, omitted) 0.74 0.44
Passage 2 (=1) 0.10 0.30
Passage 3 (=1) 0.10 0.30
Passage 4 (=1) 0.06 0.23
Seasonal indicators for interview:
January (omitted =1) 0.14 0.35
February (=1) 0.15 0.36
March (=1) 0.11 0.32
April (=1) 0.01 0.12
May (=1) 0.04 0.19
June (=1) 0.12 0.32
July (=1) 0.03 0.17
August (=1) 0.03 0.16
September (=1) 0.04 0.20
October (=1) 0.13 0.34
November (=1) 0.15 0.35
December (=1) 0.05 0.23
¹ For construction and contributions to wealth index see Table A7.  
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Table A7: Construction of per capita wealth index
Baseline (1991 - 1994) End-line (2004)
(N = 1,480) (N = 755)
Mean Proportion Cumulative Mean Proportion Cumulative
Contributing factors: contribution contribution contribution contribution
(1)    Dwelling value (log shillings) 11.07 0.212 0.212 10.77 0.709 0.709
(2)    Land value (log shillings) 11.52 0.121 0.333 10.96 0.330 1.039
(3)    Livestock value (log shillings) 7.19 0.117 0.450 4.38 0.214 1.253
(4)    Toilet (=1) 0.94 0.087 0.536 0.94 0.040 1.293
(5)    TV (=1) 0.00 0.072 0.608 0.03 0.033 1.326
(6)    Car (=1) 0.03 0.069 0.677 0.02 0.001 1.332
(7)    Bicycle (=1) 0.33 0.065 0.742 0.39 -0.005 1.327
(8)    Refrigerator (=1) 0.01 0.059 0.801 0.00 -0.023 1.304
(9)    Stove (=1) 0.21 0.052 0.853 0.16 -0.039 1.265
(10)  Radio (=1) 0.43 0.044 0.897 0.59 -0.055 1.210
(11)  Dwelling has cement floors (=1) 0.18 0.042 0.939 0.19 -0.060 1.149
(12)  Per-capita number of rooms in dwelling 0.62 0.032 0.972 0.53 -0.065 1.084
(13)  Main light source electricity (=1) 0.04 0.029 1.000 0.06 -0.084 1.000
Note: Factors are listed in the order of their proportion of contribution to the score.
Quintile measurements are proportional to households with women entering the baseline and panel respectively.
All values are in shillings and deflated to the baseline year 1991.  
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Table A8: Regression results of baseline economic welfare estimation (1991-94)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log Log Log Log
Self Log total ind total hh Savings ind hh
Employed employed earnings expend. expend. account savings savings
High WPIR (=1) 0.002 0.075 0.054 0.461 0.300 0.018 0.691 0.420
(0.034) (0.025)*** (0.237) (0.203)** (0.156)* (0.017) (0.295)** (0.457)
Age 20 to 29 (=1) 0.038 0.048 0.431 0.084 -0.079 0.042 1.142 -0.164
(0.019)* (0.019)** (0.152)*** (0.183) (0.121) (0.014)*** (0.272)*** (0.335)
Age 30 to 39 (=1) 0.129 0.072 1.293 -0.287 -0.209 0.114 1.248 -0.611
(0.034)*** (0.022)*** (0.324)*** (0.219) (0.114)* (0.035)*** (0.348)*** (0.363)*
Age 40 to 49 (=1) 0.054 0.068 0.696 -0.235 -0.165 0.075 1.462 -0.297
(0.027)* (0.030)** (0.245)*** (0.216) (0.124) (0.027)*** (0.377)*** (0.382)
Age 50 and over (=1) 0.005 0.016 0.154 -0.815 -0.282 0.058 0.889 -0.585
(0.023) (0.031) (0.200) (0.386)** (0.236) (0.024)** (0.427)** (0.562)
No formal education (=1) 0.011 -0.025 0.098 -0.803 -0.548 -0.036 -1.318 -1.201
(0.016) (0.019) (0.147) (0.178)*** (0.116)*** (0.013)*** (0.218)*** (0.317)***
Secondary or above (=1) 0.151 -0.021 1.479 1.019 0.623 0.207 0.759 1.267
(0.043)*** (0.031) (0.362)*** (0.183)*** (0.112)*** (0.040)*** (0.365)** (0.558)**
Never married (=1) 0.042 0.039 0.443 -1.401 -0.231 -0.009 -0.510 -0.887
(0.022)* (0.017)** (0.190)** (0.236)*** (0.115)* (0.021) (0.337) (0.340)**
Widowed or separated (=1) 0.026 0.072 0.077 -0.898 -0.440 -0.015 0.657 -1.293
(0.023) (0.025)*** (0.185) (0.150)*** (0.102)*** (0.017) (0.290)** (0.313)***
Muslim (=1) -0.038 0.040 -0.284 0.004 0.063 -0.001 -0.542 -0.759
(0.020)* (0.021)* (0.175) (0.153) (0.122) (0.018) (0.291)* (0.513)
Other Christian denominations (=1) -0.022 0.002 -0.121 -0.163 -0.195 0.006 -0.131 -0.100
(0.021) (0.017) (0.171) (0.146) (0.108)* (0.014) (0.238) (0.315)
Mnyambo (=1) -0.035 0.002 -0.213 -0.050 0.059 0.010 0.284 0.651
(0.030) (0.030) (0.249) (0.213) (0.167) (0.028) (0.287) (0.675)
Mhangaza (=1) -0.056 0.027 -0.412 -0.280 -0.430 -0.007 -0.517 0.045
(0.029)* (0.020) (0.217)* (0.198) (0.200)** (0.020) (0.326) (0.511)
Other tribe (=1) 0.011 0.024 0.047 -0.118 -0.153 -0.042 -0.693 -0.537
(0.037) (0.021) (0.276) (0.308) (0.196) (0.014)*** (0.313)** (0.501)
Bottom quintile of wealth (=1) 0.059 -0.030 0.418 -0.634 -1.121 -0.028 -0.582 -2.985
(0.024)** (0.014)** (0.181)** (0.192)*** (0.134)*** (0.008)*** (0.225)** (0.364)***
Constant -0.010 -0.071 -0.351 8.707 10.125 -0.029 2.159 7.609
(0.031) (0.034)** (0.239) (0.258)*** (0.215)*** (0.025) (0.423)*** (0.545)***
F-test for community controls (χ²) 0.041 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.011 0.001
F-test for seasonal controls (χ²) 0.085 0.131 0.086 0.048 0.001 0.729 0.108 0.105
F-test for passage controls (χ²) 0.242 0.241 0.241 0.270 0.007 0.010 0.766 0.013
R² 0.089 0.082 0.112 0.1543 0.3063 0.141 0.121 0.207
Note: All models are estimated using LPM and OLS models.  Standard errors clustered at the community level are reported
in parentheses.  Also included but not reported are community-level controls found in Table A6 (urban, population, bank
HHs have electricity, HHs have piped water, public transport, district is regional capital), seasonal controls and baseline
passage controls).
* indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table A9. Panel fixed effects regression results of economic welfare estimation 
                 (1991-94 to 2004)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log Log
Self Log total ind total hh
Employed employed earnings expend expend
High WPIR (=1) -0.004 0.066* 0.029 0.048 0.219
(0.04) (0.04) (0.26) (0.24) (0.29)
Age 20 to 29 (=1) 0.022 0.096* 0.243 0.318 -0.326
(0.05) (0.05) (0.37) (0.38) (0.35)
Age 30 to 39 (=1) 0.082 0.129* 0.627 -0.567 -0.787*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.49) (0.47) (0.45)
Age 40 to 49 (=1) 0.101 0.156* 0.825 -0.645 -0.997
(0.10) (0.08) (0.72) (0.66) (0.69)
Age 50 and over (=1) 0.110 0.114 0.674 -0.948 -1.159
(0.12) (0.10) (0.89) (0.89) (0.94)
No formal education (=1) 0.005 -0.019 0.010 -0.719 -0.442
(0.04) (0.04) (0.30) (0.47) (0.30)
Secondary or above (=1) 0.122 0.079 1.735 0.423 0.076
(0.16) (0.11) (1.07) (0.67) (0.36)
Never married (=1) 0.043 0.030 0.292 -1.055** -0.648**
(0.06) (0.04) (0.46) (0.40) (0.26)
Widowed or separated (=1) -0.004 0.053 0.133 -0.865** 0.045
(0.05) (0.06) (0.42) (0.43) (0.38)
Bottom quintile of wealth (=1) 0.036 -0.030 0.317 -0.182 -0.883***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.35) (0.31) (0.33)
Constant 0.039 -0.051 0.377 8.552*** 10.389***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.62) (0.54) (0.71)
F-test for community controls (χ²) 0.280 0.979 0.463 0.609 0.929
F-test for seasonal controls (χ²) 0.750 0.781 0.790 0.696 0.425
R² (within) 0.051 0.088 0.062 0.113 0.099
Note: Columns 1 and 2 are estimated using a fixed effects linear probability model, the 
remaining use OLS; Standard errors clustered at the community level are reported in 
parentheses.  Also included but not reported are time variant community-level controls
found in Table A6 (population, bank, HHs have electricity, HHs have piped water, public 
transport) and seasonal controls.  
* indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table A10. Inverse probability weighting (IPW) fixed effects regression results of economic
welfare estimation (1991-94 to 2004)
(1) (2) (3) (5) (6)
Log Log
Self Log total ind total hh
Employed employed earnings expend expend
High WPIR (=1) 0.153 -0.144 1.336 -0.323 -0.468
(0.065)** (0.099) (0.576)** (0.490) (0.527)
Age 20 to 29 (=1) -0.214 -0.048 -2.180 -0.391 -1.058
(0.077)*** (0.100) (0.718)*** (0.499) (0.478)**
Age 30 to 39 (=1) -0.084 0.004 -1.193 -0.943 -1.396
(0.092) (0.102) (0.801) (0.553)* (0.808)*
Age 40 to 49 (=1) -0.057 0.111 -0.837 -0.305 -0.445
(0.118) (0.092) (1.020) (0.877) (0.951)
Age 50 and over (=1) -0.060 0.160 -1.096 -0.492 -0.088
(0.148) (0.110) (1.351) (1.203) (1.429)
No formal education (=1) -0.020 0.030 -0.164 -0.570 -0.740
(0.048) (0.074) (0.394) (0.672) (0.643)
Secondary or above (=1) -0.187 0.284 -2.209 -1.293 -1.315
(0.181) (0.188) (1.508) (0.715)* (0.663)*
Never married (=1) -0.007 0.009 0.352 -2.590 -2.478
(0.136) (0.109) (1.018) (0.523)*** (0.603)***
Widowed or separated (=1) -0.071 -0.049 -0.814 -2.967 -2.910
(0.079) (0.075) (0.619) (0.472)*** (0.414)***
Bottom quintile of wealth (=1) 0.024 0.037 0.263 -0.564 -0.925
(0.057) (0.075) (0.407) (0.414) (0.513)*
Constant 0.293 0.290 2.810 17.018 20.548
(0.128)** (0.139)** (1.015)*** (0.709)*** (0.949)***
F-test for community controls (χ²) 0.746 0.672 0.754 0.017 0.001
F-test for seasonal controls (χ²) 0.203 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
R² (within) 0.363 0.953 0.439 0.981 0.975
Note: All models are estimated using a fixed effects OLS and LPM.  Standard errors
clustered at the community level are reported in parentheses.  Also included but not
reported are time variant community-level controls found in Table A6 (population, bank,
HHs have electricity, HHs have piped water, public transport) and seasonal controls.
* indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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APPENDIX B: CHAPTER III 
 
 
Table B1: Construction of economic welfare outcomes 
Labor force participation and earnings
Employed outside the home Measured as a binary indicator for the last week.  Woman is asked if she has
worked for someone who is not a member of her household and examples are
given (employer, the government, a firm, other people).  Asked to all household 
members over the age of seven.
Working self employed Measured as a binary indicator for the last week.  Woman is asked if she has
worked for herself or her household and examples are given (independent 
or fisherman, lawyer, doctor or other self-employed activity).  Asked to all 
household members over the age of seven.
Earnings Measured in log shillings on a monthly basis, deflated to 1991.  Includes paid 
salary, gratuities and bonuses and in-kind payments for any employed work.  
Asks for both primary and secondary jobs.
Savings
Savings account Measured as a binary indicator of reporting individual bank savings account.  
Asked to all adult household members over the age of 15.
Total individual savings Measured in log shillings deflated to 1991.  Asks the amount of personal savings 
in the following places: bank savings account, checking account,
foreign currency account, other bank accounts, other savings at home or in 
other's homes.  Asked to all adult household members over the age of 15.
Any savings Measured as a binary indicator of any total individual savings reported.
Participates in informal credit group   Measured as a binary indicator of reporting current participation in a local credit 
group (bujunis ).  Asked to all adult household members of the age of 15.
Expenditures
Total individual expenditure Measured in log shillings bought or acquired in the last year (medical and 
clothing) and last two weeks (food consumed outside the home), deflated to 
1991.  Clothing includes khangas and kitenges, fabric and cloth, other clothing 
and footwear.  
Medical includes medicine and medical services including transportation to and 
from any health center. Asked to all household members over the age of 15.
Any expenditures Measured as a binary indicator of any total individual expenditures reported.
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Table B2: Distribution of control variables used in prediction of economic welfare outcomes 
         Pooled         Wave 1         Wave 4
       (1991-94)        (1991-94)           (1994)
      (N = 3,781)        (N = 956)        (N = 825)
Individual-level variables: (N = 1,480) Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Age 27.19 [9.88] 27.12 [9.78] 27.53 [9.94]
Age² 837.05 [595.83] 831.16 [585.63] 856.69 [602.71]
Education:
No formal education (=1, omitted) 0.05 [0.22] 0.19 [0.39] 0.00 [0.05]
Partial/completed primary (=1) 0.77 [0.42] 0.75 [0.44] 0.81 [0.40]
Secondary or above (=1) 0.06 [0.24] 0.06 [0.23] 0.06 [0.24]
Marital status:
Union (=1, omitted) 0.47 [0.50] 0.48 [0.50] 0.46 [0.50]
Never married (=1) 0.35 [0.48] 0.34 [0.47] 0.36 [0.50]
Widowed or separated (=1) 0.19 [0.39] 0.18 [0.39] 0.18 [0.39]
Religion of HH head:
Catholic or Christian (=1, omitted) 0.87 [0.34] 0.86 [0.35] 0.87 [0.34]
Muslim (=1) 0.13 [0.34] 0.14 [0.35] 0.13 [0.34]
Ethnicity/tribe of HH head:
Haya (=1, omitted) 0.63 [0.48] 0.61 [0.49] 0.62 [0.48]
Nyambo (=1) 0.13 [0.34] 0.13 [0.34] 0.13 [0.34]
Hangaza (=1) 0.12 [0.32] 0.12 [0.32] 0.12 [0.32]
Other tribe (=1) 0.13 [0.34] 0.14 [0.35] 0.12 [0.33]
Bottom 40% wealth distribution¹ 0.40 [0.49] 0.39 [0.49] 0.40 [0.49]
Community-level variables:
Urban (=1) 0.21 [0.41] 0.22 [0.41] 0.21 [0.41]
Population (in 1,000's) 3.44 [2.95] 2.88 [1.66] 3.97 [3.98]
Bank (=1) 0.12 [0.33] 0.13 [0.33] 0.12 [0.32]
Daily market in community (=1) 0.62 [0.48] 0.41 [0.49] 0.78 [0.42]
HHs have electricity (=1) 0.29 [0.45] 0.28 [0.45] 0.29 [0.45]
HHs have piped water (=1) 0.23 [0.42] 0.23 [0.42] 0.23 [0.42]
Note: Also included as control variables are wave indicators and seasonal indicators. 
¹ For construction and contributions to wealth index see Appendix Table B3.  
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Table B3: Construction of wave 1 household per capita wealth index
Mean SD Proportion Cumulative
Contributing factors contribution contribution
(1)    Dwelling value (log shillings) 11.08 [1.59] 0.211 0.211
(2)    Land value (log shillings) 11.37 [3.34] 0.128 0.339
(3)    Livestock value (log shillings) 6.54 [4.49] 0.123 0.462
(4)    Toilet (=1) 0.94 [0.24] 0.093 0.554
(5)    TV (=1) 0.00 [0.06] 0.088 0.641
(6)    Car (=1) 0.02 [0.14] 0.076 0.718
(7)    Bicycle (=1) 0.34 [0.47] 0.069 0.786
(8)    Refrigerator (=1) 0.01 [0.10] 0.056 0.842
(9)    Radio (=1) 0.41 [0.49] 0.048 0.890
(10)  Dwelling has cement floors (=1) 0.17 [0.37] 0.046 0.937
(11)  Per-capita number of rooms in dwelling 0.67 [0.42] 0.033 0.969
(12)  Main light source electricity (=1) 0.03 [0.18] 0.031 1.000
Note: Factors are listed in the order of their proportion of contribution to the score.
All values are in shillings and deflated to the baseline year 1991.  
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Table B4: Full regressions of pooled cross-sections models predicting economic welfare outcomes (N = 3,781)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Empld Self-empld Log Savings Any Log total Credit Any Log
Determinants last week last week earnings account savings savings group par exp total exp
Contraceptive use (=1) 0.050** 0.024 0.509** 0.046** 0.105*** 0.943*** 0.045* 0.036** 0.650***
(0.025) (0.019) (0.233) (0.018) (0.023) (0.181) (0.023) (0.014) (0.145)
Age (years) 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.273*** 0.023*** 0.064*** 0.543*** 0.025*** 0.006 0.116**
(0.005) (0.006) (0.050) (0.006) (0.010) (0.076) (0.007) (0.005) (0.046)
Age² (years) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.004*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.008*** -0.000** 0.000 -0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Partial/completed primary (=1) -0.022* 0.056*** -0.108 0.038*** 0.212*** 1.588*** 0.042* 0.039* 0.794***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.084) (0.010) (0.022) (0.162) (0.024) (0.020) (0.185)
Secondary or above (=1) 0.073* 0.035 1.061*** 0.201*** 0.237*** 2.308*** -0.043 0.079** 1.829***
(0.043) (0.036) (0.389) (0.036) (0.040) (0.346) (0.032) (0.032) (0.304)
Never married (=1) 0.071*** 0.036* 0.628*** 0.021 0.030 0.300 -0.139*** -0.071*** -1.048***
(0.019) (0.020) (0.167) (0.019) (0.041) (0.289) (0.029) (0.018) (0.190)
Widowed or separated (=1) 0.011 0.063*** 0.024 -0.021 0.124*** 0.882*** -0.027 -0.052*** -0.641***
(0.020) (0.023) (0.153) (0.015) (0.031) (0.248) (0.032) (0.016) (0.186)
Muslim (=1) -0.029* 0.046* -0.225 -0.013 -0.013 0.047 0.028 -0.006 0.053
(0.017) (0.026) (0.180) (0.017) (0.034) (0.262) (0.023) (0.018) (0.185)
Nyambo (=1) -0.055*** -0.007 -0.410** 0.005 0.021 0.097 -0.199*** -0.003 -0.126
(0.018) (0.033) (0.158) (0.027) (0.028) (0.245) (0.040) (0.023) (0.285)
Hangaza (=1) -0.031 -0.019 -0.178 -0.001 -0.141*** -0.844*** -0.288*** 0.01 0.271
(0.022) (0.023) (0.192) (0.017) (0.024) (0.193) (0.031) (0.021) (0.231)
Other tribe (=1) -0.019 0.059** -0.132 0.004 -0.045 -0.166 -0.203*** -0.018 -0.145
(0.024) (0.028) (0.200) (0.014) (0.043) (0.339) (0.044) (0.022) (0.317)
Bottom 40% wealth (=1) 0.042*** -0.031** 0.225** -0.031*** -0.066*** -0.714*** -0.012 -0.042*** -0.717***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.101) (0.010) (0.018) (0.135) (0.019) (0.013) (0.144)
Urban (=1) 0.023 0.042 0.383* 0.066** 0.081** 0.916*** -0.042 0.021 0.628***
(0.022) (0.027) (0.224) (0.026) (0.039) (0.295) (0.041) (0.022) (0.226)
Constant -0.384*** -0.400*** -3.934*** -0.380*** -0.733*** -6.928*** -0.095 0.890*** 6.214***
(0.076) (0.095) (0.808) (0.104) (0.161) (1.266) (0.114) (0.073) (0.681)
F-test seasonal cont. (F-prob) 0.113 0.142 0.214 0.354 0.312 0.369 0.193 0.080 0.274
F-test community cont. (F-prob) 0.319 0.000 0.105 0.001 0.056 0.002 0.380 0.000 0.009
R² 0.062 0.072 0.089 0.157 0.178 0.136 0.193 0.046 0.099
Note: Columns 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 are binary outcomes and estimated with LPMs.  Standard errors clustered at the community
level are reported below in ( ).  Omitted are married, no schooling, Catholic/Christian religion and Haya ethnic group. 
Also included as control variables but not reported are community-level indicators (daily market, population, bank, HHs have
electricity, HHs have piped water), wave indicators and seasonal indicators.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table B5: Full regressions of pooled cross-sectional instrumental variable models predicting economic welfare outcomes 
                 (N = 3,781)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Empld Self-empld Log Savings Any Log total Credit Any Log
Determinants last week last week earnings account savings savings group par exp total exp
Contraceptive use (=1) 0.022 0.024 0.778 -0.211 0.126 1.611 0.156 -1.219 -0.216
(0.170) (0.154) (1.480) (0.142) (0.290) (2.092) (0.241) (1.880) (0.205)
Age (years) 0.029*** 0.023*** 0.263*** 0.032*** 0.064*** 0.519*** 0.021** 0.180** 0.014*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.064) (0.006) (0.012) (0.087) (0.010) (0.080) (0.008)
Age² (years) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.004*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.007*** 0.000 -0.003** -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Partial/completed primary (=1) -0.021 0.056*** -0.122 0.051*** 0.211*** 1.553*** 0.036* 0.893*** 0.052***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.121) (0.009) (0.027) (0.187) (0.021) (0.169) (0.019)
Secondary or above (=1) 0.078* 0.035 1.015*** 0.245*** 0.233*** 2.193*** -0.062 2.146*** 0.122***
(0.040) (0.036) (0.360) (0.037) (0.061) (0.452) (0.048) (0.394) (0.044)
Never married (=1) 0.071*** 0.036** 0.627*** 0.022* 0.030 0.299 -0.139*** -1.041*** -0.070***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.137) (0.013) (0.026) (0.192) (0.018) (0.154) (0.016)
Widowed or separated (=1) 0.012 0.063*** 0.011 -0.009 0.123*** 0.851*** -0.032 -0.552*** -0.040**
(0.015) (0.017) (0.127) (0.013) (0.026) (0.192) (0.023) (0.155) (0.017)
Muslim (=1) -0.029** 0.046*** -0.223** -0.016 -0.013 0.054 0.029 0.033 -0.009
(0.012) (0.016) (0.102) (0.010) (0.023) (0.171) (0.019) (0.139) (0.015)
Nyambo (=1) -0.055*** -0.007 -0.411*** 0.004 0.021 0.095 -0.198*** -0.135 -0.004
(0.012) (0.016) (0.103) (0.013) (0.029) (0.205) (0.021) (0.176) (0.018)
Hangaza (=1) -0.031** -0.019 -0.173 -0.005 -0.140*** -0.831*** -0.286*** 0.241 0.006
(0.015) (0.015) (0.127) (0.010) (0.028) (0.196) (0.018) (0.179) (0.020)
Other tribe (=1) -0.019 0.059*** -0.140 0.008 -0.046* -0.184 -0.205*** -0.118 -0.014
(0.016) (0.019) (0.124) (0.011) (0.028) (0.201) (0.022) (0.175) (0.021)
Bottom 40% wealth (=1) 0.041*** -0.031*** 0.233*** -0.037*** -0.065*** -0.696*** -0.009 -0.763*** -0.048***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.083) (0.008) (0.018) (0.128) (0.014) (0.112) (0.012)
Urban (=1) 0.023 0.041** 0.363*** 0.076*** 0.078*** 0.872*** -0.048** 0.692*** 0.031
(0.015) (0.017) (0.124) (0.012) (0.027) (0.200) (0.023) (0.180) (0.019)
Constant -0.397*** -0.400*** -3.811*** -0.495*** -0.723*** -6.622*** -0.034 5.381*** 0.778***
(0.106) (0.094) (0.908) (0.087) (0.168) (1.221) (0.045) (1.095) (0.114)
Exclusion restrictions (F-prob) 0.030 0.339 0.002 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.019 0.228 0.245
Exclusion restrictions (F-stat) 2.250 1.160 3.360 7.350 1.640 4.640 2.430 1.360 1.320
F-test seasonal cont. (F-prob) 0.098 0.142 0.236 0.311 0.330 0.408 0.193 0.094 0.277
F-test community cont (F-prob) 0.600 0.000 0.382 0.001 0.088 0.002 0.414 0.000 0.005
R² 0.058 0.072 0.084 0.153 0.132 0.172 0.192 0.045 0.095
Note: Columns 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 are binary outcomes and estimated with LPMs.  Bootstrapped standard errors with 1,000 
replications are clustered at the community level and are reported below in ( ).  Omitted are married, no schooling, Catholic/
Christian religion and Haya ethnic group.  Also included as control variables but not reported are community-level indicators
(daily market, population, bank, HHs have electricity, HHs have piped water), wave indicators and seasonal indicators.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table B6: Full regressions of pooled cross-sectional instrumental variable models predicting economic welfare outcomes, 
                variation 1 using non-self clustered mean as an addition to first-stage instruments (N = 3,781) .
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Empld Self-empld Log Savings Any Log total Credit Any Log
Determinants last week last week earnings account savings savings group par exp total exp
Contraceptive use (=1) 0.061 0.091 1.131 0.003 0.394* 4.184** 0.300 -0.080 0.411
(0.141) (0.137) (1.164) (0.110) (0.239) (1.723) (0.203) (0.167) (1.561)
Age (years) 0.028*** 0.021*** 0.251*** 0.025*** 0.054*** 0.430*** 0.016* 0.010 0.124*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.052) (0.005) (0.011) (0.077) (0.009) (0.007) (0.070)
Age² (years) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.004*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.006*** 0.000 0.000 -0.002**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Partial/completed primary (=1) -0.023 0.052*** -0.14 0.040*** 0.197*** 1.419*** 0.029 0.045** 0.806***
(0.015) (0.013) (0.110) (0.008) (0.026) (0.176) (0.021) (0.018) (0.162)
Secondary or above (=1) 0.072* 0.024 0.957*** 0.208*** 0.188*** 1.761*** -0.086* 0.099** 1.869***
(0.037) (0.035) (0.326) (0.034) (0.054) (0.408) (0.044) (0.039) (0.355)
Never married (=1) 0.071*** 0.036** 0.626*** 0.021 0.029 0.289 -0.140*** -0.070*** -1.047***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.136) (0.013) (0.026) (0.192) (0.018) (0.016) (0.155)
Widowed or separated (=1) 0.011 0.059*** -0.005 -0.019 0.110*** 0.731*** -0.039* -0.046*** -0.628***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.118) (0.012) (0.025) (0.183) (0.022) (0.017) (0.148)
Muslim (=1) -0.029** 0.047*** -0.219** -0.014 -0.010 0.082 0.030 -0.008 0.050
(0.012) (0.016) (0.101) (0.010) (0.023) (0.171) (0.019) (0.015) (0.138)
Nyambo (=1) -0.055*** -0.006 -0.408*** 0.005 0.023 0.111 -0.197*** -0.004 -0.129
(0.012) (0.016) (0.103) (0.013) (0.029) (0.205) (0.021) (0.018) (0.177)
Hangaza (=1) -0.031** -0.018 -0.168 -0.002 -0.136*** -0.789*** -0.283*** 0.008 0.268
(0.015) (0.015) (0.128) (0.010) (0.027) (0.194) (0.018) (0.020) (0.176)
Other tribe (=1) -0.019 0.058*** -0.145 0.004 -0.050* -0.223 -0.207*** -0.017 -0.146
(0.016) (0.019) (0.123) (0.011) (0.028) (0.197) (0.022) (0.021) (0.175)
Bottom 40% wealth quintile (=1) 0.043*** -0.029*** 0.243*** -0.032*** -0.058*** -0.628*** -0.005 -0.045*** -0.722***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.080) (0.007) (0.018) (0.126) (0.014) (0.012) (0.109)
Urban (=1) 0.022 0.039** 0.353*** 0.067*** 0.069*** 0.785*** -0.052** 0.025 0.627***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.114) (0.011) (0.026) (0.192) (0.022) (0.018) (0.174)
Constant -0.379*** -0.370*** -3.651*** -0.398*** -0.602*** -5.465*** 0.020 0.838*** 6.112***
(0.092) (0.088) (0.771) (0.076) (0.151) (1.108) (0.120) (0.102) (0.992)
Exclusion restrictions (F-prob) 0.037 0.414 0.003 0.000 0.113 0.000 0.019 0.290 0.329
Exclusion restrictions (F-stat) 2.100 1.060 3.180 6.630 1.650 4.080 2.370 1.240 1.170
F-test seasonal cont. (F-prob) 0.113 0.126 0.084 0.152 0.360 0.447 0.184 0.086 0.258
F-test community cont. (F-prob) 0.634 0.000 0.253 0.375 0.103 0.003 0.458 0.000 0.079
R² 0.058 0.072 0.335 0.000 0.132 0.173 0.192 0.044 0.944
Note: Columns 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 are binary outcomes and estimated with LPMs.  Bootstrapped standard errors with 1,000
replications are clustered at the community level and are reported below in ( ).  Omitted are married, no schooling, Catholic/
Christian religion and Haya ethnic group.  Also included as control variables but not reported are community-level indicators
(daily market, population, bank, HHs have electricity, HHs have piped water), wave indicators and seasonal indicators.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table B7: Full regressions of pooled cross-sectional instrumental variable models predicting economic welfare outcomes,
                 variation 2 using cluster fixed effects as an addition to first-stage instruments (N = 3,781) .
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Empld Self-empld Log Savings Any Log total Credit Any Log
Determinants last week last week earnings account savings savings group par exp total exp
Contraceptive use (=1) 0.082 0.037 0.896 0.024 0.239* 2.487** 0.191* 0.057 1.049
(0.077) (0.084) (0.614) (0.054) (0.134) (0.970) (0.113) (0.092) (0.870)
Age (years) 0.027*** 0.023*** 0.259*** 0.024*** 0.060*** 0.489*** 0.020*** 0.005 0.102*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.039) (0.004) (0.008) (0.059) (0.006) (0.005) (0.053)
Age² (years) -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.004*** -0.000*** -0.001*** -0.007*** -0.000* 0.000 -0.002**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Partial/completed primary (=1) -0.024* 0.055*** -0.128 0.039*** 0.205*** 1.508*** 0.034* 0.038** 0.773***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.098) (0.006) (0.023) (0.157) (0.019) (0.016) (0.145)
Secondary or above (=1) 0.068** 0.033 0.997*** 0.205*** 0.214*** 2.050*** -0.067* 0.076** 1.762***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.282) (0.030) (0.043) (0.333) (0.035) (0.030) (0.276)
Never married (=1) 0.071*** 0.036** 0.626*** 0.021 0.030 0.294 -0.140*** -0.071*** -1.049***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.136) (0.013) (0.026) (0.192) (0.018) (0.016) (0.154)
Widowed or separated (=1) 0.01 0.062*** 0.006 -0.020* 0.118*** 0.810*** -0.034 -0.053*** -0.659***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.108) (0.010) (0.023) (0.169) (0.021) (0.016) (0.140)
Muslim (=1) -0.028** 0.046*** -0.221** -0.013 -0.012 0.064 0.029 -0.006 0.058
(0.012) (0.016) (0.101) (0.010) (0.023) (0.171) (0.019) (0.015) (0.138)
Nyambo (=1) -0.055*** -0.007 -0.408*** 0.005 0.022 0.106 -0.198*** -0.003 -0.124
(0.012) (0.016) (0.103) (0.013) (0.029) (0.206) (0.021) (0.018) (0.177)
Hangaza (=1) -0.030** -0.019 -0.172 -0.001 -0.138*** -0.818*** -0.285*** 0.011 0.278
(0.015) (0.015) (0.126) (0.010) (0.027) (0.194) (0.017) (0.020) (0.174)
Other tribe (=1) -0.019 0.059*** -0.138 0.004 -0.047* -0.189 -0.205*** -0.019 -0.153
(0.016) (0.018) (0.122) (0.011) (0.028) (0.196) (0.022) (0.020) (0.173)
Bottom 40% wealth quintile (=1) 0.043*** -0.030*** 0.236*** -0.031*** -0.062*** -0.673*** -0.008 -0.042*** -0.706***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.076) (0.007) (0.017) (0.120) (0.013) (0.012) (0.104)
Urban (=1) 0.021 0.041** 0.367*** 0.066*** 0.076*** 0.861*** -0.047** 0.020 0.610***
(0.013) (0.016) (0.109) (0.011) (0.025) (0.183) (0.021) (0.018) (0.167)
Constant -0.370*** -0.394*** -3.761*** -0.389*** -0.673*** -6.238*** -0.034 0.900*** 6.394***
(0.073) (0.073) (0.614) (0.060) (0.122) (0.894) (0.030) (0.079) (0.778)
Exclusion restrictions (F-prob) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Exclusion restrictions (F-stat) 4.100 3.360 4.550 4.000 3.010 2.250 5.580 2.140 3.650
F-test seasonal cont. (F-prob) 0.129 0.118 0.268 0.374 0.397 0.499 0.161 0.076 0.294
F-test community cont. (F-prob) 0.536 0.000 0.156 0.000 0.651 0.002 0.453 0.000 0.058
R² 0.058 0.072 0.082 0.153 0.132 0.173 0.192 0.045 0.095
Note: Columns 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 are binary outcomes and estimated with LPMs.  Bootstrapped standard errors with 1,000
replications are clustered at the cluster level and are reported below in ( ).  Omitted are married, no schooling, Catholic/
Christian religion and Haya ethnic group.  Also included as control variables but not reported are community-level indicators
(daily market, population, bank, HHs have electricity, HHs have piped water), wave indicators and seasonal indicators.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table B8: Full regressions of individual-level fixed effects models predicting economic welfare outcomes 
                (N = 3,781 women years; 1,159 women)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Empld Self-empld Log Savings Any Log total Credit Any Log
Determinants last week last week earnings account savings savings group par exp total exp
Contraceptive use (=1) 0.008 0.025 0.031 0.020* 0.074** 0.571** 0.044 0.051** 0.637***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.128) (0.010) (0.034) (0.240) (0.033) (0.023) (0.226)
Age (years) 0.010 0.033* 0.098 0.013* 0.074*** 0.616*** 0.017 -0.015 0.165
(0.015) (0.017) (0.104) (0.007) (0.027) (0.194) (0.029) (0.024) (0.211)
Age² (years) 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.000* -0.001** -0.008*** 0.000 0.000 -0.003
(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Partial/completed primary (=1) -0.011 0.024 -0.188 -0.004 0.040 0.200 0.012 0.013 0.415
(0.023) (0.022) (0.171) (0.006) (0.040) (0.239) (0.034) (0.046) (0.392)
Secondary or above (=1) -0.044 -0.036 -0.301 -0.043 0.014 0.065 0.004 0.029 0.711
(0.051) (0.064) (0.328) (0.049) (0.098) (0.687) (0.091) (0.075) (0.646)
Never married (=1) -0.007 -0.058 -0.011 -0.038 -0.016 -0.184 -0.043 -0.014 -0.101
(0.049) (0.072) (0.375) (0.030) (0.096) (0.687) (0.058) (0.071) (0.689)
Widowed or separated (=1) 0.017 -0.084 -0.079 -0.039 -0.017 -0.149 -0.058 -0.042 -0.553
(0.035) (0.053) (0.285) (0.043) (0.068) (0.495) (0.063) (0.040) (0.354)
Bottom 40% wealth quintile (=1) 0.028 -0.018 0.262 0.005 0.001 -0.106 -0.013 -0.025 -0.226
(0.022) (0.021) (0.174) (0.013) (0.032) (0.216) (0.025) (0.030) (0.273)
Constant -0.019 -0.539** -0.330 -0.116 -0.717* -7.085** 0.068 1.358*** 5.701*
(0.224) (0.268) (1.560) (0.112) (0.425) (3.122) (0.417) (0.366) (3.228)
Hausman test of FE vs. RE 0.046 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
F-test seasonal cont. (F-prob) 0.568 0.120 0.852 0.290 0.606 0.623 0.152 0.165 0.300
F-test community cont. (F-prob) 0.238 0.003 0.168 0.019 0.424 0.749 0.965 0.741 0.920
R² (within) 0.013 0.025 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.014 0.02 0.021
Note: Columns 1, 2, 4, 5, 7 and 8 are binary outcomes and estimated with LPMs.  Standard errors clustered at the community
level are reported below in ( ).  Omitted variables are married and no schooling. Also included as control variables but not
reported are community-level indicators (daily market, population) and seasonal indicators.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Table B9: Summary of coefficient results of modern contraceptive use predicting
                   economic welfare outcomes (left column)
(A) (B)
Pooled Individual
  Cross-section panel FE
(N = 3,781) (N = 3,781)
Labor force participation and earnings Coeff SE Coeff SE
   Employed outside the home (last week = 1) 0.080** (0.033) 0.044 (0.029)
   Working self employed (last week = 1) 0.043 (0.028) 0.084** (0.040)
   Earnings (log shillings last month) 0.783** (0.340) 0.369* (0.199)
Savings 
   Savings account (=1) 0.036 (0.027) 0.015 (0.026)
   Any savings (=1) 0.139*** (0.033) 0.112** (0.052)
   Savings amount (log shillings) 1.208*** (0.280) 0.754** (0.379)
   Participates in informal credit group (=1) 0.083** (0.038) 0.046 (0.052)
Expenditures ¹
  Any expenditures (=1) 0.049*** (0.018) 0.075*** (0.024)
  Total expenditures (log shillings) 0.743*** (0.203) 0.759*** (0.271)
Note: All models are estimated using OLS and LPMs using same specifications as
in main models.  Standard errors clustered at the community level are reported in 
parentheses ( ).  All shilling amounts are deflated to the base year 1991.
¹ Expenditures categories are clothing, medical and food consumed outside the home.
Clothing and medical expenses are recalled on 12 months, food expenses are recalled
for two weeks.
* indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table B10: Summary of coefficient results of dual contraceptive use predicting
                   economic welfare outcomes (left column)
(A) (B)
Pooled Individual
  Cross-section panel FE
(N = 3,781) (N = 3,781)
Labor force participation and earnings Coeff SE Coeff SE
   Employed outside the home (last week = 1) 0.174** (0.071) 0.138 (0.099)
   Working self employed (last week = 1) 0.005 (0.044) 0.035 (0.060)
   Earnings (log shillings last month) 1.646*** (0.611) 0.869 (0.656)
Savings 
   Savings account (=1) 0.005 (0.035) -0.029 (0.040)
   Any savings (=1) 0.169** (0.076) 0.100 (0.094)
   Savings amount (log shillings) 1.481** (0.568) 0.436 (0.641)
   Participates in informal credit group (=1) 0.040 (0.061) -0.014 (0.071)
Expenditures ¹
  Any expenditures (=1) 0.031 (0.041) 0.066 (0.051)
  Total expenditures (log shillings) 0.922* (0.501) 0.791 (0.483)
Note: All models are estimated using OLS and LPMs using same specifications as
in main models.  Standard errors clustered at the community level are reported in 
parentheses ( ).  All shilling amounts are deflated to the base year 1991.
¹ Expenditures categories are clothing, medical and food consumed outside the home.
Clothing and medical expenses are recalled on 12 months, food expenses are recalled
for two weeks.
* indicates significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table B11: Descriptive statistics of community-level determinants 
                  of stocking contraceptive pill (N = 204)
Indicators Mean SD
  Average completed fertility (women 15 to 50) 2.95 [0.78]
  Average completed fertility (women 30 to 50) 3.74 [1.71]
Ethnic majorities
 Haya (omitted =1) 0.75 [0.44]
  Nyambo (=1) 0.10 [0.30]
  Hangaza (=1) 0.12 [0.32]
  Sukuma (=1) 0.04 [0.19]
Religious majorities
  Catholic (omitted =1) 0.90 [0.30]
  Muslim (=1) 0.02 [0.14]
  Christian/Protestant/other (=1) 0.08 [0.19]
Economic indicators
  Urban (=1) 0.22 [0.41]
  Population (1,000's) 3.19 [2.48]
  Bank (=1) 0.12 [0.32]
  Daily market (=1) 0.60 [0.49]
  HHs have electricity (=1) 0.27 [0.45]
  HHs have piped water (=1) 0.22 [0.41]
Regional indicators
  District 1 (=1) 0.10 [0.30]
  District 2 (=1) 0.33 [0.47]
  District 3 (=1) 0.16 [0.36]
  District 4 (=1) 0.08 [0.27]
  District 5 (=1) 0.12 [0.32]
  District 6 (omitted =1) 0.22 [0.41]
Passage indicators
 Passage 1 (omitted =1) 0.25 [0.43]
  Passage 2 (=1) 0.25 [0.43]
  Passage 3 (=1) 0.25 [0.43]
  Passage 4 (=1) 0.25 [0.43]  
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Table B12: Community-level determinants of nearest health facility stocks
                  contraceptive pill (N = 204)
Determinants (A) (B)
  Average fertility (women 15 to 50) --- 0.138***
--- (0.046)
  Average fertility (women 30 to 50) 0.079** ---
Ethnic majorities (omitted = Haya) (0.036) ---
  Nyambo (=1) 0.000 0.280
(0.000) (0.258)
  Hangaza (=1) 0.354 0.205
(0.247) (0.255)
  Sukuma (=1) 0.268 0.263
Religious majorities (omitted = Catholic) (0.213) (0.226)
  Muslim (=1) -0.437* -0.471**
(0.244) (0.235)
  Christian/Protestant (=1) -0.108 -0.151
Economic indicators (0.181) (0.185)
  Urban (=1) 0.216 0.133
(0.228) (0.227)
  Population (1,000's) -0.017 -0.014
(0.022) (0.022)
  Bank (=1) -0.172 -0.141
(0.155) (0.157)
  Daily market (=1) 0.043 0.048
(0.077) (0.076)
  HHs have electricity (=1) 0.160 0.142
(0.122) (0.120)
  HHs have piped water (=1) -0.140 -0.155
Regional indicators (omitted = district 6) (0.125) (0.122)
  District 1 (=1) 0.408 0.000
(0.253) (0.000)
  District 2 (=1) 0.443** 0.332
(0.220) (0.226)
  District 3 (=1) 0.482** 0.394*
(0.220) (0.221)
  District 4 (=1) 0.574** 0.406
(0.260) (0.270)
  District 5 (=1) 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant -0.236 -0.059
(0.294) (0.219)
R² 0.1449 0.1593
F-test of demographic indicators (F-prob) 0.164 0.237
F-test of economic indicators (F-prob) 0.541 0.644
F-test of regional indicators (F-prob) 0.223 0.349
Note: Coefficients are from LPMs and robust standard errors are reported 
below in parenthesis ( ); included but not reported are passage indicators.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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APPENDIX C: CHAPTER IV 
 
 
Figure C1: Pathways to fistula diagram 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Wall et al., 2001 ‘The obstetric fistula pathway: Origins and consequences.’ 
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Figure C2: Fistula module questionnaire for Malawi (2004) 
 
 
432A After this birth, did you
experience a problem such as:
Heavy bleeding?
High blood pressure?
Stroke/convulsions?
Infection/fever?
Post-partum depression/blues?
494B YES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
NO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
DON'T KNOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Sometimes a woman can have a problem, usually after a difficult 
childbirth, such that she experiences an uncontrollable leakage of 
urine or stool from her vagina.  
Have you ever experienced this problem?
3
DON'T
YES NO KNOW
3
1
1 2 3
3
2 3
31
Uncontrollable leakage of urine or 
stool from your vagina?
1 2
1 2
2
1 2
 
 
Note: Question 432A is asked only to women who had received postpartum care for a birth in the last 
five years.  Question 494B is asked to all women regardless of childbearing status. 
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Figure C3: Fistula module questionnaire for Rwanda (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Question 433A is asked only to women who report having a birth in the last five years. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  433A 
    Avez - vous jamais souffert d’une fistule obstétricale ?  
(MALADIE CARACTÉRISÉE PAR L’ÉCOULEMENT 
INCONTRÔLÉ DES URINES OU/ÉT DES SELLES DU 
VAGIN À CAUSE DE LA PERFORATION DE LA 
PAROI DU VAGIN QUI LE MET EN  
COMMUNICATION AVEC LA VESSIE ET/OU LE 
RECTUM) 
  
 
 OUI.................................................1
 NON...............................................2
 
 
            PASSER A 434 
 
  433B 
    Avez - vous recherché des soins pour ce problème ?   OUI.................................................1 NON...............................................2
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Figure C4: Fistula module questionnaire for Uganda (2006) 
 
 
 
 
Note: Question 643C is asked to all women ages 15 to 49. 
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Figure C5: Fistula module questionnaire for Ethiopia (2005) 
 
 
 
 
Note: Question 1021 is asked to all women ages 15 to 49. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1021 Have you ever heard of obstetric fistula (USE LOCAL TERM)? YES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
NO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1101
IF NO PROBE: Have you ever heard of a condition in which a 
woman  continuously leaks urine and/or faeces following 
childbirth?
1022 Have you yourself experienced obstetric fistula? YES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
NO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1024
1023 Have you ever been treated for obstetric fistula? YES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
NO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1024 Are there any (other) women in your household who suffer from YES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
obstetric fistula? NO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1101
1025 How many (other) women in your household suffer from 
obstetric fistula? NUMBER 
DON'T KNOW 98. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
   
 141
 
Table C1: Background maternal health and welfare indicators by country
Malawi Rwanda Uganda Ethiopia
Maternal health: (2004) (2005) (2006) (2005)
   Maternal Mortality Ratio (per 100,000 live births) 984 750 435 673
   Percentage births with skilled attendance 57.0 38.6 42.0 5.7 
   Total fertility rate (TFR) 6.0 6.1 6.7 5.4
   Median age at first birth (ages 24-49) 19.0 22.0 17.8 19.0
   Female life expectancy at birth (years)¹ 40.1 44.1 50.0 49.0
Gender equity:
   Ratio literate women to men (aged 15-24) 0.91 0.96 0.83 0.62
   Gender related development index (GDI) value² 0.378 0.416 0.483 0.347
   Gender related development index (GDI) rank² 132 129 117 139
Poverty:
   Per-capita Gross national Income (GNI)³ 160 230 280 160
   Per-capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP)² 570 1,250 1,490 810
Note: Unless otherwise noted, indicators are from the current DHS country reports.
¹ From UNFPA and PRB, 2005: Country Profiles for Population and Reproductive Health:  
Policy Developments and Indicators for 2005.
² UNDP, 2003. The GDI index ranges from 0.941 to 0.279; the GDI rank is out of 144 countries 
with available data; GDP is purchasing power parity as of 2001 in USD.  
³ WB, 2007. World Develop Indicators Database. Atlas method, purchasing power parity 
as of 2005 in USD.  
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Table C2: Construction of sexual violence indicators by country
Questions asked by country:
Malawi (2004) Intimate partner SV: 71 percent 
(ever married).
(QDV06A (h)): (Does/did) your (last) husband/partner ever: (i) 
physically force you to have sexual intercourse with him even when 
you did not want to?
Forced sex: 76 percent (sexually 
active).
(QDV21B): The first time you had sexual intercourse, would you say 
that you had it because you wanted to, or because you were forced to 
have it against your will?
(QDV21C): In the last 12 months, has anyone forced you to have 
sexual intercourse against your will?
Rwanda (2005) Intimate partner SV: 22 percent 
(ever married).
(Q1106A (i)): (Does/did) your (last) husband/partner ever: (i) 
physically force you to have sexual intercourse with him even when 
you did not want to?
Forced sex: 34 percent (sexually 
active).
(Q 542): The first time you had sexual intercourse, did you want to 
have sex or you were forced against your will? 
(Q 543): In the last 12 months, did someone force you to have sex 
against your will?
Uganda (2006) Intimate partner SV: 20 percent 
(ever married).
(Q1105 (h)): (Does/did) your (last) husband/partner ever do any of the 
following things to you: (h): physically force you to have sexual 
intercourse with him even when you did not want to?
Forced sex: 22 percent (sexually 
active).
(Q1121): The first time you had sexual intercourse, would you say 
that you had it because you wanted to, or because you were forced to 
have it against your will?
(Q1125): At any time in your life, as a child or as an adult, has anyone 
ever forced you in any way to have sexual intercourse or perform any 
other sexual acts?
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 143
Table C3: Logit models for determinants of incontinence by country using composite 
measures
Malawi Rwanda Uganda Ethiopia
(2004) (2005) (2006) (2005)
Determinants: N = 11698 N = 5386 N = 8524 N = 3907
Sexual violence (=1) 1.667*** 3.778*** 1.404 ---
Not selected for domestic violence module (=1) 1.087 1.943** 1.246 ---
Female genital cutting (=1) --- --- 1.207 0.819
Age 20 to 29 (=1) 0.887 1.018 1.079 1.036
Age 30 to 39 (=1) 0.856 0.523 1.211 1.244
Age 40 to 49 (=1) 0.784 0.673 1.114 2.103
Primary only (=1) 0.881 1.220 1.219 1.224
Secondary and above (=1) 0.547** 1.083 1.126 0.656
Bottom decile of height distribution (=1) 1.211 0.828 2.054** 0.207
Missing information on height (=1) 0.491** 0.840 0.960 1.076
Ever had still birth (=1) 1.729** 0.843 1.947* 0.000
Missing information on birth (=1) 0.058*** --- 0.101*** 0.365**
Second wealth quintile (=1) 1.106 1.030 0.951 0.979
Third wealth quintile (=1) 0.944 1.214 0.920 0.649
Fourth wealth quintile (=1) 0.841 1.119 0.898 1.054
Fifth wealth quintile (=1) 0.634** 1.073 0.731 0.496
Urban (=1) 0.938 0.712 0.861 1.835
Limited access to health care (=1)¹ 1.204 1.868** 1.240 1.023
Inverse Mills ratio --- 3.404* --- 0.078*
Pseudo R² 0.064 0.037 0.049 0.114
Note: Coefficients are reported as odds ratios and standard errors (not reported) are clustered 
at the PSU level. Omitted categories are age 15 to 19, less than primary education and first
wealth quintile. Rwanda and Ethiopia are second stage regressions of Heckman selection
models.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
¹ Community mean of self-report if accessing health care is a big problem.  
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Table C4: Logit models for determinants of incontinence by country using specific measures
Malawi Rwanda Uganda Ethiopia
(2004) (2005) (2006) (2005)
Determinants: N = 11698 N = 5386 N = 8524 N = 3907
Intimate partner sexual violence (=1) 1.654*** 2.375*** 1.008 ---
Other forced sex (=1) 1.428*** 2.453*** 1.500 ---
Not selected for domestic violence module (=1) 1.096 2.038*** 1.261 ---
Female genital cutting (least invasive =1) --- --- --- 0.854
Female genital cutting (sewn shut =1) --- --- --- 0.369
Female genital cutting (any =1) --- --- 1.200 ---
Age 20 to 29 (=1) 0.882 0.930 1.075 1.054
Age 30 to 39 (=1) 0.851 0.475 1.203 1.255
Age 40 to 49 (=1) 0.786 0.611 1.100 2.121
Primary only (=1) 0.873 1.213 1.215 1.221
Secondary and above (=1) 0.547** 1.115 1.127 0.682
Bottom decile of height distribution (=1) 1.213 0.809 2.047** 0.206
Missing information on height (=1) 0.496** 0.821 0.959 1.089
Ever had still birth (=1) 1.753** 0.834 1.944* 0.000
Missing information on birth (=1) 0.062*** --- 0.105*** 0.367**
Second wealth quintile (=1) 1.099 1.015 0.952 0.942
Third wealth quintile (=1) 0.942 1.210 0.921 0.631
Fourth wealth quintile (=1) 0.845 1.105 0.898 1.009
Fifth wealth quintile (=1) 0.630** 1.053 0.733 0.477
Urban (=1) 0.936 0.740 0.858 1.946
Limited access to health care (=1)¹ 1.195 1.916** 1.243 1.046
Inverse Mills ratio --- 3.454* --- 0.066*
Pseudo R² 0.065 0.039 0.049 0.116
Note: Coefficients are reported as odds ratios and standard errors (not reported) are clustered
at the PSU level. Omitted categories are age 15 to 19, less than primary education and first
wealth quintile. Rwanda and Ethiopia are second stage regressions of Heckman selection
models.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
¹ Community mean of self-report if accessing health care is a big problem.  
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Table C5: Logit models for determinants of incontinence by country using composite 
measures including mediating variable for health seeking behavior
Malawi Rwanda Uganda Ethiopia
(2004) (2005) (2006) (2005)
Determinants: N = 11698 N = 5386 N = 8524 N = 3907
Sexual violence (=1) 1.673*** 3.713*** 1.406 ---
Missing information on sexual violence (=1) 1.086 1.904** 1.251 ---
Female genital cutting (=1) --- --- 1.191 0.816
Age 20 to 29 (=1) 0.891 1.082 1.065 1.031
Age 30 to 39 (=1) 0.859 0.574 1.19 1.250
Age 40 to 49 (=1) 0.786 0.721 1.101 2.145
Primary only (=1) 0.871 1.192 1.227 1.239
Secondary and above (=1) 0.534** 1.073 1.151 0.669
Bottom decile of height distribution (=1) 1.215 0.848 2.060** 0.208
Missing information on height (=1) 0.493** 0.858 0.962 1.082
Ever had still birth (=1) 1.729** 0.871 1.978* 0.000
Missing information on birth (=1) 0.059*** --- 0.100*** 0.368**
Second wealth quintile (=1) 1.104 1.023 0.954 0.986
Third wealth quintile (=1) 0.939 1.202 0.925 0.644
Fourth wealth quintile (=1) 0.830 1.093 0.918 1.036
Fifth wealth quintile (=1) 0.622** 1.091 0.752 0.486
Urban (=1) 0.935 0.712 0.88 1.843
Limited access to health care (=1)¹ 1.256 1.831** 1.213 1.008
Skilled attendance last birth (=1)² 1.165 2.080*** 0.436 1.557
Delivered in facility last birth (=1) 0.979 0.510** 1.959 0.641
Inverse Mills ratio --- 3.067 --- 0.076
Pseudo R² 0.064 0.047 0.050 0.115
Note: Coefficients are reported as odds ratios and standard errors (not reported) are clustered
at the PSU level. Omitted categories are age 15 to 19, less than primary education and first
wealth quintile. Rwanda and Ethiopia are second stage regressions of Heckman selection
models.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
¹ Community mean of self-report if accessing health care is a big problem.
² Skilled attendance includes doctors, nurses, midwives and trained birth assistance and 
excludes traditional birth attendants.  
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Table C6: Logit models for determinants of incontinence by country using specific measures
including mediating variable for health seeking behavior
Malawi Rwanda Uganda Ethiopia
(2004) (2005) (2006) (2005)
Determinants: N = 11698 N = 5386 N = 8524 N = 3907
Intimate partner sexual violence (=1) 1.667*** 2.346*** 1.017 ---
Other forced sex (=1) 1.431*** 2.384*** 1.511 ---
Not selected for domestic violence module (=1) 1.095 2.000** 1.266 ---
Female genital cutting (least invasive =1) --- --- --- 0.851
Female genital cutting (sewn shut =1) --- --- --- 0.362
Female genital cutting (any =1) --- --- 1.182 ---
Age 20 to 29 (=1) 0.886 0.985 1.061 1.051
Age 30 to 39 (=1) 0.854 0.518 1.183 1.262
Age 40 to 49 (=1) 0.787 0.653 1.088 2.168
Primary only (=1) 0.862 1.182 1.223 1.236
Secondary and above (=1) 0.534** 1.092 1.154 0.694
Bottom decile of height distribution (=1) 1.218 0.823 2.054** 0.207
Missing information on height (=1) 0.499** 0.838 0.961 1.097
Ever had still birth (=1) 1.753** 0.856 1.975* 0.000
Missing information on birth (=1) 0.062*** --- 0.104*** 0.371**
Second wealth quintile (=1) 1.098 1.010 0.955 0.946
Third wealth quintile (=1) 0.937 1.200 0.927 0.623
Fourth wealth quintile (=1) 0.833 1.085 0.918 0.989
Fifth wealth quintile (=1) 0.617** 1.074 0.754 0.466
Urban (=1) 0.934 0.740 0.877 1.951
Limited access to health care (=1)¹ 1.250 1.866** 1.215 1.032
Skilled attendance last birth (=1)² 1.201 2.071*** 0.434 1.586
Delivered in facility last birth (=1) 0.960 0.514** 1.961 0.633
Inverse Mills ratio --- 3.132 --- 0.064*
Pseudo R² 0.066 0.044 0.050 0.117
Note: Coefficients are reported as odds ratios and standard errors (not reported) are clustered 
at the PSU level. Omitted categories are age 15 to 19, less than primary education and first
wealth quintile. Rwanda and Ethiopia are second stage regressions of Heckman selection
models.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
¹ Community mean of self-report if accessing health care is a big problem.
² Skilled attendance includes doctors, nurses, midwives and trained birth assistance and 
excludes traditional birth attendants.  
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Table C7: First stage logit models: Rwanda, live birth in last five years;
Ethiopia, ever heard of fistula.
Rwanda Ethiopia
(2005) (2005)
Instruments: N = 11321 N = 14059
Ever terminate a pregnancy (=1) 1.598***
Ever use contraceptive method (=1) 3.587***
Reads magazine or newspaper more than once a week (=1) 1.863***
Heard of sexually transmitted diseases (=1) 2.995***
Heard of tonsillectomy (=1) 2.947***
Knows ways to avoid HIV infection (=1) 2.235***
Other covariates:
Age 20 to 29 (=1) 33.416*** 1.574***
Age 30 to 39 (=1) 67.738*** 2.031***
Age 40 to 49 (=1) 11.149*** 2.609***
Primary only (=1) 0.735*** 1.692***
Secondary and above (=1) 0.433*** 5.100***
Second wealth quintile (=1) 1.017 1.258**
Third wealth quintile (=1) 1.144 1.154
Fourth wealth quintile (=1) 1.105 1.151
Fifth wealth quintile (=1) 0.837* 1.298**
Urban (=1) 0.664*** 1.711***
F-test for instrument strength (p-value) 0.000 0.000
F-statistic for instrument strength (χ²) 448 339
Exclusion F-test in second stage (p-value) 0.501 0.167
Pseudo R² 0.289 0.223
Note: Coefficients are reported as odds ratios and standard errors (not reported) are 
clustered at the PSU level. Omitted categories are age 15 to 19, less than primary 
education and first wealth quintile. 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
